Three essays on IPO, liquidity, and corporate governance by Roychoudhury, Saurav
Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports 
2006 
Three essays on IPO, liquidity, and corporate governance 
Saurav Roychoudhury 
West Virginia University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd 
Recommended Citation 
Roychoudhury, Saurav, "Three essays on IPO, liquidity, and corporate governance" (2006). Graduate 
Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports. 4262. 
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd/4262 
This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by the The Research 
Repository @ WVU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that is 
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you must obtain 
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license 
in the record and/ or on the work itself. This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in WVU Graduate Theses, 
Dissertations, and Problem Reports collection by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @ WVU. 
For more information, please contact researchrepository@mail.wvu.edu. 
  
Three Essays on IPO, Liquidity, and Corporate Governance 
Saurav Roychoudhury 
Dissertation submitted to the  
College of Business and Economics 
At West Virginia University 
In partial fulfillment of the requirements 
For the degree of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in  
Economics 
Alexei V. Egorov, Ph.D., Chair 
Ashok B. Abbott, Ph.D. 
Ronald J. Balvers, Ph.D. 
Subhayu Bandyopadhyay, Ph.D. 
Alexander Kurov, Ph.D. 
Department of Economics 
Division of Economics and Finance 
Morgantown, West Virginia 
2006 
Keywords: IPOs, Liquidity, Long Run Performance, Corporate Governance  
Copyright © 2006 Saurav Roychoudhury 
  
ABSTRACT 
Three Essays on IPO, Liquidity, and Corporate Governance 
Saurav Roychoudhury 
The first essay looks at the issue of long run performance of initial public 
offerings (IPOs). We provide a liquidity based explanation for why certain IPOs 
underperform in the long run. By separating IPOs into sub-samples based on excess 
liquidity, considered relative to benchmarks based on size, we find that IPO 
underperformance from 1993 to 2005 differs significantly based on the excess liquidity of 
an IPO. In general, positive excess liquidity portfolios tend to underperform compared to 
negative excess liquidity portfolios one to two years after the initial post IPO portfolio 
formation period. A potential explanation of the magnitude and extent of IPO 
underperformance is the liquidity profile of IPOs. More specifically, if there are more 
IPO firms characterized by positive excess liquidity in a given year, then the subsequent 
future returns could show underperformance. 
The second essay relates corporate governance to firm’s productivity growth. 
Given technological constraints, some firms are very efficient whereas others are not and 
some firms have much faster rates of innovation and productivity growth than others. Are 
these differences due to chance or are there some factors contributing to higher total 
factor productivity growth? In this paper, we find that firms with stronger shareholder 
rights have higher total productivity growth. By employing the governance index 
compiled by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), we determine that the effect of 
governance on productivity varies positively with the quality of corporate governance. 
Furthermore, this relationship is strongest among firms which have the strongest 
shareholder rights. 
The third essay serves as a connecting link between the first two essays. It looks 
at the differences in the long term performance of IPOs with strong and weak shareholder 
rights. We find that performance of IPOs is stronger for the larger firms. We also find 
that governance does play a part in how an IPO will perform in the long run. IPOs having 
stronger shareholder rights in most of our results perform better then IPOs with weak 
shareholder rights. There is also some evidence of underperformance for smaller firms 
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Set your heart upon your work, but never on its reward. Work not for a reward; but never 
cease to do your work. 







You are never given a wish without also being given the power to make it true. You may 
have to work for it, however. 
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C H A P T E R  1  
Three Essays on IPO, Liquidity, and Corporate Governance: An Introduction 
The three essays in this dissertation address two contemporary areas of research in 
finance: initial public offerings (IPOs) and corporate governance. The first essay 
addresses the issue of IPO underperformance using a liquidity approach. The second 
essay digresses to the issue of corporate governance and its relation to productivity 
growth and innovation. The third essay ties together IPOs and corporate governance by 
looking at the issue of long run performance of IPOs in the context of corporate 
governance of IPOs. 
A. The Liquidity Effect and Long Term Performance of Initial Public Offerings. 
Investors caught up in the latest fad frenzy, salivating over the next skyrocketing 
initial public offering by a hot Krispy Kreme, Fashionmall, or Priceline have learnt a hard 
lesson. By the end of 2000, roughly two thirds of all the highflying IPOs of 1999 were 
trading at or under their offer prices.  Moreover, at least 20% of IPOs debuting in 2000 
ended the year 90% or more below their first day close1F. Given no prior trading history 
and limited financial information, the opinion about a firm's subsequent performance 
ranges from "this is the next Microsoft" to "this one will not see its first birthday." While 
some IPO investors may experience outstanding long-term returns, the poor aftermarket 
performance of the average issue is widely documented by Ritter (1991) and Loughran 
and Ritter (1995), among others. If investors are doomed to lose, should they refrain from 
investing in IPOs and bring the primary markets to a grinding halt?  Is there any way for 
them to participate in these markets and still receive a return on their investment? An 
                                                 
1 According to the Securities Data Corporation (SDC). 
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exploration of the performance of IPOs finds that the tortoise seems to win more often 
than hare.  
The results show that these tortoises or hares can be proxied by their liquidity 
profile. The growing literature on liquidity and stock returns from Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986) to Acharya and Pederson (2004) suggests an inverse relationship 
between liquidity and expected stock returns. Specifically, portfolios of IPOs with 
positive and negative excess liquidity during the first year after an IPO issuance, where 
excess liquidity is defined relative to a size benchmark are constructed. Overall, IPO 
underperformance in the long run differs significantly for positive or negative excess 
liquidity IPO portfolios. In general, positive excess liquidity portfolios tend to 
underperform compared to negative excess liquidity portfolios one to two years after the 
initial post IPO portfolio formation period. A potential explanation of the magnitude and 
extent of IPO underperformance is the liquidity profile of IPOs. More specifically, if 
there are more IPO firms characterized by positive excess liquidity in a given year, then 
the subsequent future returns could show underperformance. The results have significant 
implications about the role of observed liquidity as an indicator of future returns. 
B. Corporate Innovation and Corporate Governance: A Study of US firms. 
In response to a series of failures in governance mechanisms at Enron, Worldcom, 
Adelphia and Tyco, the issue of corporate governance has gained importance in recent 
years. The magnitude of the crisis dwarfed any precedence in US corporate history by the 
sheer amount of money involved. Monks and Minow (2004), who were prompt to bring 
out the third edition of their popular book, "Corporate Governance," comment,  
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All of a sudden, everyone was interested in corporate governance. The term was 
even mentioned for the first time in the president's annual State of the Union 
address...……………….Corporate governance is now and forever will be 
properly understood as an element of  risk for investors, whose interests may 
not be protected by ineffectual or corrupt managers and directors, and risk for 
employees, communities, lenders, suppliers, and customers as well.  (pp. 17) 
 
In the span of a few years, the Securities and Exchange Commission has been busy 
enacting rules in pursuant to the famous Sarbanes-Oxley2F act of 2002. 
In finance, research was quick to follow up on the craze of corporate governance. 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) wrote a widely cited and highly influential paper 
finding that a zero investment strategy which was long on a portfolio of firms having the 
strongest shareholder rights and short on a portfolio having the weakest shareholder 
rights, yields a risk adjusted annual abnormal return of 8.5% from 1990 to 1999. They 
created a widely used broad-based index “G” (for governance, not Gompers) as a 
measure of the strength of shareholder rights. This “G” index is used as a proxy for the 
quality of governance in the analysis here to study the effect of corporate governance on 
productivity and innovation. 
A related literature with roots in the writing of Nobel Laureate Robert Solow 
explains that some 80% of the rise in output per worker in the United States over the 
preceding half-century was explained by a mysterious residual which he called the 
measure of our ignorance. This residual, or total factor productivity (TFP), is the 
difference between the rates of growth of an index of input and an index of output. The 
                                                 
2 The Act covers issues such as establishing a public company accounting oversight board, auditor 
independence, corporate responsibility and enhanced financial disclosure. It was designed to review the 
dated legislative audit requirements, and is considered one of the most significant changes to United States 
securities laws since the New Deal in the 1930s. Named after sponsors Senator Paul Sarbanes (D–Md.) and 
Representative Michael G. Oxley (R–Oh.), the Act was approved by the House by a vote of 423-3 and by 
the Senate by a vote of 97-0. 
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novel thing about TFP is that it can be applied to compare countries, industries, or even 
firms on a micro level.  
Taking the constraints of technology into account, some firms are very efficient 
whereas others are not. Additionally, some firms have much faster rates of innovation 
than others. Are these differences due to chance or are there some factors that contribute 
to higher total factor productivity growth, which may determine this difference among 
firms? Bartelsman and Doms (2000) point out that managerial ability, 
management/ownership changes, technology, human capital, and regulation are factors 
that have been discussed recently as factors influencing productivity growth. Such factors 
can substantially differentiate two firms with otherwise identical amounts of capital and 
labor in place and lead to very different levels of profits. The concept of TFP at the firm 
level is applied to isolate such factors and is named corporate innovation3F. We argue that 
the productivity difference between the firms is ultimately due to how well they innovate 
and how effectively they use available resources and technology. One of the most 
important factors that determine corporate innovation is the quality of corporate 
governance of the firm.  
More specifically, the relationship between the level of corporate governance and 
total factor productivity (TFP) growth is analyzed here. In the process, controls for most 
of the conceivable (and quantifiable) factors that may influence the level and growth of 
TFP, such as the effect of intangibles, the economies of scale effect due to asset size, and 
industry effects which result in different production technologies, are employed. The 
                                                 
3 The term “Corporate Innovation” in the context of TFP was first used by Maria Vassalou, a finance 
professor at Columbia University. Our version of corporate innovation separates other factors like industry 
specific productivity differences and economies of scale to narrow it down to managerial effectiveness. 
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results show that there is positive relationship between the quality of corporate 
governance and firm productivity, strongest among firms that have the strongest 
shareholder rights. As the governance quality becomes worse, the strength of the effect 
diminishes. 
C. IPO underperformance and Corporate Governance: An Evidence from the US Stock 
Market. 
The third essay links IPO performance and corporate governance. It analyzes the 
differences in the long term performance of IPOs with strong and weak shareholder 
rights. In this context it is important to consider the IPOs because the literature suggests 
that IPOs under perform in the long run (Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995). It 
seems that managers in IPO firms are unable to attain the goal of long term shareholder 
wealth maximization, on average. The long run underperformance of IPOs could be, 
among other things, a corporate governance issue.  
The burst of the IPO bubble in 2000 and the string of corporate scandals in the 
early years of 2000 have seen stringent corporate governance compliance requirements 
for companies filing for their public offering. In particular, private companies that 
anticipate a public stock offering will need to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley well in 
advance of the IPO filing, to ensure that auditors and investment bankers can complete 
due diligence and issue positive opinions. CEO/CFO certifications in post-IPO reports 
filed with the SEC will cover pre-IPO periods, and corporate officers will face personal 
liability if controls and reporting are non-compliant for those periods. 
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A sample of IPO firms4F shows that IPOs on average have stronger shareholder 
rights. Considering recent evidence, firms with strong shareholder rights should 
outperform the firms with weak shareholder rights (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (GIM), 
2003). The result is puzzling because IPOs are found to under perform in the long run 
and are more democratic. For both the results to be correct, it must be that the IPO firms 
from the GIM sample are not the representative IPO firms or since most IPO firms 
included in the GIM dataset are large IPO firms, the phenomenon of IPO 
underperformance may be restricted to smaller IPO firms.  Evidence suggests that IPOs 
which have G-index reported do not under perform in the long run. The results support 
both ideas. Overall, there is evidence that IPOs with strong shareholder rights perform 
better than IPOs with weak shareholder rights but the strength of this phenomenon 
depends on the sample period used.  
D. Summary 
In summary, these essays contribute to the literature of IPO performance, 
productivity, and corporate governance in several important ways. First, regarding IPO 
performance, it is shown that the liquidity profile of an IPO in the post IPO period is an 
important determinant of how an IPO performs in the long run. This result is explained 
by creating positive and negative excess liquidity portfolios based on size and turnover. 
Second, in the area of productivity, there is evidence from the US market that better 
corporate governance is positively related to stronger productivity growth of the firm.  
Third, concerning IPOs and corporate governance, IPO firms having stronger 
shareholder rights tend to perform better than firms having weaker shareholder rights. 
                                                 




The underperformance is limited to the small size category of the IPOs with more 
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C H A P T E R  2  
The Liquidity Effect and the Long Term Performance of Initial Public Offerings. 
Introduction 
Few ideas in finance have attracted more attention in recent years than Initial 
Public Offerings (IPOs). The two major issues concerning IPOs are underpricing in the 
short run and underperformance in the long run.5 This paper focuses on the long run 
performance of IPOs and provides a liquidity based explanation for why some IPOs 
underperform in the long run. 
I. Background and Motivation 
A. Long term Performance of IPOs 
Using data from 1975 to 1984, Ritter (1991) finds that the average three-year 
holding period return for IPOs (beginning with the closing price on the first trading day) 
was 34.5% whereas the average return for a sample of size matched firms was 61.9%. 
Furthermore, Welch and Ritter (2003) find that, from 1980 to 2001, an average IPO firm 
underperformed the CRSP value-weighted market index by 23.4% and underperformed 
seasoned companies with the same market capitalization and book-to-market ratio by 
5.1%.  
Although there appears to be evidence on the long run underperformance of IPOs, 
the source of this underperformance is unclear. Miller (1977) argues that short sell 
constraints and heterogeneous investor valuation are the reason for the poor performance 
of IPOs. Miller suggests that the most optimistic investors tend to buy IPOs. Then, as the 
                                                 
5 See Ljungqvist (2006) for a survey. 
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variance of opinions decreases over time, the marginal investor’s valuation will converge 
towards the mean valuation, causing the price to fall. Shiller (1990) emphasizes the 
influence of behavioral fads in the market leading to long run IPO underperformance. 
Ritter (1991) finds that younger firms and companies going public in heavy-volume years 
tend to under perform more than other firms.  Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) attribute 
some of the poor post-IPO stock performance to optimistic accounting early in the life of 
a firm, suggesting that at least a part of the poor long-run performance is because of a 
market that is overly optimistic and unable to properly forecast rough times.  
Jain and Kini (1994) and Mikkelson et al. (1997) find that the long run 
underperformance tends to be accompanied by poor operating performance. Heaton 
(2002), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Bernardo and Welch (2001) 
argue that overconfidence of managers, investors and entrepreneurs might be a reason for 
IPOs poor long run underperformance. Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) find that 
underwriter reputation is an important factor determining long run performance in IPOs. 
Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2005) suggest that the presence of a class of irrationally 
exuberant investor, coupled with short sale restrictions, leads to long run 
underperformance.  
Some recent studies have challenged the idea that IPOs under perform, arguing 
that the results could be caused by a small sample effect or by the way that 
underperformance is measured. Brav and Gompers (1997) and Brav, Geczy, and 
Gompers (2000) use different benchmarks and methods of measuring performance and 
control for the impact of venture capitalists. They report that long run underperformance 
is mainly found in small, non-venture capital backed IPOs. Moreover, they argue that 
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underperformance is not an IPO effect and that the underperformance found by Ritter 
(1991) is not unique to firms issuing equity because small, low book-to-market IPOs do 
not perform differently from small, low book-to-market non-IPO firms. Since the 
magnitude and sign of long-term abnormal returns are sensitive to alternative 
measurement methodologies, they question their existence and relevance. Loughran and 
Ritter (2000) suggest that the magnitude of abnormal returns should indeed differ because 
various methodologies use different weighting schemes, implying that they should differ 
in a predictable manner. Specifically, if there are significant misvaluations in the stock 
market, then abnormal returns should not have robust results in differing methodologies. 
They reexamine the long run performance of IPOs by implementing the Fama-French 
three-factor model with a reconstruction of size and value factors and excluding IPOs and 
SEOs. They find that new issues underperform on both a value-weighted and equal-
weighted basis (by about 4% per year) and that the underperformance is most severe in 
high-volume periods, confirming Ritter’s (1991) results.  
A potential explanation of the long run underperformance of IPOs is based on the 
endogeneity of the number of new issues. Schultz (2003) presents a pseudo-market 
timing hypothesis, suggesting that more firms issue equity at higher stock prices even 
though they cannot predict future returns. Even when ex-ante expected abnormal returns 
are zero, median ex-post underperformance for equity issuers will be significantly 
negative when calculated in the event-time. This is because issuers time their IPOs when 
the stock market is high and coincide with periods of excessive optimism such that more 
companies go public when investor sentiment is high. Subsequently, the last large group 
of IPOs would underperform and be a relatively large fraction of the sample. Due to the 
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clustering of events after periods of high abnormal returns in issues, ex post measures of 
average abnormal returns may be negative on average despite zero ex-ante abnormal 
returns. This could lead to incorrectly inferring underperformance.  
However, Dahlquist and Jong (2004) claim it is unlikely that the endogeneity of 
the number of new issues explains long run underperformance. They find that the small 
sample bias is small and negligible for typical sample sizes and counters the contention of 
Schultz’s pseudo market timing hypotheses. Similarly, Ang, et al. (2005) rejects the idea 
that a small sample effect is responsible for IPO underperformance. They also find robust 
evidence of IPOs underperforming in the long run, both in event and calendar time.  
Nevertheless, all studies that refute underperformance when measuring against a 
multifactor framework find underperformance when the cumulative average excess 
returns method or the buy-and-hold return method is used.  However, Eckbo and Norli 
(2005) show that the existence of underperformance disappears when controlling for 
differences in liquidity by including a liquidity factor in the standard multifactor Fama-
French framework with Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor. They claim that IPOs are 
more liquid than their style matched peer firms. Hence, the expected returns are lower for 
IPOs and should not under perform if correctly accounting for liquidity risk.  
B. Liquidity  
Amihud and Mendelson (1986, 1989) present the concept that more liquid firms 
have lower expected returns than other firms. They suggest this is because the more 
illiquid the stock of a firm, the more it will cost to trade. Although investors can always 
trade the stock, they may only do so by discounting the value of the stock according to its 
illiquidity. An investor will only be willing to purchase an illiquid stock if there is a 
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premium to buying the stock. Similarly, investors pay a liquidity premium when 
purchasing a highly liquid stock to ensure the ability to liquidate a position immediately. 
The liquidity hypothesis suggests that holders of less liquid stocks will demand higher 
expected returns as a result of bearing more liquidity risk. Brennan and Subrahmanyam 
(1996), Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe (1998), 
Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2001), all find a negative relationship between liquidity and 
subsequent returns. 
C. Liquidity and IPOs 
In recent years, new literature has related liquidity with IPO underpricing and 
long run performance. Booth and Chua (1996) suggest that underpricing is used to 
increase secondary market liquidity. Hahn and Ligon (2004) empirically test Booth and 
Chua’s hypotheses using different measures of liquidity and find mixed results. Ellul and 
Pagano (2006) find that expected after-market liquidity and liquidity risk are important 
determinants of IPO underpricing. The more illiquid the IPOs are expected to be and the 
less predictable their liquidity is, the larger the risk premium needed to compensate the 
investor, resulting in more under pricing by issuers.  
By constructing fully-rational symmetric information model of an IPO, Pritsker 
(2006) attempts to explain under pricing and underperformance of IPOs. He shows that, 
both anomalies can be explained by the extent to which the initial IPO shares are 
allocated to large investors. To maximize revenue and avoid unnecessary aftermarket 
sales, the underwriter distorts share allocations toward those investors who have market 
power and allocates shares at an IPO offer price that is below the trading price that will 
prevail shortly after the IPO. Investors who receive large share allocations at the IPO then 
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unwind them slowly due to market illiquidity. This results in a reduction in the supply of 
shares that are available to small price-taking investors, causing the price to be bid up and 
the return to be bid down, which then results in poor long run performance. 
D. Contribution 
Pritsker (2006) also points out a conflict between Ellul and Pagano’s (2006) 
theoretical model which suggests that IPOs are illiquid and Eckbo and Norli’s (2005) 
contention that IPOs are very liquid. Both theories would be correct if liquidity 
conditions rapidly change in the IPO after market. This paper will contribute to this 
stream of literature by suggesting a liquidity based explanation of underperformance. 
Eckbo & Norli (2005) find that IPOs are more liquid on average. We find IPOs are not 
always more liquid if compared to size matched firms. Many IPOs have either similar 
liquidity or are less liquid than peer firms. The performance of IPO firms in the long run 
can be explained by their liquidity profiles during the first year of their equity issuance.  
The reason for this result is that there will be long run underperformance if an IPO’s 
expected return in the short run is lower than its expected return in the long run.  It 
appears that there is initial overpricing in the after market of an IPO during the short run 
which is coupled with high liquidity. If liquidity is priced appropriately and there is 
excess liquidity to begin with, the expected return on an IPO is lower in the short run.  If 
the level of liquidity observed in the IPO after-market in the short run cannot be sustained 
in the long run, then as the liquidity declines the expected rate of return increases to its 
long run ‘equilibrium’ value.  This causes underperformance in the long run.  
In order to test this hypothesis, excess liquidity is measured as the difference 
between the liquidity of an IPO and the mean liquidity of a size matched firm. In 
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particular, two sub-samples of IPOs are created based on their excess liquidity and are 
called positive excess liquidity IPOs and negative excess liquidity IPOs. Results suggest 
that the two portfolios created on excess liquidity perform very differently. The positive 
excess liquidity portfolio of firms performs worse than the negative excess liquidity 
portfolio one to two years after the initial one-year post IPO portfolio formation period.  
Moreover, empirical evidence on the long term performance of IPOs during 1993 
to 2005 is presented. If underperformance is measured in a multifactor asset pricing 
framework, then underperformance is found accounting for the market, size, value, and 
liquidity factors, but the existence of underperformance diminishes in significance if a 
momentum factor is included. Furthermore, when measuring underperformance in a multi 
factor framework, the existence of underperformance is sensitive to the sample period, 
which supports Loughran and Ritter (2000). Previously, when using a multi factor 
framework, some studies have found underperformance, such as Loughran and Ritter, 
(2000) while some have reported no underperformance, such as Brav and Gompers 
(1997) or Eckbo and Norli (2005). A potential explanation for this can be the fact that the 
extent of long run performance of IPOs in a sample period is determined by the liquidity 
profile of IPOs. More specifically, if there are many IPO firms characterized by positive 
excess liquidity, then subsequent future returns would show underperformance if 
measured above a period of one to three years. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the 
choice of liquidity variable. Section III creates two sub-samples of IPOs based on 
positive and negative excess liquidity and section IV uses performance measures to 
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evaluate the performance of the two liquidity portfolios. Section V creates a market wide 
liquidity factor. Section VI reports and analyzes the results and Section VII concludes.  
II. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
A. Data Description 
The sample consists of 976,452 monthly observations spanning all listed 
securities for three equity markets (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) over the time period 
January, 1993 to December, 2005. This period was selected because the reporting of 
trading volume was standardized across the three equity markets only in June 1992. Prior 
to this date, the trading volume reported by NASDAQ was the aggregate of volume 
reported by all dealers in the security, leading to inflated counts as dealers/market makers 
reported each buy and sell transaction separately. Since the sample comprises an 
overwhelming majority of NASDAQ stocks and the key liquidity variable is volume 
based, the sample starts with 1993. Monthly trading volumes are used to avoid distortions 
introduced by infrequent trading in smaller value stocks.  IPO listings are from Thomson 
Financial’s SDC New Issues database. The corresponding closing price, trading volume, 
returns, shares outstanding, market capitalization, exchange and SIC code data from the 
CRSP database are from the Center for Research in Security Prices at the University of 
Chicago. The IPO listings and the issue dates were crosschecked with the dataset 
provided by Jay Ritter. The securities ineligible for continued listing (priced at less than 
one dollar per share, less than 750,000 shares outstanding, or number of shareholders 
fewer than 300), were deleted from the sample in order to avoid any delisting bias. Also 
excluded were closed-end funds, ADRs (American Depository Receipts, issues by 
foreign firms which have listings in at least one other market outside the US), REITs (real 
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estate investment trusts), units, mutual-to-stock conversions, preferred stocks, penny 
stocks6 (with offer price less than $5), and financial companies and IPOs which had less 
than 150 days of trading activity in the 250 trading days following the offer.  Our IPO 
sample consisted of 3,373 firms, of which 503 firms were listed in NYSE, 104 firms in 
AMEX and 2,766 firms in NASDAQ. Figure 2.1 shows the number of IPOs issued from 
years 1992 to 2003. The highest period of IPO issuance in NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX 
occurred in 1996. The new issue activity declined sharply after the year 2000 with the 
burst of the “dot com” bubble and the US economy moving into a recession in late 2001. 
B. Liquidity Measure  
To measure liquidity, turnover, which is the ratio of trading volume to the number of 
shares outstanding, is used as a proxy. This gives a direct measure of the asset trading 
frequency. Datar, et al. (1998) finds that cross section stock returns decline in turnover. 
Other measures based on bid-ask spreads and price impacts may not capture liquidity to 
the extent that large shareholders wish to make transactions. Turnover is a widely used 
proxy for liquidity (Chordia et al. ,2000b; Eckbo and Norli , 2005). 
The monthly turnover (TVO ) for the thi stock is computed as: 















where tditvo ,,  is the share turnover for stock i on day d in month t , and tiD , is the number 
of trading days  for stock i in month t . 
                                                 
6 Including Penny stocks is likely to show a bias towards long run underperformance. Using a time period 
from 1990-1998, Bradley et al. (2006) found evidence that penny stock IPOs have higher initial returns 




Figure 2.2 depicts the time series movement of IPO excess returns, measured by 
difference between monthly IPO return and the CRSP equal-weighted market return 
(NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX), and the mean turnover of IPO stocks. Liquidity gradually 
increases from 1997 and tends to be the highest during the bubble period from 1999 to 
early 2000, when NASDAQ reached an all time high of 5080 in mid March 2000. The 
following years show a slump followed by a recovery in early 2003. This is consistent 
with the findings of Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001) that liquidity plummets 
significantly in down markets but increases weakly in up markets. 
III. Portfolios based on Excess liquidity 
A. Creating an Excess Liquidity Measure 
Size, as measured by the market capitalization, is a standard criterion for sorting 
stocks in empirical investment studies. Data for each month is sorted based on the 
combined ranking by the size of the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks. Table 2.1 
reveals summary data for the aggregate sample as well as each size decile. As expected, 
smaller stocks have low turnover compared to larger stocks. Also, turnover shows a 
monotonic increase with the size of the firm7, which is also reported by Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) among others. From 1993 to 2005, the firms in the smaller size deciles 
did not perform well compared to larger firms. Turnover and returns both increase almost 
monotonically with the size of a firm. The mean monthly turnover for our sample is 
1.59% and the average monthly raw return is 0.97%.  
                                                 
7 We find that turnover increases with size except for the largest size decile. This may be explained by 
increased institutional holdings for the largest firms. 
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In order to distinguish IPOs based on their liquidity profile, one option is to 
simply sort them by stock turnover. However, as Table 2.1 displays, turnover and size 
have a positive relationship, so it would be difficult to separate the ‘size’ effect of the 
IPOs if they are ranked by turnover alone. Even though IPO firms tend to be in the lower 
size deciles, it is still important to separate out any size effect. If IPO firms are first sorted 
on the basis of size, then within each size decile look at the turnover of the IPO stocks it 
is likely to mitigate the size effect if not totally eliminate it. In the data set, all IPOs are 
excluded and the non-IPO stocks are divided into deciles by ranking them according to 
size on the basis of the market capitalization of the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks. 
The mean liquidity measured by turnover for the truncated sample is computed for each 
month and each size decile. Then, the IPO firms are matched by size and placed into the 
corresponding size deciles. The excess liquidity is calculated as the difference between 
the liquidity of the matched IPO firm and the mean liquidity of the size matched non-IPO 
firms for the corresponding decile for each month. This methodology shows that the 
excess liquidity varies with size for IPO firms. Excess liquidity is lowest for the smallest 
size decile and increases with size, but remains generally flat between the size deciles 
four and eight. Also, it rises sharply for the largest decile, whereas for the simple turnover 
measure the turnover actually falls for the largest size decile. 
B. Forming Negative and Positive Excess Liquidity portfolios 
The sample of IPOs is divided into two portfolios based on their excess liquidity.  
A portfolio HOT LIQ of IPOs is created that has a mean positive excess liquidity in the 
11 months following the first month of an IPO and also a positive excess liquidity on the 
12th month of an IPO. Similarly, a negative excess liquidity portfolio, COLD LIQ is 
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created based on the mean negative excess liquidity in the 11 months following the first 
month of an IPO and also a negative excess liquidity on the 12th month of an IPO. 
To differentiate between the short run and the long run, most IPO studies have 
categorized long run returns as returns for more than one year. Therefore, any firm from a 
portfolio is excluded if it has any of the intermediate months missing between the 24th 
and 36th month, or if the life of the IPO is less than 36 months. If a firm moved to a 
higher or lower size decile, the mean turnover for excess liquidity calculation of the base 
decile the firm was assigned to in the 2nd month of IPO is used. As a result, there are 
1,376 IPOs that comprise the HOT LIQ portfolio and 1,348 IPOs belonging to the COLD 
LIQ portfolio. IPOs which had excess liquidity not significantly different from zero,8 or 
do not qualify the twin criteria to be included in the HOT LIQ or COLD LIQ portfolio 
are excluded, resulting in a loss of about 20% of the IPO firms from the sample.  
Figure 2.3 shows the distribution by size of the firms in the COLD LIQ and HOT 
LIQ portfolio. A careful look shows that COLD LIQ firms are smaller firms on average 
compared to the HOT LIQ firms and are also more dispersed. Table 2.2 shows the mean 
values of the average size of a firm in the respective portfolio. The mean market 
capitalization of a firm belonging to the COLD LIQ portfolio during the sample period 
was $49.93 million and for the corresponding HOT LIQ portfolio firm was $89.01 
million. A simple comparison with the size deciles in Table 2.1 confirms the notion that 
the COLD LIQ and HOT LIQ firms tend to be small. The median values (not reported in 
the table) are much lower at $21.25 million and $27.73 million for the COLD LIQ and 
HOT LIQ portfolios respectively. Compared to the market capitalization of the more 
                                                 
8 If the difference between the mean turnover of the size decile and the turnover of the IPO firm was not 
significantly different at 5% level, it was not included in either the HOT LIQ or COLD LIQ portfolio. 
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seasoned firms the COLD LIQ and HOT LIQ firms are heavily centered on the second 
and third smallest size deciles. 
Table 2.2 also reports the mean turnover of the firms in the two liquidity 
portfolios. The mean turnover for the COLD LIQ portfolio over a three year holding 
period is 0.0092 as compared to 0.0235 for the HOT LIQ portfolio. A comparison with 
the broad spectrum of stocks over the size deciles in Table 2.1 reveals that though the 
average size of a HOT LIQ firm would put it in the 5th size decile (3rd size decile if we 
consider median market capitalization), the mean turnover is much higher than the mean 
turnover value of all firms for the same size decile. In fact, the mean turnover values are 
close to the average turnover values of the 8th and 9th largest size deciles. In contrast, the 
NEG LIQ firms have a mean turnover value which corresponds to the mean turnover 
values of the entire market for similar size deciles. 
C. Statistics of returns and turnover of HOT LIQ and COLD LIQ Portfolios 
The return distribution for the two portfolios is shown in figure 2.4. They do not 
differ significantly from each other though the positive excess liquidity portfolio is more 
dispersed. Table 2.2 reveals the mean portfolio returns of the COLD LIQ and HOT LIQ 
portfolios in calendar time. Panel A of Table 2.2 reports the ex-post time-series mean 
returns for the two liquidity portfolios during the portfolio formation period of 2-12 
months. The monthly raw return for the HOT LIQ portfolio is significantly high at 
1.82%. The excess returns based on equal-weighted and value-weighted CRSP 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index returns are also positive. The mean turnover of the HOT 
LIQ firms is 2.56%, which is considerably higher than the mean turnover of all stocks at 
1.6% (see Table 2.1). For the NEG LIQ portfolio, the corresponding values contrast. 
 
  24
Though the raw returns during the portfolio formation period was positive at 0.11% per 
month, the equal-weighted and value-weighted excess returns are both negative. The 
mean turnover of 0.7% is much lower than 2.56% for the HOT LIQ firms and 1.6% for 
all stocks in general.  
For the analysis period which includes firms from the 13th to the 36th month of the 
IPO, the figures differ. Table 2.2, panel B shows these results. For the HOT LIQ Portfolio 
the time-series mean raw return is positive but has declined to 0.41%. The corresponding 
monthly raw return for the COLD LIQ portfolio has increased to 1.15%. The equal-
weighted and value-weighted excess returns for COLD LIQ portfolio are now positive 
whereas for the HOT LIQ, the fortunes seemed to have reversed as both excess returns 
are negative. The mean turnover for COLD LIQ firms has increased to 1.19%. The 
turnover of the HOT LIQ firms has declined from 2.56% to 1.93%, but is still much 
higher than for the NEGLIQ firms. Notice then, that there is a reversal in returns for the 
HOT LIQ and COLD LIQ firms in the period between years one and three of the IPO.  
This is also accompanied by an increase in liquidity for COLD LIQ firms and a decline in 
liquidity for the HOT LIQ firms.  
  IV. Event time performance of the liquidity portfolios 
A. Cumulative Average Excess Returns 
To compare the performance of the positive and negative excess liquidity firms 
against broad based market indices, a standard procedure of computing cumulative 
average returns in event time is employed.  Following Ritter (1991) and Ang, et al. 
(2005), the cumulative average excess return of a portfolio of IPO firms from event 
month τ to month T is given as : 
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The CAR statistic cumulates the average excess IPO returns across various 
horizons T, where the averaging is done across all IPO firms from the event month t. The 
average tER  is either equal-weighted or value-weighted. BtR  is the monthly return on a 
benchmark index used to calculate excess return each month. Equal-weighted and value-
weighted CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ returns are used as benchmark index returns. 
To compute the equal-weighted excess return tER , the weight tω  is 1/ tN  where tN is the 
number of IPOs forming in the IPO portfolio in the event month t. For the value–
weighted excess return tER , the weight tω  for the excess negative liquidity portfolio 
equals tNi MVMV /  where iMV is the market capitalization of the 
thi stock and tNMV is the 
total market capitalization of all the IPO stocks forming the portfolio at event month t.  
The cumulative average excess returns for the two portfolios are listed in Table 
2.3. If the any IPO firms get delisted before the holding period of 36 months the CRSP 
delisted returns are used.9 The t-statistics show the result of a paired t-test for the 
significance of two means. In the portfolio formation period of 12 months, the HOTLIQ 
portfolio outperforms the COLDLIQ portfolio in terms of excess returns10 (both equal-
                                                 
9 An alternative delisting return of 35% for NYSE/AMEX firms and 55% for NASDAQ firms for delisting 
codes 500 and 500-584 are also used as recommended in Shumway (1997) and Shumway and Warther 
(1999) and our results remain qualitatively unchanged. 




weighted and value-weighted) and raw returns. For the HOTLIQ portfolio, the equal-
weighted cumulative excess return for the portfolio formation period of 2-12 months is 
8.63% as compared to -4.17% for the COLDLIQ portfolio. The comparable values for 
value weighted cumulative excess returns are 9.03% and -3.27% for the HOTLIQ and 
COLDLIQ portfolios respectively. For the cumulative raw returns, the difference is larger 
in magnitude. For the holding period of 13 to 36 months following the portfolio 
formation period, the results differ significantly. The HOTLIQ portfolio has an equal-
weighted cumulative excess return of -7.67% over the 13th to 36th month of the IPO, and 
the COLDLIQ portfolio generates a return of 5.12% for the same period. The values for 
the value-weighted cumulative excess returns are -9.45% and 7.3% for the HOTLIQ and 
COLDLIQ portfolios respectively. The differences in means are statistically significant.  
For robustness we exclude IPOs which are between 1 and 36 months old in the 
hot issue period of 1999 to mid 2000. The equal weighted cumulative excess returns for 
the HOTLIQ and COLDLIQ portfolios are 13.06% and 6.46% respectively for the 
portfolio formation period and the corresponding values for value-weighted returns are 
11.39% and 7.81% respectively. For holding period of 13 to 36 months the equal 
weighted cumulative excess return for the HOTLIQ portfolio is -9.13% and that for the 
COLDLIQ portfolio is -2.95%. The value-weighted cumulative excess returns are -7.14% 
and -2.98% for HOTLIQ and COLDLIQ respectively. This suggests that both portfolios 
under perform on the broad based market indices but the underperformance of the 
positive excess liquidity portfolio is greater than the negative excess liquidity portfolio. 




The fact that HOTLIQ firms have positive excess liquidity in the short run 
supports the notion that liquidity is positively related to contemporaneous returns 
(Acharya and Pederson, 2003).  Interestingly, Acharya and Pederson’s theoretical model 
also provides some explanation for the good performance of the COLD LIQ firms in the 
long run. Their model predicts that positive shocks to illiquidity (in this case the negative 
liquidity of COLDLIQ firms) are associated with a low contemporaneous returns and 
high predicted future returns.  
V. Liquidity risk in a multifactor model 
The use of performance evaluation in event time is often criticized (Kothari and 
Warner, 2005) as it fails to explicitly control for temporal dependence in returns. It can 
still be possible that even though HOT LIQ IPOs perform poorly in event time, they may 
not under perform in a risk adjusted multi factor asset pricing framework. In other words, 
it can only be conclusively said that HOT LIQ firms under perform relative to COLD 
LIQ firms if the underperformance persists even after adjusting for the systematic risk 
factors. It is not aberrant to expect that HOT LIQ and COLD LIQ firms would be 
affected differently by changes in market wide liquidity. 
A. Liquidity as a Priced Factor 
Fama and French (1992) argue that liquidity is an important issue, but it does not 
need to be specifically measured and accounted for because it is subsumed by the 
combination of size and book-to-market factors. However, cross-sectional studies by 
Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) find that there is a statistically significant positive 
relationship between expected returns and illiquidity, even after taking the Fama and 
French (1993) risk factors of size and book-to-market factors into account.  Other studies, 
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such as Chordia, Subrahmanyam and Anshuman (2001), find that individual stock 
liquidity is very much an important factor in returns even after controlling for size, book-
to-market factors, and other variables.  
Chordia et al. (2000a) and Huberman and Halka (2001) examine the systematic 
nature of liquidity risk. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) focus on systematic liquidity risk in 
returns and provide evidence that stocks that are highly sensitive to shifts in market 
liquidity (having high liquidity beta) have high expected returns. This liquidity factor 
appears to be distinct from SMB and HML, suggesting an independent source of risk. 
O’Hara (2003) argues that asset pricing models need to be recast in broader terms to 
incorporate the transaction costs of liquidity. Acharya and Pederson (2003) find that 
incorporating systematic liquidity risk in the standard CAPM model increases the 
explanatory power of CAPM. Eckbo and Norli (2005) create a liquidity factor using an 
algorithm similar to the Fama-French factor and find it to be comparable in significance 
to other priced factors. Addressing the recent literature on liquidity risk, liquidity is 
included in the Fama-French factor framework. 
B. Creating the LIQ Factor 
For calculating a market wide liquidity measure, our data set consists of 5,390 
firms spanning NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks that are not new issues. Specifically, 
all firms that publicly issued new equity for cash during the prior five years or have been 
CRSP-listed for less than five years are excluded from the sample. The procedure is 
similar to Loughran and Ritter (2000), to create purged HML and SMB factors by 
excluding new issues11.Their argument is that if IPOs in the universe of firms are used to 
                                                 
11 Loughran and Ritter (2000) also exclude Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) along with the IPOs. 
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create the Fama-French factors, there would be benchmark contamination if IPO returns 
are used as the dependent variable as the regressors themselves will be ‘contaminated’ 
with firms which are new issues. In the limit, the power of the test is lowest when the 
benchmark is composed of same firms with the same weights, as the sample being tested. 
Re-creating the factors devoid of IPO firms would increase the power of the test. To 
reduce this factor contamination bias documented in Loughran and Ritter (2000), the 
liquidity factor is created on a purged dataset.  
The liquidity premium is calculated each month following an algorithm similar to 
the size premium created by Fama and French (1992, 1993). To construct the liquidity 
factor, three portfolios are formed based on a ranking of firms beginning in December, 
1992, based on the market value of equity for the purged NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks 
(small, medium and big size firms) and three portfolios are formed using 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks ranked on turnover. Next, nine portfolios are 
constructed from the intersection of the three size and the three turnover portfolios. 
Monthly equal-weighted returns on these nine portfolios are calculated starting in 
January, 1993. Portfolios are reformed in July every year using firm rankings from 
December of the previous year. The return on the LIQ premium is the difference between 
the equal-weighted mean returns for the three lowest liquidity portfolios and three highest 
liquidity portfolios. The risk free rate fR  and the three Fama-French factors, market risk 
premium MKT( ), size (SMB), value (HML), and momentum (UMD) for each month 
were obtained from Kenneth French site.12   
                                                 
12    http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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The LIQ factor is included with the market premium, SMB (size premium), and 
HML (value premium) factor data from Kenneth French web site to create a matrix of 
explanatory variables.  
C. Summary Statistics of the Explanatory Factors 
The liquidity factor, LIQ, differs from the LMH (Low minus high) factor created 
by Eckbo and Norli (2005) in two important respects. The primary difference is the LIQ 
factor does not include stocks which were IPOs in the prior 60 months. This would help 
to avoid the factor contamination problem discussed in Loughran and Ritter (2000). 
Secondly, Eckbo and Norli create six portfolios based on two size and three turnover 
portfolios and take the difference between the average monthly returns of two lowest 
liquidity portfolios and two highest liquidity portfolios to obtain the liquidity factor 
LMH. To calculate LIQ, the difference between the average monthly returns for the three 
lowest liquidity portfolios and three highest liquidity portfolios from a matrix of nine 
portfolios (three size and three turnover) is used. Eckbo and Norli (2005) use 
NYSE/AMEX stocks to sort firms into size and liquidity portfolios. An overwhelming 
majority of the IPO stocks are listed in NASDAQ, so both NASDAQ and NYSE/AMEX 
stocks are included for ranking purposes. Another reason to include NASDAQ is due to 
the fact that NASDAQ firms exhibit larger turnover than NYSE/AMEX stocks.  
The time series average monthly return on LIQ is 0.10% against 0.14% for LMH 
during the overlapping period from January, 1993 to December, 2002. This difference in 
returns can be attributed to the inclusion of IPOs in creating the LMH factors. If the IPOs 
are mostly high liquidity stocks, they would fall under the ‘High’ turnover portfolios, 
 
  31
given that the IPOs did not perform well compared to size matched firms13, it is not 
surprising that the premium between low liquidity and high liquidity firms will be greater 
if the returns of IPO firms are include in creating the liquidity factor. Table 2.4, panel B 
shows that the correlation between LIQ and LMH is quite high at 82.6. Table 2.4, panel 
A reports the time series average values of the Fama and French three factors and the 
momentum factor along with the liquidity factors. The table also includes the size and 
value factors estimated by Loughran and Ritter (2000) from datasets which excludes new 
issues and seasoned equity offerings. Table 2.4, panel B reports the pair-wise correlation 
of the factors used in the multifactor regressions.  
The average return on factors has changed over time. Using data from July, 1963 
to December, 1991, Fama and French (1993), find the market premium to be 0.43%. 
Here, a market premium of 0.62% is found for the period from January, 1993 to 
December, 2005. The value premium HML has slightly increased from 0.40% per month 
(Fama and French, 1993) to 0.42% in the sample period used here. However, the size 
factor, SMB, declined from 0.27% (Fama and French, 1993) to about 0.17% for the time 
period 1993 to 2005. An explanation for this is the poor performance of small firms 
relative to big firms during 1990’s. The momentum factor UMD, based on Carhart 
(1997), has the highest average return among the factors at 0.89% from 1993 to 2005. In 
the same period, the liquidity factor LIQ has a positive average return of 0.09%. For the 
size and value factors on the purged datasets, data up to December 2003 is used. The time 
series average of the purged size factor, pSMB, is 0.20% during that period. The 
premium on the purged value factor is widely different. For the time period 1993 to 2005, 
                                                 
13 Ritter (1991), Ang et al.(2005), and Eckbo and Norli (2005) find lower returns for IPO firms compared to 
the size matched firms when they use buy-and-hold abnormal returns. 
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the pHML is 0.20% compared to 0.45% for the unpurged HML factor during the same 
period. This can be attributed to the fact that low Book-to-Market portfolios are usually 
intensive in recent issuers. Including IPOs in creating the Fama French factors would 
tend to have a higher HML premium than if IPO firms are excluded.  The new issue firms 
are found to have lower returns on average than the size and value matched firms (Ritter, 
1991).  
VI. Results and Analysis 
A.  Multi Factor Asset Pricing framework 
Time-series regressions have an advantage over traditional event-study 
procedures in that the regressions can explicitly control for temporal dependence in 
returns. The long run performance is measured in a multi-factor asset pricing framework 
(see Appendix A for a discussion). In each calendar month over the entire sample period, 
a portfolio is constructed comprising all IPO firms experiencing the event within the 
previous 36 months. Since the number of event firms is not uniformly distributed over the 
sample period, the number of firms included in a portfolio is not constant through time. 
As a result, some new firms are added each month and some firms exit each month. 
Accordingly, the portfolios are rebalanced each month and an equal-weighted portfolio 
excess return is calculated. The resulting time series of monthly excess returns is 
regressed on the three Fama-French (1993) factors, including the liquidity factor14, the 
Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and the five factors.  The regression equation is 
therefore: 
 
                                                 
14 We are grateful to Eckbo and Norli for providing the LMH factor. 
tttttttftIPO UMDucLIQhHMLsSMBbMKTRR εα ++++++=−,
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where tIPOR ,  is the return to IPO portfolio for month t, ftR  is the one month Treasury-
Bill return for month t, and tMKT  is the excess market return to the CRSP value-
weighted index for month t. The factor loading b on the market premium MKT gives the 
CAPM beta of the IPO portfolio. tSMB  is the realization on a size-based portfolio that 
buys small cap stocks and sells large cap stocks. Similarly, tHML  is the realization on a 
factor portfolio that buys high Book-to-Market stocks and sells low Book-to-Market 
stocks. The s and h coefficients measure the sensitivity of the portfolio's return to the 
small-minus-big and high-minus-low factors respectively. Portfolios of value stocks 
should have a high positive value for h, while growth portfolios should have a high 
negative h. The largest capitalization portfolio should have a negative value for s, and 
small capitalization portfolios should have a large positive factor loading on SMB  (s 
should be positive).  
A.1. Multifactor Regressions on All IPO firms. 
Table 2.5 reports time series multifactor regressions on equal-weighted excess 
returns of a portfolio of all IPO firms in the sample which have issued equity for cash 
during the prior 36 months. The excess return is calculated each month by subtracting the 
1-month Treasury bill rate from the calendar time IPO portfolio return for that month. 
Column (1) shows the result of the Fama-French model. The factor loading on the market 
premium is 1.39 and highly significant. This suggests that IPO firms have high market 
risk as measured by the beta. The coefficient on the size factor is 0.989 and is also highly 
significant. The high s signifies that, in general, IPO portfolios are small firms compared 
to the market. The loading on the value factor, HML, is significantly negative at -0.44 
which is expected as IPO firms are usually growth firms. The Jensen’s alpha which 
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measures abnormal performance is negative at -0.274% and significant at 10%. This 
translates to an underperformance of 27 basis points per month or about 3.3% per year. 
Loughran and Ritter (1999) used a similar model for the time period from 1973 to 1996, 
and found Jensen’s alpha to be -0.40% and significant at 1%. For the time period 1990 to 
2000, Welch and Ritter (2002) find the underperformance of -0.48% with a marginally 
high t-statistic of -2.01.  
Column (2) reports the regression results during the same sample period for the 
Carhart four factor model which includes the momentum factor UMD in addition to the 
Fama French factors. The factor loadings for the market, size, and value factors have the 
same sign and significance as in three the factor Fama French model. The UMD factor 
has negative and highly significant factor loading. The Jensen’s alpha is negative again 
but not significant with a t-statistic of -1.86.  
Column (3) reports the Fama French three factor augmented with our liquidity 
factor LIQ. The loading on the market declines from 1.39 to 1.23 but remains highly 
significant. The factor loading on the liquidity factor LIQ is -0.235 and significant at 
10%. The product of this estimate and the average return on LIQ during the same period 
(0.09%) gives a reduction in the expected return of the IPO portfolio by 0.021% per 
month. The Jensen’s alpha for this regression is -0.20% and significant at 10%, which 
implies less underperformance than in the Fama-French model. Following Eckbo and 
Norli (2005), this implies that if an IPO portfolio is more liquid than the market, the 
expected return is lower, as the IPO portfolio has a lower ‘liquidity’ risk.  
However, the inclusion of a liquidity factor does not make the underperformance 
vanish. Column (4) reports the five factor regression which includes the momentum and 
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the LIQ factor along with the regular Fama French factors. The alpha is still negative but 
is insignificant. Column (5) reports the five factor model regression replacing the 
previously used LIQ factor with Eckbo and Norli’s LMH factor. The sample period for 
this regression is from 1993 to 2003 as the data for LMH is available only till December 
2003. Though comparing the alpha coefficient is not directly comparable for different 
time periods, it is still negative but remains insignificant. The co-efficient on the LMH 
factor is -0.33 and significant at 5% which is greater than the coefficient of LIQ15. This 
difference in the liquidity coefficient could result because Eckbo & Norli’s liquidity 
factor LMH contain returns of IPO firms whereas the LIQ does not.  
Overall, IPO firms have negative abnormal return in the sample period from 1993 
to early and mid 2000, though the significance is diminished the momentum factor or the 
augmented five factor model is used. 
A.2. Different Sample Periods 
Comparing Jensen’s alpha coefficient when the IPO sample is broken into sub-
periods is of interest. The first sub-period uses the starting year 1993, which is the year 
when the U.S. economy (and the stock market) began to recover from the 1992 recession. 
The ending year for the first sub-period is 1998 when the stock market started to receive 
warnings of “irrational exuberance” by Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan but still continued 
good performance. Since 1999 to early 2000 saw one of the greatest stock market 
increases in history with NASDAQ (reaching above 5000 points in March, 2000), the 
second sub-period is from January 1999 to December 2000. The third sub-period starts 
                                                 
15 Separate unreported five factor regression with LIQ as the liquidity factor for the common sample period 
from 1993 to 2003 was also conducted. The coefficient on LIQ is -0.1565 and significant at 10% and alpha 
is -0.18 but insignificant. 
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with January, 2001, when the stock market was gradually declining. With the terrorist 
attack in U.S. soil in September, 2001, the market declined a bit but the sharpest decline 
started in early 2002 with the fall of Enron. Within a few months, NASDAQ had fallen to 
levels of 1200. The sub-period of IPO firms stops at year 2002 though the estimation 
period is till 2005 since firms which have less than 3 years of post issue performance are 
not included. 
Table 2.6 reports the results for different sub-periods. For the first sub-period, the 
alpha is negative and significant at 10%. For the Fama French model, the alpha is -0.31% 
and for the five factor model with LIQ the alpha is -0.25 and also significant. The 
coefficient on LIQ is -0.134 and significant at 10%. For the second sub-period, the alpha 
is also negative and large at -0.96% for the Fama French and -0.73% for the five factors 
though the alphas are not significant. The loading on LIQ is -0.21% but not significant.  
For the third sub-period, the results are significantly different. The alpha is 
positive at 0.64% for the three factor Fama French model but is insignificant with a t-
statistic of 1.32. For the five factor model the alpha is 0.45 but insignificant with a t- 
statistic of 0.93. This ‘anomalous’ result is similar to the results found by Welch and 
Ritter (2002) for the sample period January, 2000 to September, 2001, where the alpha 
co-efficient was an insignificant but positive 0.62% for the Fama French model. They 
attributed the result to the high negative market returns and concurrent collapse of 
technology stocks. Although during the same period they found IPOs under perform the 
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CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index returns by -34.3% if the underperformance is 
measured by the standard buy and hold method.16 
The results show that the extent, to which IPOs underperform, as measured by Jensen’s 
alpha, varies significantly across sub-periods. This is consistent with the findings of 
Loughran and Ritter (2000) and Welch and Ritter (2002). Baker and Wurgler (2006) find 
that in periods of high investor sentiment, stocks that are attractive to optimists and 
speculators and at the same time unattractive to arbitrageurs like IPOs, such as small 
stocks and extreme growth stocks, tend to earn relatively low subsequent returns. They 
measure market sentiment, among other things, by average stock turnover, frequency of 
IPO offerings in a year and average first day returns on IPOs. Conditional on low 
sentiment, they find that these cross-sectional patterns attenuate or completely reverse. If 
Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) sentiment index17 is considered, the underperformance is 
highest when the market sentiment was highest (2000) and lowest when the sentiment 
was lowest (2002 to 2004).  
A.3. Long run Performance of IPOs across Exchanges 
Table 2.7 reports the Fama French and the five factor regressions on the IPOs 
from the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ exchanges. There are 503 IPOs listed in NYSE in 
the sample. Columns (1) and (2) reports the regression results for NYSE IPOs. The 
Jensen’s alpha is -0.13% for the Fama French and -0.14% for the five factor and are 
significant at 5%. The coefficient on LIQ is negative at -0.41% but not significant. The 
                                                 
16 Welch and Ritter (2002) in the same paper comment that “[the Fama French regression results] indicate 
that the period during which the Internet bubble collapsed were great years for recent IPOs, even though an 
equally weighted portfolio of recent IPOs lost on average 355 basis points per month.” (pp. 1823) 
17 The various sentiment index data is available at Jeffery Wurgler’s website at Stern, NYU.  
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factor loading on size is 0.69 which is much lower than the high numbers of around 1 for 
the entire sample. Another interesting feature is the HML factor is positive and highly 
significant in contrast to the negative factor loadings for the entire sample. This implies 
that the firms listed in NYSE are on average “value” firms relative to the entire IPO 
sample or NASDAQ IPOs.  
Columns (3) and (4) report the regression results for AMEX firms which has 104 
firms in the sample. The alpha is negative but highly insignificant. The loading on the 
liquidity factor is -0.092% but not significant. The R-square for the AMEX sub-sample 
are in the range of 8.5% which is much lower compared to NYSE and NASDAQ 
regressions where the R-squares are in the nature of 85% to 89%.  
The NASDAQ IPOs form the bulk of our sample comprising of 2,766 firms out of 
the total sample of 3,373 IPOs. The Jensen’s alpha is -0.17% and significant for the Fama 
French model and -0.19% but insignificant for the five factor model. The loading on LIQ 
is significant and has a value of -0.47% which is little higher than the factor loading on 
LIQ for NYSE IPOs. The interesting difference is on the value factor. Here the loading 
on HML is significant and negative implying that the NASDAQ IPOs are high growth 
firms in general. The loading on the size factor is above 1% compared to 0.65% to 0.69% 
for NYSE firms. This is expected as NASDAQ firms are much smaller than NYSE firms. 
The NASDAQ IPOs are also more sensitive to the momentum factor than the 
NYSE IPOs. Overall, in the sample period from January 1993 to December 2005, the 
IPO underperformance is robust across exchanges.  
B. Performance of NEG LIQ and HOT LIQ IPOs 
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The focus will now turn to the two sub sample portfolios of IPOs created using 
the excess liquidity measure.  The results will first show how the two portfolios 
performed in calendar time for a holding period of three years. It should be noted that the 
portfolio can only be formed by looking at the excess liquidity of the first year of IPOs, 
so the results are ex-post and only indicate how the two portfolios performed overall. The 
results presented here can only give some idea of how the factor loadings have changed 
from the portfolio formation period to the actual evaluation period.  
B.1. All Periods 
Table 2.8 reports the multi factor regression results. Columns (1) and (3) give the 
Fama French regression results for COLD LIQ and HOT LIQ portfolios respectively. 
Both the portfolios have a negative Jensen’s alpha, but whereas the alpha -0.084% for 
COLD LIQ IPO is insignificant, the corresponding number for the HOT LIQ portfolio is 
significant with a value of -0.27%. The five factor regressions, as reported in column (2) 
and (4) for the respective portfolios, show the alpha for the COLD LIQ portfolio 
decreases to -0.1% but still remains insignificant. The magnitude of the 
underperformance for the HOT LIQ portfolio declines to -0.21% and becomes 
insignificant with a t-statistic of -1.33.  
Additionally, the loading on the market factor is higher for the HOT LIQ portfolio 
than the COLD LIQ portfolio, possibly indicating that HOT LIQ stocks are more exposed 
to market risk. The loading on the size factor is not markedly different, though the COLD 
LIQ portfolio has slightly lower values. The discrepancy is higher for the value factor. 
For both liquidity portfolios it is negative but it is about three times higher in absolute 
magnitude for the HOT LIQ firms than the COLD LIQ firms. This indicates that the 
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COLD LIQ firms are low growth firms relative to the HOT LIQ firms. For the loadings 
on the liquidity factor, both the coefficients are negative but the HOT LIQ portfolio has a 
higher negative factor loading than the COLD LIQ portfolio. 
B.2.  The Evaluation Period Results for COLD LIQ and HOT LIQ portfolios 
The COLD LIQ portfolio in the evaluation period consists of all negative excess 
liquidity firms which have issued equity more than 12 months before and which have not 
completed a three year anniversary of their initial public offering. The multi factor 
regression results in calendar time for the portfolio of COLD LIQ firms are reported. 
The sample period for the regressions in the first four columns is from January 
1994 to December 2005. Column (1) of Table 2.9 shows the Fama French three factor 
results. The Jensen’s alpha is 0.19% and significant at 5% level which shows a significant 
departure from the negative alphas seen in the earlier regressions. This translates to a 
2.3% abnormal performance per year for the COLD LIQ portfolio. For the Carhart model 
regression, reported in column (2), the alpha is still positive and significant at 10% but 
the magnitude of over performance has declined to 0.15% per month. For the four factor 
model with liquidity, the loading on the liquidity factor LIQ is -0.24% and is significant 
at 10%. 
Column (4) reports the five factor regression results. The factor loading on 
liquidity is now -0.13% due to the inclusion of the momentum factor. The alpha is 
positive at 0.19% but insignificant. For the sample period from January 1994 to 
December 2002, the five factor regression with Eckbo and Norli’s (2005) liquidity factor 
gives an insignificant alpha of 0.22%. The loading on the LMH is -0.33% and is 
significant at 10%. 
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Table 2.10 displays the corresponding results for the HOT LIQ portfolio. The 
alphas are significantly negative for the Fama French model and the Fama French model 
with liquidity. The magnitude of underperformance for Fama French is -0.37% which 
equals a negative abnormal annual return of -4.45%. The corresponding value of alpha 
for Fama French with liquidity is -0.33%. The alpha is positive but not significant at 10% 
for the other three regressions. The magnitude of Jensen’s alpha ranges from -0.44% for 
the five factor model with LMH to -0.26% for the Carhart model. 
The Tables 2.9 and 2.10 confirm that the findings for cumulative average excess 
returns in even time (see Table 2.3). The COLD LIQ portfolio performs better than the 
HOT LIQ portfolio even in calendar time.  
C. Zero-Investment Returns Tested in a Multifactor Framework. 
To evaluate the Zero-investment strategy returns in the Fama French framework 
augmented by momentum and liquidity factors, the five factor model can be rewritten:  
 
 
this can be re-written as: 
 
where tnpR , is the difference between monthly returns on the negative excess liquidity and 
positive excess liquidity portfolios. The alpha ( ptnttnp ααα −=, )in the regression is the 
abnormal return on a zero-investment strategy that buys the negative excess liquidity 
portfolio and sells short the positive excess liquidity portfolio. If there is no perceivable 
difference in risk-adjusted returns between the two portfolios, the alpha coefficient 
ttnptnptnptnptnpnptnp UMDuLIQcHMLhSMBsMKTbR εα ++++++=,
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should be close to zero and insignificant. The results in Table 2.11 suggest this is not 
true.. tnp ,α is positive and significant for the Fama-French three factor model, the Fama-
French model with liquidity factor and the five factor model with LIQ. It is positive but 
not significant in the Carhart (1997) model and the five factor model with LMH. The 
monthly return on the zero investment strategy tnp ,α  for the Fama-French model is 
0.56% per month which translates into a more than 6.7% annual return. The returns for 
the other models are modest, range from 0.67% per month for the four factors with 
liquidity to 0.4% for Carhart (1997) model. The coefficient on market premium is 
negative, confirming the result in the previous section that positive liquidity stocks are 
high beta stocks and are more exposed to market risk.  
The liquidity betas are significant and have positive sign due to the fact that the 
HOT LIQ portfolio has a greater negative factor loading on the liquidity factor than the 
NEG LIQ portfolio. For the five factor model with LMH, the estimated coefficient on 
LMH is 0.17 and significant at 10%. The product of this estimate and the average return 
on the LMH portfolio, as seen in Table 2.4, is about 0.024% per month. This increase in 
expected return for the zero investment portfolio is beyond the effect of LMH on the 
expected return of the HOT LIQ portfolio. The coefficient on the size factor is marginally 
negative but insignificant, suggesting that there is no significant impact of size that would 
drive the difference in returns. The coefficient on HML is positive and significant in all 
the factor regressions. This supports previous findings that the HOT LIQ firms are higher 
growth firms than the COLD LIQ firms.  
D. Robustness Tests 
D.1. Purged Factors 
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As discussed earlier, one of the criticisms against using Fama-French factors for 
testing abnormal performance of IPOs is benchmark contamination. In the multifactor 
regressions the liquidity factor LIQ was created using a purged dataset which excludes 
IPOs. However, the size, value, market, LMH and momentum factors are all created 
using a dataset which also contains IPO firms. In particular, when abnormal returns are 
being calculated using buy-and-hold returns, it is common practice to calculate the 
benchmark buy-and-hold returns by matching characteristics such as size and book-to-
market factors after excluding event firms. Loughran and Ritter (1999) recommend that 
the same purging of the benchmarks should be done when multifactor models are being 
used. If the benchmark is composed of the same firms, with the same weights, as the 
sample being tested, the intercept will be biased towards zero and there will be no 
abnormal performance. They create size and value factors on a purged dataset of firms 
which excludes IPOs and SEOs which have issued equity for cash in the prior five years. 
The updated dataset is obtained from Jay Ritter’s website, however the data runs only till 
December 2003.  
Regressions on the HOT LIQ and COLD LIQ portfolios over the second and third 
year of IPO on the sample period from January 1993 to December 2003 using the 
modified Fama French model with purged SMB and purged HML factors are displayed 
in Table 2.12.  For the COLD LIQ portfolio, there is significant overperformance of 
0.22% at a 5% level of significance. The comparable value for the unpurged regression in 
Table 2.9 is 0.19%. For the HOT LIQ portfolio the alpha coefficient is still negative (-
0.36%) and significant for the Fama French model. The level of significance declines to 
above 10% for both the portfolios if we use a five factor model. 
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Overall, there is stronger evidence that the COLD LIQ portfolio over performs 
during the sample period if the Fama French model with purged value and size factors is 
used. There is also significant evidence that the HOT LIQ firms under perform if the 
“decontaminated factors” in Fama French regression are included.  
D.2. Different Time periods 
Welch and Ritter (2002) reported that the Jensen’s alpha is sensitive to different 
time periods.  The results in Table 2.6 find a positive but insignificant alpha for IPO firms 
during the 2001 to 2005 period. How the HOT LIQ and COLD LIQ portfolios performed 
during different time periods are compared in Tables 2.13 and 2.14. All regressions are 
on the portfolio of HOT LIQ and COLD LIQ firms which have completed their first year 
anniversary but have not exceeded the three year age limit. The regression results for 
different sample periods are tabulated in Table 2.13 for the COLD LIQ portfolio and 
Table 2.14 for the HOT LIQ portfolio. For the three sub-periods, the Jensen’s alpha is 
positive and significant at 10% level for the COLD LIQ portfolio. For the HOT LIQ 
portfolio, Table 2.14 shows that the sub-periods from 1993 to 1998 and from 1999 to 
2000 yielded negative abnormal returns. For the period from January 2001 to December 
2005, the alpha intercept is positive but insignificant. These results are similar to the 
positive alpha obtained for the same sub period for all IPO firms, as is seen in Table 2.6. 
A potential explanation for the strong underperformance of the HOT LIQ stocks during 
periods of high sentiment of 1999-2000 can be attributed to Baker and Wurgler (2006). 
They find that in periods of high investor sentiment, stocks that are attractive to optimists 
and speculators and at the same time unattractive to arbitrageurs like IPOs, such as small 
stocks and extreme growth stocks, tend to earn relatively low subsequent returns. The 
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HOT LIQ IPOs are extreme growth stocks and have significantly high growth parameter 
than COLD LIQ IPOs which is evident from the high negative factor loading on the value 
factor and significantly positive loading on the value factor for the hedge portfolio (Table 
2.11). 
The change in factor loadings on the liquidity factor LIQ over time is also shown. 
During the sub-period from 1993 to 1998, the factor loadings on LIQ for both the 
liquidity portfolios are roughly similar. Since 1999, the negative loadings on the HOT 
LIQ portfolio have exceeded that of the COLD LIQ portfolio. The loadings on the 
momentum factor are always much higher for the HOT LIQ portfolio.  
Overall, the COLD LIQ firms have above average risk adjusted returns over all 
the sample periods in two to three year of their IPO. The HOT LIQ firms have 
significantly negative performance from 1993 to 2000, and the performance becomes 
marginally positive but insignificant for the period 2001 to 2005. The fact that 
underperformance of IPOs using Fama French factors might be widely underestimated is 
mentioned in Welch and Ritter (2002).  They comment, 
Unless one is comfortable concluding that IPOs with –64.7 percent returns offered 
investors positive risk-adjusted returns, one should be wary of considering the 
Fama-French factors to be equilibrium risk factors and using them as controls. 
(pp. 1820) 
 
D.3. Equally Weighing by Number of Firms Verses Equal Weighing the Time Period  
In all the regressions thus far, each time period is equal-weighted rather than 
equal-weighing each firm. The standard procedure in calendar time regression is valuing 
each time series equally as it avoids the clustering problem in time series. Loughran and 
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Ritter (2000) suggest that if there are time varying misvaluations that firms capitalize on 
by taking some action (a supply response), there will be more events involving larger 
misvaluations in some periods than in others. They provide examples of include junk 
bond issuance, equity-financed acquisitions, equity issues, and share repurchases. They 
mention that, in general, tests that weigh firms equally should have more power than tests 
that weigh time periods equally.  
A valid criticism against weighing by number of firms equally is due to pseudo-
market timing hypotheses of Schultz (2003). Schultz speculates that issuers time their 
IPOs when the stock market is high and coincides with periods of excessive optimism 
such that more companies go public. Subsequently, the last large groups of IPOs 
underperform and comprise a relatively large fraction of the sample.  
Thus, as a robustness check, a panel data cross section regression which weighs 
each firm equally is shown in Table 2.15. The standard errors are heteroskedastic and 
autocorrelation consistent Huber-White sandwich estimators. For the COLD LIQ 
portfolio during the evaluation period of second and third years of IPOs, the negative 
excess liquidity portfolio significantly over performs in the Fama French three factor 
model as well as in the five factor liquidity models. For the HOT LIQ portfolio, the 
reverse occurs with significantly high underperformance. The factor loadings on all the 
factors are significant.  
D.4. Bid-Ask Adjusted Portfolio Returns 
The HOT LIQ IPOs should generally have low transaction costs to trade as 
measured by the bid-ask spread. Conversely, the COLD LIQ IPOs should have a higher 
transaction cost to trade as they are more illiquid stocks. If the size of this transaction cost 
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is sizeable, it may mitigate any observable excess return. This is a valid concern and 
deserves some consideration. The returns for the IPOs are obtained from Center for 










R . CRSP generally uses the closing price at period 1−t  and t  
for 1−tP  and tP , which will be either a bid price or an ask price to calculate the rate of 
return. Since trades occur randomly at either the bid or the ask price, the measured rate of 
return will vary depending upon whether the price movement was from a bid price to an 
ask price or from one ask (bid) to another ask (bid) price. If the latter takes place, the 
absolute value of the CRSP measured return would be lower than in the case when the 
price movement was from a bid price to an ask price. This results in a measurement bias.  
The second source of bias can arise from infrequent trading. Most illiquid stocks 
are less likely to trade on a given day. For these stocks, CRSP uses the average of the bid 
and ask price to measure returns. The mid price is not likely to be the price at which an 
investor trades the stock. To address both these issues18 we take the ask price at the 
beginning of the month and the bid price at the end of the month for 1−tP  and tP  to 











The bid-ask adjusted returns for IPOs are run on Fama –French and five factor 
(with LIQ) regressions for the COLD-LIQ, HOT LIQ and the zero-investment portfolios. 
The results are presented in Table 2.16. For the Fama French framework, the COLD LIQ 
portfolio has a significant (10%) positive alpha of 0.16% per month which is slightly 
lower than 0.19% alpha for similar regression using CRSP monthly return (see Table 
                                                 
18 In general the size of the bias is larger if the returns are measured daily.  
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2.9). For the HOT LIQ portfolio the alpha of -0.37% is almost similar to the result with 
CRSP monthly returns (see Table 2.10). The columns (5) and (6) of Table 2.16 reveals 
the result of the zero investment portfolio. For the Fama French model the intercept is 
0.53% which translates to an excess return of 6.4% per annum. This compares to 0.56% 
monthly excess return or 6.7% annual return for the zero investment portfolio created 
using CRSP monthly returns (see Table 2.11). The results for alpha for the five factor 
model for COLD LIQ and zero-investment portfolio is positive but not significant and for 
HOT LIQ it is negative but insignificant. 
VII. Conclusions 
The relationship between current liquidity and future returns is negative but a 
positive contemporaneous relationship exists between liquidity and returns. This has 
significant implications about the role of observed liquidity as an indicator of future 
returns. Early excess liquidity seems to be an indicator of IPO underperformance in the 
long run. It appears to us that there is initial overpricing in the after market of IPO during 
short run which is coupled with high liquidity. If there is positive excess liquidity to 
begin with, the expected return on the IPO is lower in the short run.  If the level of 
liquidity observed at the IPO after-market in the short run cannot be sustained over the 
long run, then as the liquidity declines, the expected rate of return will rise towards its 
long run ‘equilibrium’ value causing underperformance.  
Two sub-samples of IPOs based on their excess liquidity show that the positive 
excess liquidity portfolio of firms under performs compared to the negative excess 
liquidity portfolio in the long run of one to two years after the initial one year portfolio 
formation period following the IPO.  
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Empirical evidence on the long term performance of IPOs from 1993 to 2005 
shows that if the long term performance is measured by cumulative average excess 
returns, IPOs underperform a standard benchmark index. If the measure of 
underperformance in a multifactor asset pricing framework is used, there is 
underperformance when the market, size value, and liquidity factors are considered.  
However, the underperformance diminishes in significance if a momentum factor is 
included.  The underperformance measured in the factor framework is sensitive to the 
sample period which supports the findings of Loughran and Ritter (2000).  
If the multi- factor framework is considered, some studies find underperformance 
and some have reported no underperformance either in identical sample periods or 
different sample periods. A potential explanation for this can be the fact that the extent of 
long run performance of IPOs in a sample period is determined by the liquidity profile of 
the IPOs.  More specifically, if there are more IPO firms which are characterized by 
positive excess liquidity, the subsequent future returns would show underperformance if 
measured above a period of one to three years. 
Furthermore, the liquidity of the positive excess liquid IPOs declines on average 
and that negative excess liquid IPOs increase over time. The statistical event period of 
three years is too small to indicate a mean reversion in liquidity; however, this analysis is 
an area for future research.  
Changes in liquidity can act as early warning signal for market moves. This is an 
interesting avenue that may be worth pursuing for security analysts. Creating high and 
low excess liquidity portfolios could be used as suitable hedging portfolios for fund 
managers. In general, our results suggest that future research should explore in more 
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detail what role liquidity risk plays in various event studies as well as in pricing 
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 The sample consists of CRSP-Compustat consistent NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ data from January, 
1993 to December, 2005. Excluded are closed-end funds, ADRs (American Depository Receipts, issued by 
foreign firms which have listings in at least one other market outside the US), REITs (real estate investment 
trusts), units, mutual-to-stock conversions, preferred stocks, penny stocks (with offer price less than $5), 
and the securities ineligible for continued listing. The data set is partitioned by size deciles by ranking all 
stocks each month by market capitalization and assigning a capital rank. The mean market raw monthly 







Capital size deciles 






    
1 $8.98 0.0041 -1.33% 
2 $14.23 0.0072 -0.65% 
3 $31.59 0.0094 0.18% 
4 $61.25 0.0112 0.70% 
5 $114.51 0.0135 1.25% 
6 $213.60 0.0161 1.36% 
7 $420.43 0.0189 1.72% 
8 $893.78 0.0225 2.07% 
9 $1,235.79 0.0284 2.31% 
10 $13,207.10 0.0276 2.11% 
    
Total Sample $1,520,994.54 0.0159 0.97% 
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Table 2.2: COLD and HOT Liquidity Portfolios 
This table reports summary statistics for the COLD LIQ and HOT LIQ portfolios held in calendar time. 
The HOT LIQ portfolio consists of IPOs that have a mean positive excess liquidity in the 11 months 
following the first month of its IPO and also a positive excess liquidity on the 12th month of its IPO. The 
negative excess liquidity portfolio COLD LIQ is created based on the mean negative excess liquidity in the 
11 months following the first month of its IPO and also a negative excess liquidity on the 12th month of its 
IPO. The sample period is from January, 1993 to December, 2005. The monthly equal-weighted and value-
weighted excess returns are created against a benchmark of equal-weighted and value-weighted CRSP 
NYSE/NASDAQ index returns. 
 
Panel A: Portfolio formation period: 2-12 month of IPO 
 COLD LIQ Portfolio HOT LIQ Portfolio 
 Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N 
Size ($’000,000) $15.8 2.395 12342 $37.1 39.21 14054 
Raw returns 0.11 2.53 12341 1.82 2.697 14052 
Excess returns (Equal 
weighted) -0.76 1.917 12341 1.08 2.55 14052 
Excess returns (Value 
weighted) -0.93 1.966 12341 0.58 2.02 14055 
Stock turnover 0.0070 0.0060 12342 0.0256 0.0287 14054 














Panel C: Entire period:2-36 month of IPO 
 COLD LIQ Portfolio HOT LIQ Portfolio 
 Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N 
Size ($’000,000) $49.93 557.1 39323 $89.01 831.7 44555 
Raw returns 0.85 2.419 39323 1.07 2.834 44555 
Excess returns (Equal 
weighted) 0.24 2.298 39323 -0.06 2.667 44555 
Excess returns (Value 
weighted) 0.31 2.344 39323 0.01 2.139 44694 
Stock turnover 0.0092 0.0227 39460 0.0235 0.0472 44749 
       
 
Panel B: Analysis period:13-36 month of IPO 
 COLD LIQ Portfolio HOT LIQ Portfolio 
 Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N 
Size ($’000,000) $57.2 678.9 27118 $94.4 874.4 30602 
Raw returns 1.153 2.845 26982 0.41 2.951 30592 
Excess returns (Equal 
weighted) 0.41 2.732 26982 -0.12 2.782 30592 
Excess returns (Value 
weighted) 0.42 2.775 26982 -0.07 2.232 30592 
Stock turnover 0.0119 0.0360 27118 0.01927 0.0701 30602 
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Table 2.3: Cumulative Average Excess returns on COLD and HOT Liquidity Portfolios 
This table reports the cumulative average excess returns for the COLD LIQ and HOT LIQ portfolios in 
event time. The HOT LIQ portfolio consists of IPOs that have a mean positive excess liquidity in the 11 
months following the first month of its IPO and also a positive excess liquidity on the 12th month of its IPO. 
The negative excess liquidity portfolio COLD LIQ is created based on the mean negative excess liquidity 
in the 11 months following the first month of its IPO and also a negative excess liquidity on the 12th month 
of its IPO. The sample period is from January, 1993 to December, 2005. The monthly equal-weighted and 
value-weighted excess returns are created against a benchmark of equal-weighted and value-weighted 
CRSP NYSE/NASDAQ index returns. The t-statistics in parentheses gives the result of a paired t-test for 











Excess Liquidity Portfolios 
Cumulative Average 
Excess Returns, 







    
HOTLIQ    (2-12 months) 8.63 9.03 13 
COLDLIQ   (2-12 months) -4.17 -3.27 0.73 
 (-4.31) (-4.22) (-4.34) 
HOTLIQ  (13-36 months) -7.67 -9.45 2.36 
COLDLIQ (13-36 months) 5.12 7.3 9.32 
 (2.67) (2.93) (3.19) 
(Without years 1999-2000)    
HOTLIQ   (2-12 months) 13.06 11.39 13.17 
COLDLIQ  (2-12 months) 6.46 7.81 9.18 
 (-4.74) (-4.36) (-4.76) 
HOTLIQ  (13-36 months) -9.13 -7.14 3.01 
COLDLIQ (13-36 months) -2.95 -2.98 7.24 
 (2.90) (2.94) (2.72) 
 
  62
Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics 
MKT  is the realization of the market risk premium in period t, SMB is the return on a portfolio of small 
stocks minus the return on a portfolio of big stocks in period t, and HML is the return on a portfolio of 
value stocks minus the return on a portfolio of growth stocks in period t. UMD is the momentum factor as 
in Carhart (1997).The factor returns are obtained from Kenneth French’s web site. LIQ (low minus high) is 
the liquidity risk premium calculated as the difference between the mean returns for the three lowest 
liquidity portfolios (as measured by turnover) and three highest liquidity portfolios. LMH (low minus high) 
liquidity factor is supplied by Eckbo and Norli. pSMB and the pHML are the size and value factors created 
on a dataset purged of new issues and IPOs. The purged factors are obtained from Jay Ritter’s web site. The 
sample period is from January, 1993 to December, 2005. The data on LMH factor is only available till 









Panel A:    
 Mean Std. Dev. 
No. of 
months 
Excess return on the market, MKT 0.6167 4.2569 156 
Difference in returns between small and big firms, SMB 0.1706 3.9179 156 
Difference in returns between value and growth firms, HML 0.4241 3.6076 156 
Difference in returns between winner and loser firms, UMD 0.8933 5.1542 156 
Difference in returns between low liquidity and high 
liquidity firms, LIQ 0.0903 5.2840 156 
    
Eckbo & Norli (2005) liquidity factor based on the 
difference in returns between firms with low and high 
turnover, LMH 0.1442         3.2528 120 
Difference in returns between small and big firms purged of 
new issues, pSMB 0.2021 3.4763 132 
Difference in returns between value and growth firms 
purged of new issues, pHML 0.2040 3.2197 132 
    
Panel B:         
 MKT SMB pSMB HML pHML UMD LIQ LMH 
MKT 1        
SMB 0.1533 1       
pSMB 0.02 0.9565 1      
HML -0.5649 -0.5255 -0.3727 1     
pHML -0.5454 -0.4237 -0.3067 0.9453 1    
UMD -0.1865 0.186 0.1839 -0.0589 -0.0326 1   
LIQ -0.5639 -0.5112 -0.4401 0.6134 0.5605 0.0999 1  
LMH -0.6887 -0.5237 -0.4265 0.6081 0.5747 0.21 0.8267 1 
         
 
  63
Table 2.5: ALL IPO firms 
All regressions are calendar time portfolio regressions using the Newey-West method. The dependent 
variable is the equal-weighted monthly percentage return on a portfolio of IPOs that have gone public 
during the prior 36 months. fIPO RR − is the excess return over the risk-free rate on an IPO portfolio in 
time period t, MKT  is the realization of the market risk premium in period t, SMB is the return on a 
portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a portfolio of big stocks in period t, and HML is the return on 
a portfolio of value stocks minus the return on a portfolio of growth stocks in period t. UMD is the 
momentum factor as in Carhart (1997).The factor returns are obtained from Kenneth French’s web site. 
LIQ is the liquidity risk premium calculated as the difference between the mean returns for the three lowest 
liquidity portfolios (as measured by turnover) and three highest liquidity portfolios. LMH ((low minus 
high) is the liquidity factor supplied by Eckbo and Norli. The sample period for the first four regressions is 
from January, 1993 to December, 2005. For the regression with the LMH factor, the sample period is from 
January, 1993 to December, 2002. The standard errors are in parentheses. ***,**,* denote significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 All Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 FF-3 factor  Carhart(1997) FF + LIQ 5-Factor (LIQ) 5-Factor (LMH) 
α  -0.274* -0.155 -0.2044* -0.156 -0.215 
 (0.1142) (0.0833) (0.0978) (0.0857) (0.1356) 
MKT 1.388*** 1.202*** 1.228*** 1.103*** 1.021*** 
 (0.1677) (0.0882) (0.1639) (0.1004) (0.0806) 
SMB .989*** 1.106*** .8558*** 1.006*** .9453*** 
 (0.131) (0.0967) (0.1516) (0.103) (0.0709) 
HML -.4438*** -.5284*** -.4472*** -.5767*** -.5877*** 
 (0.096) (0.1355) (0.0762) (0.1216) (0.1213) 
LIQ   -0.235* -.1213*  
   (0.1178) (0.0563)  
UMD  -.5152***  -.505*** -.4779*** 
  (0.0744)  (0.0779) (0.0781) 
LMH     -.3482** 
     (0.1233) 
      
R-squared 0.8104 0.8768 0.8263 0.8904 0.8917 
No. of 
Observations 156 156 156 156 120 






Table 2.6: By different sample periods 
All regressions are calendar time portfolio regressions using the Newey-West method. The dependent 
variable is the equal-weighted monthly percentage return on a portfolio of IPOs that have gone public 
during the prior 36 months. fIPO RR − is the excess return over the risk-free rate on a IPO portfolio in 
time period t, MKT  is the realization of the market risk premium in period t, SMB is the return on a 
portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a portfolio of big stocks in period t, and HML is the return on 
a portfolio of value stocks minus the return on a portfolio of growth stocks in period t. UMD is the 
momentum factor as in Carhart (1997).The factor returns are obtained from Kenneth French’s web site. 
LIQ is the liquidity risk premium calculated as the difference between the mean returns for the three lowest 
liquidity portfolios (as measured by turnover) and three highest liquidity portfolios. Newey-West standard 










IPO performance: by Sample Period 




     -Dec 1998        
Fama-French -0.308* 1.612*** .851*** -.4752***   0.8803 
 (0.1322) (0.0969) (0.1107) (0.0875)    
5-Factor model -0.255* 1.011*** 1.114*** -0.2636 -.1336* -0.0492 0.8871 
 (0.1220) (0.063) (0.1017) (0.194) (0.0617) (0.1139)  
         
Jan 1999 
- Dec 2000        
Fama-French -0.961 1.013*** 0.484* -.8612**   0.8939 
 (0.5167) (0.2477) (0.1873) (0.2513)    
5-Factor model -0.726 .9342* .5136* -.9185** -0.2005 -0.2062 0.9008 
 (0.4595) (0.3477) (0.1941) (0.235) (0.2741) (0.1719)   
         
Jan 2001 
- Dec 2005        
Fama-French 0.643 1.614*** 1.297*** -.7707***   0.8366 
 (0.4835) (0.1092) (0.2574) (0.1619)    
5-Factor model 0.45 1.082*** 1.244*** -0.126 -0.37032 -.79*** 0.9569 
 (0.4823) (0.1542) (0.1164) (0.1122) (0.2569) (0.1482)  
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Table 2.7: By different exchanges 
All regressions are calendar time portfolio regressions using the Newey-West method. The dependent 
variable is the equal-weighted monthly percentage return on a portfolio of IPOs that have gone public 
during the prior 36 months. fIPO RR − is the excess return over the risk-free rate on a IPO portfolio in 
time period t, MKT  is the realization of the market risk premium in period t, SMB is the return on a 
portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a portfolio of big stocks in period t, and HML is the return on 
a portfolio of value stocks minus the return on a portfolio of growth stocks in period t. UMD is the 
momentum factor as in Carhart (1997).The factor returns are obtained from Kenneth French’s web site. 
LIQ is the liquidity risk premium calculated as the difference between the mean returns for the three lowest 
liquidity portfolios (as measured by turnover) and three highest liquidity portfolios. There are 503 firms in 
NYSE, 104 firms in AMEX and 2,766 firms in NASDAQ in the IPO sample. Newey-West standard errors 













 NYSE AMEX NASDAQ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
FF-3 









α  -.133** -.138** -0.0114 -0.0188 -0.169* -0.178 
 (0.0482) (0.0829) (0.016) (0.016) (0.074) (0.119) 
MKT 1.057*** 1.049*** .379*** .3597*** 1.106*** 1.093*** 
 (0.05) (0.052) (0.0547) (0.0551) (0.034) (0.034) 
SMB 0.6567*** .6887*** .4684*** .436*** 1.074*** 1.056*** 
 (0.065) (0.067) (0.0499) (0.0506) (0.042) (0.043) 
HML .4509*** .4707*** .1507* .1865* -.8474*** -.8317*** 
 (0.0071) (0.073) (0.0737) (0.077) (0.053) (0.055) 
LIQ      -.4113  -.09224  -.4686* 
  (0.242)  (0.0651)  (0.213) 
UMD -.2839*** -.28*** .1168*** .1264*** -.538*** -.5365*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.0324) (0.0328) (0.05) (0.051) 
       
R-squared 0.8484 0.8522 0.0851 0.0882 0.8807 0.8829 
No. of 
Observations 156 156 156 156 156 156 
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Table 2.8: COLD and HOT LIQ IPOs all months 
All regressions are calendar time portfolio regressions using the Newey-West method. The dependent 
variables are the equal-weighted monthly percentage return on a portfolio of HOT LIQ and COLD LIQ 
IPOs that have gone public during the prior 36 months. The HOT LIQ and COLD LIQ portfolios are 
created using a measure of excess liquidity discussed in the paper. fIPO RR − is the excess return over 
the risk-free rate on a portfolio in time period t, MKT  is the realization of the market risk premium in 
period t, SMB is the return on a portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a portfolio of big stocks in 
period t, and HML is the return on a portfolio of value stocks minus the return on a portfolio of growth 
stocks in period t. UMD is the momentum factor as in Carhart (1997).The factor returns are obtained from 
Kenneth French web site. LIQ (low minus high) is the liquidity risk premium calculated as the difference 
between the mean returns for the three lowest liquidity portfolios (as measured by turnover) and three 
highest liquidity portfolios. LMH ((low minus high) is the liquidity factor supplied by Eckbo and Norli. 
The sample period for the first four regressions is from January, 1993 to December, 2005. For the 
regression with the LMH factor the sample period is from January, 1993 to December, 2002. The standard 





 Negative Excess Liquidity IPOs Positive Excess Liquidity IPOs 
 (1)           (2) (3)            (4) 
 FF-3 factor  5-Factor (LIQ) FF-3 factor  5-Factor (LIQ) 
α  -0.084 -0.103 -0.2958* -0.2156 
 (0.0502) (0.0551) (0.1402) (0.1621) 
MKT 1.227*** 1.016*** 1.57*** 1.25*** 
 (0.1502) (0.0766) (0.1841) (0.1201) 
SMB .9343*** .9761*** 1.061*** 1.077*** 
 (0.0767) (0.0541) (0.1702) (0.154) 
HML -.173** -.2505*** -.6455*** -.7872*** 
 (0.0649) (0.0731) (0.1266) (0.1628) 
LIQ  -.0839*  -.1553* 
  (0.0329)  (0.074) 
UMD  -.4057***  -.5913*** 
  (0.0666)  (0.0996) 
     
     
R-squared 0.79 0.8777 0.7995 0.8797 
No. of 
Observations 156 156 156 156 
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Table 2.9: COLD LIQ IPOs 
All regressions are calendar time portfolio regressions using the Newey-West method. The dependent 
variable is the equal-weighted monthly percentage return of negative excess liquidity IPOs (COLD LIQ) 
for two years after the portfolio formation period of one year. The COLD LIQ portfolio is created using a 
measure of excess liquidity discussed in the paper. MKT  is the realization of the market risk premium in 
period t, SMB is the return on a portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a portfolio of big stocks in 
period t, and HML is the return on a portfolio of value stocks minus the return on a portfolio of growth 
stocks in period t. UMD is the momentum factor as in Carhart (1997). LIQ (low minus high) is the liquidity 
risk premium calculated as the difference between the mean returns for the three lowest liquidity and three 
highest liquidity portfolios formed at the end of t-1. LMH (low minus high) is the liquidity factor supplied 
by Eckbo and Norli. The sample period for the first four regressions is from January, 1994 to December, 
2005.  The last regression includes the LMH is from January, 1993 to December, 2002. The standard errors 



























Negative Excess Liquidity IPOs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 





α  0.1876** 0.148* 0.178* 0.188 0.222 
 (0.0724) (0.0671) (0.0825) (0.1241) (0.1190) 
MKT 1.239*** 1.017*** 1.096*** .9439*** .8744*** 
 (0.165) (0.051) (0.1537) (0.0656) (0.0543) 
SMB .9296*** 1.047*** .819*** .9582*** .9103*** 
 (0.083) (0.0765) (0.1082) (0.0614) (0.0531) 
HML -0.05256 -.1773* -0.01016 -0.1747 -.1882* 
 (0.072) (0.0795) (0.089) (0.0881) (0.0778) 
LIQ   -0.2426* -0.1315  
   (0.1125) (0.1022)  
UMD  -.5642***  -.5184*** -.4945*** 
  (0.0919)  (0.0934) (0.0869) 
LMH     -.3255* 
     (0.1517) 
      
R-squared 0.7384 0.8488 0.7638 0.8606 0.8623 
No. of 
Observations 144 144 144 144 112 
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Table 2.10: HOT LIQ IPOs 
All regressions are calendar time portfolio regressions using the Newey-West method. The dependent 
variable is the equal-weighted monthly percentage return of positive excess liquidity IPOs (HOT LIQ) for 
two years after the portfolio formation period of one year. The HOT LIQ portfolio is created using a 
measure of excess liquidity discussed in the paper. fIPO RR − is the excess return over the risk-free rate 
on a portfolio in time period t, MKT  is the realization of the market risk premium in period t, SMB is the 
return on a portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a portfolio of big stocks in period t, and HML is 
the return on a portfolio of value stocks minus the return on a portfolio of growth stocks in period t. UMD 
is the momentum factor as in Carhart (1997).The factor returns are obtained from Kenneth French’s web 
site. LIQ (low minus high) is the liquidity risk premium calculated as the difference between the mean 
returns for the three lowest liquidity portfolios (as measured by turnover) and three highest liquidity 
portfolios formed at the end of t-1. The sample period for the first four regressions is from January, 1994 to 
December, 2005.  The last regression includes the LMH is from January, 1993 to December, 2002. 





























Positive Excess Liquidity IPOs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 





α  -0.373* -0.258 -0.334* -0.277 -0.443 
 (0.1601) (0.1344) (0.1583) (0.1481) (0.2669) 
MKT 1.605*** 1.282*** 1.373*** 1.123*** .9924*** 
 (0.2059) (0.1089) (0.2142) (0.1085) (0.0847) 
SMB 1.003*** 1.174*** .7847*** 1.013*** .9139*** 
 (0.1771) (0.1437) (0.2257) (0.1311) (0.1121) 
HML -.4755* -.6573** -.5316*** -.802*** -.8059*** 
 (0.1822) (0.2117) (0.1488) (0.1209) (0.1162) 
LIQ   -0.3234** -0.1409  
   (0.1282) (0.1265)  
UMD  -.8225***  -.8052*** -.8098*** 
  (0.1706)  (0.2016) (0.1012) 
LMH     -.4962*** 
     (0.1111) 
      
R-squared 0.7278 0.8510 0.7502 0.8649 0.8686 
No. of 
Observations 144 144 144 144 112 
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Table 2.11: Zero Investment Strategy on COLD and HOT Liquidity portfolios. 
The table reports the results of time series regression use the Newey-West method. The dependent variable 
is the monthly portfolios return are on a zero investment portfolio formed by an investment strategy which 
is long on negative excess liquidity IPOs (COLD LIQ) and short on positive excess liquidity IPOs (HOT 
LIQ). The portfolio includes IPOs which have completed their first anniversary of IPO but are less than 
three years of age.                 is return on the zero investment portfolio in time period t, MKT  is the 
realization of the market risk premium in period t, SMB is the return on a portfolio of small stocks minus 
the return on a portfolio of big stocks in period t, and HML is the return on a portfolio of value stocks 
minus the return on a portfolio of growth stocks in period t. UMD is the momentum factor as in Carhart 
(1997).The factor returns are obtained from Kenneth French’s web site. LIQ (low minus high) is the 
liquidity risk premium calculated as the difference between the mean returns for the three lowest liquidity 
portfolios (as measured by turnover) and three highest liquidity portfolios. LMH (low minus high) liquidity 
factor is supplied by Eckbo and Norli. The sample period for the first four regressions is from January, 
1994 to December, 2005.  The last regression includes the LMH is from January, 1993 to December, 2002. 

































 (1) (2) (3)          (4) (5) 





α  0.5606* 0.4061 0.5127* 0.4653* 0.6651 
 (0.2664) (0.2393) (0.2540) (0.2158) (0.3602) 
MKT -.3659*** -.2644** -.2772*** -.1793** -.118* 
 (0.0646) (0.0844) (0.0779) (0.0669) (0.047) 
SMB -0.07329 -0.1272 -0.03428 -0.0553 -0.00361 
 (0.1229) (0.0998) (0.1302) (0.0879) (0.0875) 
HML .4229* .48* .5214*** .6273*** .6177*** 
 (0.1697) (0.1897) (0.1272) (0.1144) (0.1175) 
LIQ   0.08296* 0.00942  
   (0.04097) (0.0667)  
UMD  .2583**  .3336*** .3153*** 
  (0.0851)  (0.0318) (0.0344) 
LMH     .1707* 
     (0.0837) 
      
R-squared .3879 .4655 .4414 .5678 .5718 
No. of 
Observations 144 144 144 144 108 
      
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )











Table 2.12: COLD LIQ and HOT LIQ portfolios on Purged Fama French factors 
All regressions are calendar time portfolio regressions using the Newey-West method. The dependent 
variables are the equal-weighted monthly percentage return on a portfolio of HOT LIQ and COLD LIQ 
IPOs for two years after the portfolio formation period of one year. The HOT LIQ and COLD LIQ 
portfolios are created using a measure of excess liquidity discussed in the paper. MKT  is the realization 
of the market risk premium in period t, SMB is the return on a portfolio of small stocks minus the return on 
a portfolio of big stocks in period t, and HML is the return on a portfolio of value stocks minus the return 
on a portfolio of growth stocks in period t. The SMB and HML factors are created by Loughran and Ritter 
(1999) using a dataset purged of IPOs and Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs). UMD is the momentum 
factor as in Carhart (1997).The factor returns are obtained from Kenneth French’s web site. LIQ is the 
liquidity risk premium calculated as the difference between the mean returns for the three lowest liquidity 
portfolios (as measured by turnover) and three highest liquidity portfolios. LMH (low minus high) is the 
liquidity factor supplied by Eckbo and Norli. The sample period for the regressions is January, 1994 to 





 Negative Excess Liquidity IPOs Positive Excess Liquidity IPOs 
 (1)           (2) (3)            (4) 
 FF-3 factor  5-Factor (LIQ) FF-3 factor  5-Factor (LIQ) 
α  0.2156** 0.1528 -0.357* -0.262 
 (0.0842) (0.0868) (-0.1601) (-0.1401) 
MKT 1.325*** .9914*** 1.7*** 1.227*** 
 (0.2026) (0.0836) (0.2415) (0.1179) 
pSMB 1.01*** .9734*** 1.129*** 1.135*** 
 (0.0684) (0.074) (0.1572) (0.1695) 
pHML -0.1927 -.3536** -.7228*** -.9948*** 
 (0.0988) (0.1078) (0.1996) (0.1052) 
LIQ  -0.1799*  -0.2038* 
  (0.0882)  (0.0858) 
UMD  -.4845***  -.8053*** 
  (0.1118)  (0.1292) 
     
     
R-squared 0.7167 0.8251 0.7159 0.8433 
No. of 
Observations 120 120 120 120 
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Table 2.13: Performance of COLD LIQ IPOs over different sample periods 
All regressions are calendar time portfolio regressions using the Newey-West method. The dependent 
variable is the equal-weighted monthly percentage return of negative excess liquidity IPOs (COLD LIQ) 
for two years after the portfolio formation period of one year. The COLD LIQ portfolios are created using a 
measure of excess liquidity discussed in the paper. MKT  is the realization of the market risk premium in 
period t, SMB is the return on a portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a portfolio of big stocks in 
period t, and HML is the return on a portfolio of value stocks minus the return on a portfolio of growth 
stocks in period t. UMD is the momentum factor as in Carhart (1997). The factor returns are obtained from 
Kenneth French’s web site. LIQ (low minus high) is the liquidity risk premium calculated as the difference 
between the mean returns for the three lowest liquidity portfolios (as measured by turnover) and three 
highest liquidity portfolios. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***,**,* denote significance at 10%,5% and 









Negative Liquidity Portfolio performance: by Sample Period (13-36) 




     -Dec 1998        
Fama-French 0.353* .9707*** 1.023*** -0.1481   0.8437 
 (0.1502) (0.0528) (0.0362) (0.0818)    
5-Factor model 0.295 .9515*** .9625*** -0.06761 -0.1767* -0.053 0.8478 
 (0.1667) (0.0701) (0.1263) (0.1941) (0.0843) (0.1359)  
         
Jan 1999 
- Dec 2000        
Fama-French 0.026* .7603** .6346** -0.2479   0.8106 
 (0.0112) (0.2515) (0.1957) (0.3023)    
5-Factor model 0.064 0.5656 .594* -0.2599 -0.4031 -0.180 0.8244 
 (0.0512) (0.2951) (0.2294) (0.3473) (0.4107) (0.1773)  
         
Jan 2001 
- Dec 2005        
Fama-French 0.526* 1.491*** 1.145*** -.4675**   0.7772 
 (0.2055) (0.1457) (0.2977) (0.1503)    
5-Factor model 0.698 .8403*** 1.09*** 0.1493 -0.2134 -.963*** 0.8865 
 (0.5966) (0.1137) (0.1493) (0.3228) (0.2187) (0.1121)  
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Table 2.14: Performance of HOT LIQ IPOs by different sample periods 
All regressions are calendar time portfolio regressions using the Newey-West method. The dependent 
variable is the equal-weighted monthly percentage return of negative excess liquidity IPOs (HOT LIQ) for 
two years after the portfolio formation period of one year. The HOT LIQ portfolios are created using a 
measure of excess liquidity discussed in the paper. MKT  is the realization of the market risk premium in 
period t, SMB is the return on a portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a portfolio of big stocks in 
period t, and HML is the return on a portfolio of value stocks minus the return on a portfolio of growth 
stocks in period t. UMD is the momentum factor as in Carhart (1997).The factor returns are obtained from 
Kenneth French’s web site. LIQ (low minus high) is the liquidity risk premium calculated as the difference 
between the mean returns for the three lowest liquidity portfolios (as measured by turnover) and three 
highest liquidity portfolios. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***,**,* denote significance at 10%,5% and 











Positive Liquidity Portfolio performance: by Sample Period (13-36) 




  -Dec 1998        
Fama-French -0.566* 1.226*** 1.1*** -0.5302***   0.8237 
 (0.2429) (0.0862) (0.1762) (0.111)    
5-Factor model -0.437* 1.196*** 0.9651*** -0.4744 -0.18435* -0.3065* 0.8332 
 (0.2091) (0.1404) (0.1661) (0.2617) (0.0832) (0.1442)  
         
Jan 1999 
- Dec 2000        
Fama-French -0.836* 1.033* 0.3264 -0.9672   0.8131 
 (0.4000) (0.402) (0.2819) (0.4996)    
5-Factor model -0.818 0.6718 0.2821 -1.025 -0.7719 -0.4225 0.8442 
 (-0.4173) (0.4212) (0.2767) (0.491) (0.4865) (0.2629)  
         
Jan 2001 
- Dec 2005        
Fama-French 0.0835 1.823* 1.674*** -1.108***   0.8009 
 (0.0576) (0.2014) (0.3516) (0.2587)    
5-Factor model 0.055 1.008*** 1.605*** -0.1184 -0.336* -1.206*** 0.9156 
 (0.0618) (0.2101) (0.2308) (0.2034) (0.1368) (0.2277)  
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Table 2.15: Equally Weighing by Number of Firms verses equally weighing time periods 
All regressions use White-Huber Sandwich estimator for cross sectional regressions. The dependent 
variable is the equal-weighted monthly percentage return of COLD LIQ or HOT LIQ portfolio for two 
years after the portfolio formation period of one year. The HOT LIQ portfolios are created using a measure 
of excess liquidity discussed in the paper. MKT  is the realization of the market risk premium in period t, 
SMB is the return on a portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a portfolio of big stocks in period t, 
and HML is the return on a portfolio of value stocks minus the return on a portfolio of growth stocks in 
period t. UMD is the momentum factor as in Carhart (1997).The factor returns are obtained from Kenneth 
French web site. LIQ (low minus high) is the liquidity risk premium calculated as the difference between 
the mean returns for the three lowest liquidity portfolios (as measured by turnover) and three highest 
liquidity portfolios. The sample period for the first four regressions is from January, 1994 to December, 
2005.  The last regression includes the LMH is from January, 1993 to December, 2002. Standard errors are 













































       
α  0.586*** .721*** .68*** -.621** -.689** -.651* 
 (0.095) (0.151) (0.13) (0.2128) (0.2657) (0.2847) 
MKT+ 1.149*** .956*** .869*** 1.422*** 1.084*** .916*** 
 (0.064) (0.056) (0.081) (0.082) (0.023) (0.0107) 
SMB .942*** .9715*** .885*** .982*** 1.037*** .899*** 
 (0.085) (0.009) (0.003) (0.122) (0.081) (0.087) 
HML -.0541*** -.256** -.247*** -.638*** -.903*** -.886*** 
 (0.098) (0.101) (0.095) (0.137) (0.129) (0.125) 
LIQ  -.0203***   -.0543*  
  (0.028)   (0.025)  
UMD  -.492*** -.442***  -.863*** -.804*** 
  (0.0080) (0.0073)  (0.112) (0.097) 
LMH   -.239***   -.4725** 
   (0.0952)   (0.174) 
       
R-squared 0.7678 0.8499 0.8531 0.7397 0.8753 0.8804 
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Table 2.16: Bid-Ask Adjusted Portfolio returns  
All regressions are calendar time portfolio regressions using the Newey-West method. The dependent 
variable in columns (1) and (2) is the equal-weighted monthly percentage return of negative excess 
liquidity IPOs for two years after the portfolio formation period of one year. The dependent variable in 
Columns (3) and (4) is the equal-weighted monthly percentage return of positive excess liquidity IPOs for 
similar duration The dependent variable in columns (5) and (6) is the monthly portfolios return are on a 
zero investment portfolio formed by an investment strategy which is long on negative excess liquidity IPOs 
and short on positive excess liquidity IPOs. The monthly returns on individual IPOs are computed using 
“Ask” price at the beginning of the month and the “Bid” price at the end of the month MKT  is the 
realization of the market risk premium in period t, SMB is the return on a portfolio of small stocks minus 
the return on a portfolio of big stocks in period t, and HML is the return on a portfolio of value stocks 
minus the return on a portfolio of growth stocks in period t. UMD is the momentum factor as in Carhart 
(1997). LIQ (low minus high) is the liquidity risk premium calculated as the difference between the mean 
returns for the three lowest liquidity and three highest liquidity portfolios formed at the end of t-1. LMH 
(low minus high) is the liquidity factor supplied by Eckbo and Norli. The sample period for the first four 
regressions is from January, 1994 to December, 2005.  The last regression includes the LMH is from 
January, 1993 to December, 2002. The standard errors are in parentheses. ***,**,* denote significance at 




 Negative Excess Liquidity Positive Excess Liquidity Zero-Investment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 FF-3 factor  
5-Factor 
(LIQ) FF-3 factor  
5-Factor 
(LIQ) FF-3 factor  
5-Factor 
(LIQ) 
α  0.1645* 0.1723 -0.3685* -0.2736 0.5329* 0.4332 
 (0.0759) (0.1379) (0.1651) (0.1532) (0.2474) (0.2851) 
MKT 1.238*** .9439*** 1.605*** 1.123*** -.3673*** -.1791** 
 (0.1653) (0.0732) (0.2063) (0.1092) (0.0646) -0.0669 
SMB .9295*** .9582*** 1.002*** 1.0133*** -0.0726 -0.0552 
 (0.0832) (0.0617) (0.1773) (0.1313) (0.1229) (0.0879) 
HML -0.0526 -0.1743 -0.4755* -.802*** .4229* .6285*** 
 (0.0717) (0.0863) (0.1831) (0.1209) (0.1701) (0.1265) 
LIQ  -0.1329  -0.1511  0.0182 
  (0.1022)  (0.1257)  (0.0597) 
UMD  -0.5184***  -.8052***  .2963*** 
  (0.0933)  (0.2017)  (0.0433) 
       
R-squared 0.7236 0.8602 0.7232 0.8589 0.3401 0.5558 
No. of 
Observations 144 144 144 144 144 144 





















Corporate Innovation and Corporate Governance:  





















C H A P T E R  3  
Corporate Innovation and Corporate Governance: A Study of U.S. Firms 
Introduction 
American workers are currently about seven times as productive as they were a 
century ago. Real wages and average family income are also roughly seven times higher 
than the corresponding levels in 1900. This increase in labor productivity has not been 
simply the result of endowing labor with more capital; it has also been the outcome of 
improved technology and efficiency. In Paul Samuelson’s (1999) words, “it is the result 
of inspiration as well as perspiration” (pp. 28). This “inspiration” is often measured by 
total factor productivity (TFP) and is calculated using a residual – the difference between 
the growth rates of an index of output and an index of input.  
The importance of TFP cannot be over emphasized. In his pioneering paper, 
Solow (1957) finds that some 80 percent of the rise in output per worker in the United 
States over the preceding half-century was explained by this mysterious residual which 
he called the measure of our ignorance. Since, many researchers have confirmed that 
sustained high economic growth is consistent with high values of this Solow residual or 
TFP. The novel thing about TFP is that it can be applied to compare economies, 
industries, and on a micro level, firms. 
Vassalou and Apedjinou (2005) use the concept of TFP at the firm level as 
corporate innovation. In their words,  
Most economists and strategists would agree that matching a firm’s amount of 
labor and capital is not sufficient for replicating its performance in terms of 
market share and profits. Several other factors play a pivotal role including, 
but not limited to, the quality of its management, its commitment to 
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innovation, marketing efforts, and brand name. Such factors can substantially 
differentiate two firms with otherwise identical amounts of capital and labor 
in place, and lead to very different levels of profits. In fact, such factors may 
contribute either positively or negatively to a firm’s profits. For simplicity, we 
will refer to such non-capital and non-labor productivity factors as corporate 
innovation. (pp. 3) 
 
A growing strand of literature, including Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (GIM, 2003), 
Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), and Cremers and Nair (2005), has found that firms having better 
corporate governance have higher long-term stock returns, firm value, and operating 
performance. This paper attempts to add to this literature by suggesting that a part of a firm’s 
TFP growth can be attributed to a better corporate governance system in the firm and 
stronger shareholder rights in particular. 
This paper shows that firms with stronger shareholder rights also have higher TFP 
growth, controlling for the factors that may influence the TFP growth. These factors include 
the effect of intangibles, the scale effect due to size, and industry specific effects. The results 
are robust for the sample period from 1990-2004.  
I.  Background and Motivation 
A.  Corporate Governance 
The single major challenge faced by corporate governance is to simultaneously 
grant the managers sufficient discretionary power over the conduct of a business and hold 
them accountable for the use of that power. However, as in a classic principal-agent 
problem, the best interest of the agent (manager) is not always aligned with that of the 
principal (owner). 
The 1980’s was a period of hostile takeovers and merger and acquisition (M&A) 
activities. This was brought about by the introduction of the junk bond market, which 
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financed leverage buy-out and management buy-out deals that threatened even the largest 
public firms. As a direct response, many firms adopted takeover defenses. These defenses 
were comprised of provisions that restricted shareholder rights and the ability for 
shareholders to meet and act. Around the late 1980’s, influenced by pressure groups, 
several states passed anti-takeover laws which helped the firms to strengthen defenses 
against hostile takeover bids. According to GIM (2003), the firms with weak shareholder 
rights are more likely to experience a wider divergence of ownership and control. 
Additionally, such firms are also more likely to have high agency costs and hence, poor 
corporate governance. 
When does a firm become susceptible to takeover bids? When another company 
(or investor) finds that the target company is not generating enough wealth to the 
shareholders or the target company has the potential to generate higher value than what is 
possible under current management. There are other factors, like product market 
competition, vertical integration, or geographical consolidation, which influence takeover 
decisions. However, ceteris paribus, a firm is a potential target for a takeover if it is not 
generating enough shareholder value under the current management. 
If a firm has strong shareholder rights and minimal takeover defenses then, a 
managers could be risk-averse and may only select low return-low risk projects. At the 
same time, if the company is not being innovative and is unable to generate high returns 
on projects, the market valuation of the firm is likely to go down in the future and 
become more susceptible to takeovers. So, the managers of a firm having strong 
shareholder rights would be more efficient (in the TFP sense) lest they might lose their 
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job.19 The justification for takeover threats (less anti-takeover provisions) is often seen as 
the strongest form of managerial discipline (Jensen, 1986). Lower agency costs due to 
stronger shareholder rights (GIM, 2003) create an environment that may foster 
managerial efficacy.  
On the other extreme, there are firms where the shareholders have very few rights. 
If there are stiff anti-takeover provisions, so that the firm is impregnable to outside 
takeovers, managers feel more secure. In this case, such managers may engage in risky 
behavior because the fear of being “taken” over by some firm is small. Managers would 
be willing to take more calculated risks, and therefore, be innovative, which may translate 
into better future growth prospects, operating performance, and increased long term value 
of the firm. At the same time, with increased job security, managers may put in less 
effort, shirk, appropriate a part of the cash flows as high executive compensations, or 
invest in inefficient projects (Williamson, 1964). With weak shareholder rights, it is 
difficult or costly to replace managers, so managers may be more willing and able to 
extract private benefits (Jensen, 1986). 
Empirical evidence supports the latter stream of reasoning (Blanchard, et al., 1994;, 
Lang, et al., 1991; Harford, et al., 2006). Those firms which have weak shareholder rights 
tend to make more acquisitions for empire building purposes, which destroy firm value 
(Masulis, et al., 2006). Similarly, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2006) argue that poorly 
governed firms dissipate excess cash quickly in ways that significantly reduce operating 
                                                 
19 Typically when there is a hostile takeover, many of the target company’s middle level and senior level 




performance. They also find that the negative impact of large cash holdings on future 
operating performance is eliminated if the firm is well governed.  
Thus, the existing literature reveals that managers in an environment of lower 
agency costs, characterized by stronger shareholder rights, are more disciplined and are less 
likely to indulge in activities which reduce firm value at the expense of their private 
benefits. In addition, this paper concludes that firms characterized by stronger shareholder 
rights and better governance have higher total factor productivity growth than the firms 
with weaker shareholder rights. Better corporate governance implies lower takeover 
defenses, more competition for the managers and hence more potential for corporate  
innovation. 
B.  Total Factor Productivity 
Bartelsman and Doms (2000) point out that managerial ability, 
management/ownership changes, technology, human capital, and regulation are all 
factors that have been discussed in recent literature that influence productivity growth.  
The direct effect on the productivity growth of the firm emanates from the fact that 
managers make the choice of the firm’s inputs, outputs, and technology. Lucas (1978) 
models labor productivity being the same across firms in equilibrium, due to diminishing 
returns to managerial skill. In contrast, according to Jovanovic’s (1982) model, better 
managers have high efficiency parameters and higher productivity. Bartelsman and Doms 
(2000) comment, 
On a practical level, managerial quality may be an important factor behind 
productivity heterogeneity……………Testing the role of managerial quality 




This paper contributes to this literature on sources of productivity growth by 
including corporate governance as a factor contributing to the growth in total factor 
productivity. In this way, governance acts as a proxy of managerial quality or competence. 
This is the first such paper which uses the broad based and widely used governance index 
G , compiled by GIM (2003) to provide evidence that stronger shareholder rights have a 
greater positive effect on productivity growth and that the effect diminishes as the strength 
of the shareholder rights weaken. 
II. Data and Methodology 
A.  Governance Data 
Following GIM (2003), the recently developed and widely used governance index 
measures is used to measure the strength of shareholder rights.20 GIM’s governance index  
G  is created on the basis of how many restrictive governance provisions are imposed on 
shareholder rights; the more restrictive the governance, the weaker the shareholder rights. 
Their primary data source is the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), which 
publishes detailed listings of corporate-governance provisions for individual firms in 
Corporate Takeover Defenses volumes (Rosenbaum, 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002 
and 2004). The governance index is constructed as follows. For every firm, GIM adds 
one point for every provision that restricts shareholder rights and correspondingly 
increases managerial power; thus, the higher the score, the weaker the shareholder rights.  
Each volume of Corporate Takeover Defenses includes about 1400 to 1500 firms, 
with some changes in the list of included firms from volume to volume. In any given year 
                                                 




of publication, the firms covered by IRRC account for over 90% of the total market 
capitalization on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. Since the IRRC does not publish 
volumes for every year, missing years are filled by assuming that the governance 
provisions reported in any given year were also in place in two years preceding the 
volume’s publication. In the event that there was a gap in reporting, for example, if a firm 
is reported in 1990 and again in 1998, the years 1991-1993 are filled assuming it did not 
change its governance value from 1990. For years 1995-1997 the value from 1998 is 
used. This procedure is consistent with all the major studies involving the G  index. 
Using different filling methods do not change the results qualitatively. The major reason 
being that the G  index is relatively sticky, as about 45% of the firms had some changes 
in its G  level in the 15 years comprising the sample (1990-2004). 
A simple linear transformation of the G  index is CORPG = 24- G . The G  index 
is based on 24 corporate governance provisions. A firm can have a maximum G  value of 
24 (which would essentially make the firm fascist.). In the sample employed in this 
paper, the CORPG has a maximum value of 22 (there are no firms having zero, or one  
G  index value) and a minimum value of 6 (which corresponds to value of 18 in the G  
index). Higher values of CORPG correspond to better shareholder rights.  
B.  Empirical Cobb-Douglas Model for Total Factor Productivity 
The starting point of our empirical model of productivity growth is a Cobb-
Douglas production function with two factor inputs. This specification, partly based on 
Nickell (1996), explicitly models the sources of total factor productivity. Specifically, the 
level of total factor productivity as a function of the firm’s past corporate governance is 
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modeled. In particular, it is assumed that firm’s production function is given by21 
   icilik ititititit HLKY ,,,
βββΦ=            (1) 
 where itY  is value added, measured as sales minus the cost of goods sold, itΦ  is a 
measure of total factor productivity, itK  is the tangible capital stock, itL  is the labor 
input, and itH  is the stock of intangible capital for firm i  in year t . Since value added, 
defined as total sales less materials costs, is used as an output measure, this specification 
implicitly allows for materials as the fourth input.  
The issue though is accounting for the different growth rates of labor and capital 
for firms in different industries. In other words, it would be naïve to assume that the 
factor inputs of labor and tangible and intangible capital have similar coefficients across 
industries. Just using industry dummies does not solve the problem as it is not able to 
isolate the effect of individual factor inputs. Instead, an alternative formulation that is 
able to capture the industry specific component on the factor inputs of labor, tangible, and 
intangible capital is employed.  
For a firm belonging to a particular industry, the coefficient on tangible capital 
ik ,β  is treated as )(,, ijkkik βββ += , to capture the industry adjusted coefficient on 
tangible capital and the coefficient on intangible capital is treated as )(,, ijhhih βββ += to 
                                                 
21 Results do not change qualitatively if a simpler specification without intangible capital is employed. 
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capture the industry adjusted coefficient on intangible capital. Similarly, the industry 
adjusted coefficient on labor il ,β is calculated as )(,, ijllil βββ += where )(ij denotes the 
industry of firm i . The regression terms for labor, tangible, and intangible capital factor 
inputs for firm i  belonging to industry )(ij are given by  
( ))(,)(,, ijtiijltil INDll ×+ ββ , ( ))(,)(,, ijtiijktik INDkk ×+ ββ  ,  ( ))(,)(,, ijtiijhtih INDhh ×+ ββ    
where jIND  is the dummy variable for the j
th industry. Unlike Nickell (1996), the 
restriction that factor coefficients to sum to 1 is not used, i.e., constant returns to scale are 
not assumed. This gives the basic log-linear empirical production function 











))(()(,))(()(,         (2)  
Additionally, taking first differences eliminates the fixed firm effect iμ  which accounts 
for all unobserved company specific factors influencing the level of productivity. This 
gives the differenced growth version of the adjusted Cobb-Douglas production function  
   ( ) ( ), ( ) ( ) , ( ) ( )
, ( ) ( )( )
y k l hit it itk lit h it
k IND l INDit itk j i j i l j i j i
h INDit ith j i j i
φ β β β
β β
β υ
Δ = Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ
+ Δ × + Δ ×
+ Δ × +Δ
      (3)    
Finally, the sources of productivity growth are specified by using the level of corporate 
governance in year t-1. The level of corporate governance is proxied by CORPG. To 
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control for value added growth differences between younger firms and older firms, the 
logarithm of a firm’s age in years, which is the difference between the foundation date of 
the firm and the current date, is used. The coefficient on the age variable should be 
negative in line with the view that younger firms are likely to have a faster growth than 
the older firms (Evans, 1987b). An alternative measure of firm age as the log of years 
listed does not qualitatively alter the results.  
In addition, time and industry dummies are included to account for time effects 
that capture shocks common to all firms and industry effects that capture shocks specific 
to the particular industry which a firm belongs to. Thus, total factor productivity growth 
is specified as  
EffectsIndustryEffectsYearAgeitCORPGit +++−=Δ )ln(211 λλφ             (4) 
The above model specification defined by equations (3) and (4) is used for all regression 
results. The Industry dummy variable from equation (4) is excluded for the firm specific 
fixed effects model as industry dummies will be collinear with firm fixed effects.  
C.  Firm Specific Accounting Data 
The inputs used to compute a firm’s TFP are obtained from COMPUSTAT. In 
terms of data series used, a firm’s gross profit or value added is defined as the difference 
between a firm’s sales (SALES, COMPUSTAT industrial Annual data item 2) and its 
cost of goods sold (COGS, COMPUSTAT Annual data item 30). A firm’s labor input is 
the number of its employees (EMP, COMPUSTAT industrial annual data item 29). The 
capital stock of a firm is measured using the Net Property, Plant, and Equipment (PPEN, 
COMPUSTAT industrial annual data item 8). PPEN is firm’s net fixed assets. The book 
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value of total assets is used to account for the size factor (ASSETS, COMPUSTAT 
industrial annual data item 6). Intangible is proxied by COMPUSTAT item 33 and 
represents the net value of intangible assets.22  Long term liabilities (LTD, industrial 
annual data item 9) are taken as the value of debt. Also, EBITDA (earnings before 
interests, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) is taken from COMPUSTAT industrial 
annual data item 13) as a gross operating profit. 
To capture industry wide differences across firms, we classify them into 10 
industries (see Table 3.2 and Appendix B) based on Fama-French (1997) classification 
system using SIC codes.23 Intangible intensity (INTANI), defined as the ratio of intangible 
assets to net fixed assets (PPEN), is used as a control variable in our regressions as a 
robustness check. This is because the intangible-intensity varies largely among industries 
(Claessens and Laev, 2003). It would also account for some industry level differences in 
productivity. Table 3.2 displays the average intangible-intensity benchmarks for U.S. 
firms in 10 different industries. The average intangible-intensity during the sample period 
(1990-2004) is 128%. But there is a wide variation of intangible-intensity across 
industries, ranging from as low as 4% for utilities and 12% for petroleum, natural gas and 
coal  products to as high as 267 % for the telecommunications industry and 224% for the 
healthcare industry. The variation concurs with notions of what constitutes relatively 
capital intensive versus more knowledge intensive industries.  
                                                 
22 Intangibles are assets that have no physical existence in themselves, but represent rights to enjoy some 
privilege. In COMPUSTAT, this item includes blueprints or building designs, patents, copyrights, 
trademarks, franchises, organizational costs, client lists, computer software patent costs, licenses, and 
goodwill. 
23 We thank Kenneth French for making this information available on his website. 
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D. Some Measurement Issues 
The capital stock in a firm is difficult to measure with time series of investments 
required along with composition issues. However, Bailey, et al., (1992), find that in the 
productivity model, the use of sophisticated measures of capital instead of crude 
measures based on book values of capital stock do not change the results qualitatively. 
For labor input, there is no way to distinguish between "blue collar" and "white collar" 
workers and hence the measured employed assumes the same amount of labor 
productivity and ignores the composition issues. 
All the variables in the Cobb-Douglas model are required to be either in nominal 
terms or real terms for consistency. We have nominal accounting values for all our 
variables except labor. The COMPUSTAT item “labor and related expenses” would have 
served the purpose, however COMPUSTAT does not report this data regularly and the 
labor and related expenses data amount to less than 5% of the sample. The widely used 
alternative is the number of employees as a measure of labor input, which is in real terms.  
Since prices do not rise equally for all goods and services, finding the real values 
from the nominal book values is not simple. Rises in the price of oil are likely to affect 
the petroleum extraction industry much more than say consumer durables. Similarly, a 
decline in the prices of consumer durables may not result in similar decline in prices in 
the food industry. To convert nominal book values into real values, each firm’s output 
and costs must be deflated by sub-industry specific producer prices. Also applying price 
deflators based on industry is only acceptable under perfect competition where price per 
unit of quality adjusted output is identical across firms. Bartelsman and Doms (2003) 
suggest that persistent dispersion of productivity and costs across firms even in the same 
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industry, disputes the empirical validity of perfect competition. Refraining from 
attempting to take on such a complicated endeavor, a generic and widely used consumer 
price index is instead used to compute the real values of the nominal variables. 
The data on the consumer price index is obtained from Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) website24 of the U.S. Department of labor. The broadest, most comprehensive CPI, 
the consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U) for the U.S. city average for 
all items with base 1982-84=100, is used here. We calculate the real values from the 
nominal book values of capital, intangibles, assets, net sales and cost of goods sold by 
deflating each variable each year by the corresponding yearly CPI-U index. 
D.  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 presents the median, mean and standard deviation of the regression 
variables. The median firm age is 37 years and the mean is 58 years with a standard 
deviation of 28 years. The governance index G  has a median value of 9 and a mean value 
of 8.40 with a standard deviation of 4.59 representing almost a normal distribution. The 
growth in value added has a median growth rate of 5.16% and a mean growth rate of 7.93% 
with a standard deviation of 16.53%. This reflects a high growth rate of output for the 
sample period from 1990 to 2004. The tangible capital stock and labor both have median 
growth rates around 3.7% and little higher mean growth rates. Intangible capital stocks 
grew at a negative rate during the sample period and the standard deviation was 13%. The 
largest part of intangibles is often goodwill. Thus, this mean negative growth of intangibles 
stock could be due to a spate of high merger and acquisition (M&A) activities in late 1980s 




and a relative decline of the M&A activities in the 1990s. The intangible-intensity is also 
highly skewed with median of 54% and a mean of 128% with a standard deviation of 60%. 
Table 3.2 presents the mean values of some firm statistics based on the 10 
industries. The industries are categorized using 10 industry classifications from SIC codes 
by Fama-French (1997). The growth in value added during the period 1990-2004 is highest 
for the healthcare industry at 18.3%. This industry also has one of the highest intangible-
intensities. The energy sector, which includes petroleum, natural gas, and coal products, 
had the second highest growth in value added at 17.8%. The EBMARGIN defined as 
EBIT/SALES, where EBIT is the earnings before interest and taxes, is highest for 
telecommunication industry at 33%, and lowest for wholesale and retail businesses at 
slightly over 9%. The gross profit margin (GPM) defined as the ratio of (Sales-
COGS)/Sales follows a pattern similar to growth in value added. The average size of total 
assets varies from $1,676 million for consumer durables to $17,481 million for 
telecommunications industry. The leverage defined as the ratio of long term liabilities to 
book value of total assets is highest for the telecommunications sector at 33%. The mean 
leverage of the entire sample is 20%. 
III. Results and Analysis 
A.  OLS estimation with robust standard errors 
The starting point of this analysis is a pooled OLS regression of the model 
specified by equations (3) and (4). Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg tests reveal the 
presence of panel heteroskedasticity which is corrected by the use of a Huber-White 
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Sandwich estimator for robust standard errors25. Wooldridge (2002) autocorrelation tests 
for panel data show autocorrelation in the levels but no serial correlation when first 
differences are used. As the model is a first differenced mode, the problems associated 
with autocorrelation are not a concern.  
Column (1) in Table 3.3 reports the result of a simple pooled regression with the 
absence of individual firm effects and cross industry dummies for capital, labor, and 
intangibles. The coefficient on growth rates of the input factors is positive and significant 
at the 1% level. The coefficient of 0.0022 on the lagged CORPG term is also positive and 
highly significant. This implies that a one point increase in CORPG will increase the 
value added by 1%.26 As expected, the coefficient on firm age is negative and is 
significant. However, there is a positive and significant (at 10%) intercept term which 
possibly indicates the presence of an omitted variable. The intercept becomes 
insignificant when cross industry dummies of the factor inputs are included in the 
regression as specified by equation (3). The coefficient on lagged CORPG is similar to 
the value in column (1) and significant at the 1% level. The coefficients for the factor 
inputs except capital are all insignificant, though a few of individual cross industry 
dummies for labor and intangibles are significant. The 30 cross industry dummies for 
factor inputs are not presented for brevity of exposition. 
The regressions in Table 3.3, columns (3) and (4) expand the model to incorporate 
temporal and per-industry heterogeneity by adding year and industry dummies to the 
                                                 
25 We also use Roger’s standard errors for robustness but the significance of the coefficient of the 
regressors does not change. 
26 A firm that is one standard deviation better than the average firm in terms of its corporate governance 
measure will have a 1% higher value added than the average firm in the sample, given by the product of the 




model. Column (3) reports a fixed time effects pooled regression model which includes 
year dummies. This helps in controlling for a time effect that makes errors spatially 
correlated.  The coefficient on the governance variable is positive and significant at 1%. 
Column (4) reports the result of a pooled OLS regression with 10 industry dummies. The 
coefficient on CORPG is significant at 5%. The last column uses both fixed time and 
industry effects and finds similar results. The coefficient on CORPG in all the five pooled 
OLS regressions is stable and significant. Overall, the results imply a robust positive and 
significant effect of corporate governance on a firm’s productivity growth.  
B.  Endogenously Issues 
One of principal problems faced when creating an empirical model for 
governance studies is the problem of endogeneity. The variables that represent levels of 
corporate governance may be also determined simultaneously with dependent variables 
related to firm value and productivity. The simultaneous equations bias makes it difficult 
to determine the direction of causality. Corporate governance can affect productivity, but 
productivity can also generate a better governance structure (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2003).  
The problem of simultaneous equation bias could be empirically treated by the 
use of an instrumental variables or the Arellano-Bond (1991) approach, but such an 
instrument for G  is not easily identified. GIM (2003) also report their inability to come 
up with a suitable instrument for G  to use as an instrumental variable. 
Using lagged values of CORPG, however, may partially reduce this endogeneity 
problem. Lagged governance index also ensures that the information set at the beginning 
of time t contains the prior year value of each firm’s governance index, preventing a 
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look-ahead bias. The endogeneity problem can also be reduced if productivity growth is 
included rather than productivity levels simply because productivity growth is less 
persistent than productivity levels (Nickell, 1996).  
C. Panel Data Fixed Effect Model 
An alternative solution for the endogeneity problem is the use of panel data fixed 
effect models. A source of endogeneity can be omitted variables related to firms, years, 
or industries. A combined time and firm fixed effect regression model eliminates omitted 
variables arising both from unobserved variables that are constant over time and 
unobserved variables that are constant across firms. With firm fixed effects, the 
regression coefficient on CORPG is driven by the extent of variation over time within 
each firm. Since the governance index for a firm being largely invariant over time (in our 
sample around 55% of the firms do not undergo a change during the sample period 1990-
2004), the fixed effects regression coefficient on CORPG is mostly attributed to the 
variation of CORPG of the firms for which the governance index does change over time. 
If a firm’s governance is sticky over time, that firm would not contribute to the 
coefficient estimation but will only introduce noise and lower test power (Chi, 2005). 
GIM rejects the use of panel data fixed effect in the sense of firm fixed effects with time-
varying coefficients for the above-mentioned reason. Another problem with firm-fixed 
effects is that including all our firm dummies significantly reduces the degrees of 
freedom.  
Hausman (1978) test suggests picking fixed effects over random effects. Though, 
both fixed and random effects regression results are presented to check for robustness. 
The GLS random effects results are discussed in the robustness section. Column (1) in 
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Table 3.4 corresponds to the total sample. This sample is then divided over two sub-
samples called DEM and DICT that correspond to the levels of lagged 5≤G  
and 2413 ≤≤G , respectively.27 Note that there are no firms with G  above 18 in the 
sample. With higher levels of CORPG corresponding to better corporate governance, the 
sub-samples DEM and DICT correspond to democratic and dictator firms in the previous 
year since they are based on lagged G  values. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 3.4 
correspond to sub-samples DEM and DICT respectively. In each column, regressions are 
for the growth of firm value added on firm’s capital, labor and intangibles growth, and 
lagged corporate governance index CORPG with the log age of firms used as a control 
variable.  
Regressors also include industry specific capital, labor, and intangibles 
components that are not reported in the table for brevity of exposition. For all firms and 
dictator sub-samples, the coefficient on lagged CORPG is positive but marginally 
significant at the 10% level. The coefficient on CORPG for all firms is higher in 
magnitude though lower in significance than the previous pooled OLS results in Table 
3.3. Notice, that the t-values are lower than those reported in the pooled OLS models.  
This is because in the fixed effects model, only the time-series variation of governance is 
captured. For the democratic sub-sample, the coefficient on CORPG is 0.0054 which 
implies that a one point increase in CORPG, all else equal, have 2.47% higher value 
                                                 
27 We modify the GIM (2003) classification for Dictator firms by including firms from 13≥G  instead of 
14≥G . This allows us to add about 500 firm years to the sample which makes our dictator sub-sample 
less skewed in number of observations in comparison to the democratic sub-sample. Our results do not 
change qualitatively if the GIM (2003) classification is used though. 
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added28. For the dictator sub-sample, the coefficient on the governance variable is 
negative but insignificant. The results for the entire sample and for the democratic sub-
sample are quite strong considering the fact that for a sizeable number of firms in the 
sample the corporate governance index does not change over time. Hence, the fixed 
effect regression only captures changes in CORPG for firms which undergo a change in 
its G  index. 
D. Robustness section 
A series of robustness checks is included in this subsection. The results indicate 
that the empirical findings documented in the previous subsection are robust to different 
econometric model specifications, additional control variables, and yearly analyses. 
D.1 Year-by-Year Regression 
In the unlikely event that the results were influenced by the effect of a single year 
or few years, OLS regressions on the model specified by equations (3) and (4) are 
conducted for each year starting from 1990 to 2004. All regressions use the Huber-White 
sandwich estimator, which is robust to the presence of generic heteroskedasticity. Table 
3.5 shows that in 14 out of 15 years in the sample, the coefficient of CORPG remains 
positive. In eight of the fifteen years it is positive and significant. The only year it is 
negative is 1997, but it is insignificant. The coefficient on CORPG is relatively stable 
throughout the years. 
D.2 Generalized Least Squares Random–Effects Model. 
                                                 
28 A firm that is one standard deviation better than the average firm in terms of its corporate governance 
measure will have a 2.47% higher value added than the average firm in the sample, given by the product of 
the standard deviation and the coefficient on CORPG, that is 4.59 times 0.54%. 
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It is possible that the level of governance effects firm productivity not only in the 
time series but also in the cross section.   A random effect model captures both the time-
series and the cross sectional variations while modeling the error terms differently for 
each firm, and therefore generates more efficient estimates than a fixed effects model 
does. However, a Hausman (1978) specification test indicates that a fixed effects model 
is more efficient as there may be omitted variables present. Random effects regression 
results are also presented; as such specification is widely used in finance research29. The 
justifications for reporting the random effects model are as follows.  First, the omitted 
variable may have nothing to do with the governance level. Second, as governance levels 
tend to be sticky over time, the fixed effects regression may not reveal the true picture. 
Third, fixed effects may work best when there are relatively fewer firms and more time 
periods, as each dummy variable removes one degree of freedom from the model. There 
are close to 2,000 firms with an average of only 9 yearly observations.  
Table 3.6 reports the result of GLS random effects regressions. Column (1) 
indicates that lagged CORPG is positive and significant at 1% for the entire sample. For 
democratic firms represented by sub-sample DEM, the coefficient of lagged CORPG has 
a higher positive number and significance at the 1% level. This implies that the effect of 
the governance variable on productivity growth is the strongest for the democratic sub-
sample. The coefficient on age is negative and significant at 5% for both the entire 
sample and democratic sub-sample. Column (3) shows the results of dictator firms 
                                                 
29 Statistically, fixed effects are always a reasonable thing to do with panel data (they always give 
consistent results) but they may not be the most efficient model to run. Random effects will give better p-
values as they are a more efficient estimator, so random effects should be employed if it is statistically 




represented by sub-sample DICT. The coefficient of lagged CORPG is negative but 
insignificant.  
D.3  Additional Control Variables 
There is a stream of literature30 which includes lagged output as a control variable 
in the empirical Cobb-Douglas production function. In particular, it is assumed that 
firm i ’s production function is given by the standard Cobb-Douglas formulation (1) and 
(2). Following Nickell (1996), lagged output is included in the empirical production 
function. This expansion takes into account potential persistence in output levels. This 
gives the basic log-linear empirical production function, with ity , itk , itl , ith and itφ  













                  (2’) 
Secondly, taking first differences eliminates the fixed firm effect iμ  which accounts for 
all unobserved company-specific factors influencing the level of productivity. The 
differenced growth version of the adjusted Cobb-Douglas production function is thus 
obtained 
1
( ) ( ), ( ) ( ) , ( ) ( )
, ( ) ( )( )
y y k l hit it itk lit o it h it
k IND l INDit itk j i j i l j i j i
h INDit ith j i j i
φ β β β β
β β
β υ
Δ = Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ
−
+ Δ × + Δ ×
+ Δ × +Δ
                         (3’) 
                                                 
30 For example, see Nickell (1996) and Köke and Renneboog, (2005). 
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where 1−Δ ty  controls for any growth or momentum effect that may obscure results of the 
regressions.  
The inclusion of dynamics in the form of a lagged dependent variable captures the 
fact that, whenever there is a change in factor inputs of production, it takes some time for 
output to reach its new long run level. For example, if new capital goods are purchased, it 
may take a considerable amount of time for the new machines to be fully operational. 
Autonomous shocks to effort (such as increasing the speed of the production line) may 
induce a rise in output and a possible fall in employment. In fact, including 1−Δ ty  puts a 
downward bias on the right-hand side exogenous variables, so the results should be 
stronger if there is still a significant relationship between governance and productivity 
growth after controlling for potential persistence in output.  
To control for growth effects related to firm size but unrelated to corporate 
governance, lagged log total assets is included. This is expected to make the coefficient 
on assets negative as small firms tend to grow faster than large firms (Hall, 1987). Also, 
intangible-intensity INTANI is included as a control variable. The modified equation 
including additional control variables is given by 
ln( ) ln, 11 2 3 , 1 4 , 1CORPG Age ASSETS INTANIit i t i t i t
Year Effects Industry Effects
φ λ λ λ λΔ = + + +− − −
+ +
                (4’) 
Table 3.7 reports pooled OLS results with Huber-White sandwich estimators. 
Column (1) shows OLS regression results without the cross industry dummies. All of the 
regressors except the lagged log assets are significant. Comparing these results with the 
results in Table 3.3, the coefficient on CORPG is still positive and significant though has 
declined from 0.0022 to 0.0019. The coefficient on log lagged assets is negative as 
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expected. Intangible-intensity is positively related to growth in value added. The 
coefficient on CORPG is fairly stable and significant, though the magnitude of the 
coefficient and the level of significance has decreased after the inclusion of additional 
control variables. 
D.3.1  Panel Data Fixed Effect and GLS Random Effects Model. 
How the coefficient on CORPG behaves in the presence of additional control 
variables for the entire sample and the sub-samples of DEM and DICT is particularly 
relevant. Column (1) of Table 3.8 reports the result of a fixed effects model for all firms. 
The coefficient on CORPG is positive but has declined from 0.0031 to 0.0024. For the 
random effects model in column (2), the coefficient on CORPG is 0.0023 and significant 
at 5%. For the democratic sub-sample, the fixed effect model generates a coefficient of 
0.0042 but is now insignificant, as is seen in column (1) of Table 3.9. The corresponding 
coefficient for the dictator sub-sample in column (1) of Table 3.10 is negative as before 
and also insignificant. Column (2) in Table 3.9 shows that the result for the DEM firms 
on CORPG for the random effects model is positive and significant, whereas for the 
DICT firms it is negative but insignificant. 
In general, the inclusion of additional control variables does not change the sign 
of the coefficient on the governance variable, though the magnitude and the significance 
declines.  
D.4 Young and Old firms 
Though firm age is included in the regressions as a control variable, a check for 
whether the strong relation between productivity and CORPG is primarily due to the 
younger firms in our sample is necessary. Follow Anderson and Reeb (2003), firms are 
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classified into young and old based on whether the firm is under or over 50 years of age. 
Also, a cut-off age as 37 years (the median) is used and had roughly similar results. Table 
3.11 shows that the coefficient on CORPG for both young and old firms is positive and 
significant; though for younger firms the effect is stronger. The results confirm that there 
is a positive association between productivity and corporate governance regardless of 
firm age. 
D.5  Outliers 
Table 3.1 gives the summary of the main regression variables. Some of the 
regressors, like growth in intangibles, assets, and intangible-intensity, are highly skewed. 
To test whether if the results are influenced by extreme values in the sample, each of the 
regression variables except CORPG is winsorized. Each tail of the distributions is 
trimmed by 5%, 10%, and 20%.  The results still show a positive relation between strong 
shareholder rights and productivity. For brevity, only the results based on 10% 
winsorization of each tail are presented in Table 3.13. Column (1) of Table 3.12 shows 
the pooled OLS regression with robust standard errors.  Column (2) shows a similar 
model with additional control variables, while columns (3) and (4) report results of a 
panel fixed effects regression and a GLS random effects regression respectively. The 
results are even stronger than without winsorizing. CORPG was only marginally 
significant at 10% for the pooled OLS with control variables and the panel fixed effects 
model, referring to Table 3.8 and Table 3.9). After trimming for outliers, the coefficient 




IV.  Conclusions 
This paper shows that a firm’s growth of total factor productivity is positively 
related to the quality of governance CORPG which proxies the strength of shareholder 
rights for a firm. The effect varies positively with the quality of governance, and is 
strongest among firms which have the strongest shareholder rights. As the governance 
quality becomes poorer, the strength of the effect declines. At very low levels of CORPG, 
corresponding to the weakest shareholder rights, the effect on productivity growth is less 
clear, and in some of the results there is a negative relationship between the level of 
governance and productivity growth. One possible explanation behind this behavior 
could be that at the weakest levels of shareholder rights, a discrete addition or inclusion 
of governance provisions does not have much of an additional effect on governance 
quality, and thus does not provide clear results in the regressions. Another possible 
reason is the much smaller size of dictator firms in the sample results in low power for 
testing. 
To summarize, some firms are very efficient whereas others are not and some firms 
have much faster rates of innovation and productivity growth than others though they use 
similar factor inputs. There are some factors which contribute to higher total factor 
productivity growth that may determine this difference among firms. This paper provides 
evidence that the quality of corporate governance in a firm is a likely source of productivity 
growth. Better governance implies lower takeover defenses, more competition for the 
managers and hence more corporate innovation. The channels through which it influences 
productivity growth are not directly investigated.  However, it is suggested that good 
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governance can have a positive influence on a manager’s ability, which in turn contributes 
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Table 3.1:  Variable Description and Summary Statistics 
 




Log of Age (in years) of firm i, defined as the 
difference between the current year, t, and the 




G  Governance index measure of a firm as 
constructed in GIM (2003). Higher values of 





 A Corporate Governance measure formed as a 
linear transformation of the G  index. Higher 





ityΔ  Growth rate of value added or the gross profit of firm i in year t, defined as the difference in 




itkΔ  Growth rate of the net capital stock of firm i in year t, defined as the difference in the log 




itlΔ  Growth rate of labor of firm i in year t, defined as the difference in the log values of number 




ithΔ  Growth rate of intangibles of firm i in year t, defined as the difference in the log values of 





Log of the Book value of Total Assets of firm i 
in year t. 
$5389 million 
$45,746 million 
($24, 284 million) 
itINTANI  
Intangible intensity of firm i in year t. Defined 
as the ratio of the Book value of Intangibles to 
the Book value of Net Fixed Assets for firm i 





Note: The median, mean and standard deviation for age and assets are given without the logs. The 





Table 3.2: Means and standard errors of selected variables based on industry. 
 
 




 EBMARGIN GPM ROE 
ASSETS 
$ millions) INTANG LEV 
         
Consumer Non-
Durables 9 8.39% 16.77% 43.17% 24.40% 3925 1.37 0.22 
  0.6% 3% 4% 5.9% 288.020 0.065 0.006 
         
Consumer 
Durables 10 10.43% 12.22% 31.63% 12.38% 1676 1.10 0.23 
  2.1% 4% 6% 0.09% 167.908 0.178 0.012 
         
Manufacturing 9 7.46% 14.63% 32.36% 14.61% 3519 0.64 0.23 
  0.5% 0.1% 3% 1.0% 133.926 0.022 0.004 
Energy, Oil, 
Gas, and Coal 
Extraction 9 17.84% 27.09% 36.07% 8.78% 7720 0.12 0.23 




Equipment 7 14.70% 16.51% 42.52% 13.18% 2594 1.06 0.14 
  0.9% 0.3% 0.5% 1.7% 207.931 0.062 0.006 
         
Telecommuni-
cations 8 16.34% 32.80% 48.03% 6.92% 17481 2.67 0.33 
  1.5% 6% 9% 1.4% 1890.681 0.223 0.013 
Wholesale, 
Retail, and 
Some Services 8 14.58% 9.24% 29.17% 12.33% 3051 0.92 0.19 
  0.5% 0.1% 0.4% 0.6% 192.697 0.097 0.004 
Healthcare, and 
Drugs 8 18.29% 22.58% 54.89% 15.82% 3712 2.24 0.15 
  0.9% 3% 7% 1.4% 308.749 0.194 0.005 
         
Utilities 9 9.31% 24.21% 24.67% 10.28% 12131 0.04 0.32 
  1.8% 5% 5% 0.4% 655.830 0.003 0.004 
         
Others 8 15.50% 19.41% 35.53% 14.61% 13962 2.11 0.18 
  0.6% 2% 3% 1.2% 1233.527 0.093 0.003 
         




Table 3.3: OLS regression with Robust Standard Errors 
The panel data encompasses all firms which have a governance index value created by GIM (2003) for 
1990-2004. The dependent variable is tyΔ or growth in value added. The regression result corresponds to 
the empirical Cobb-Douglas production function discussed in the paper. The regressors include the growth 
rate of tangible capital stock tkΔ , growth rate of labor tlΔ , and the growth rate of intangible capital stock 
thΔ . it INDkΔ , it INDlΔ  and it INDhΔ give the cross–industry dummies associated with tangible capital, 
labor, and intangible capital respectively. The measure of corporate governance is given by CORPG where 
higher values of CORPG signify stronger shareholder rights in a company. Ln (Age)is the logarithm of firm 
age in years. Robust standard errors are due to Huber-White sandwich estimators. ***,**,*  denote 















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 









tkΔ  0.228*** 0.0346 0.4338*** 0.0091 0.4505*** 
 (0.0244) (0.1159) (0.1097) (0.1437) (0.1148) 
tlΔ  0.3544*** 0.5654** 0.5688** 0.5642** 0.204* 
 (0.0342) (0.1899) (0.1921) (0.1897) (0.0981) 
thΔ  0.0244*** -0.035 -0.0148 -0.0508 -0.015 
 (0.0056) (0.346) (0.045) (0.3546) (0.0449) 
1, −tiCORPG  0.0022*** 0.0024*** 0.0024*** 0.0023** 0.0022** 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Ln(Age) -0.0124*** -0.0112*** -0.012*** -0.0083* -0.0092** 
 (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0035) 
Intercept 0.0483* 0.0345 0.021 0.0111 0.0035 
 (0.0174) (0.0206) (0.0238) (0.0283) (0.0289) 
it INDkΔ , it INDlΔ ,
it INDhΔ  
no yes yes yes yes 
      
R-Squared 0.2174 0.2276 0.2404 0.2304 0.2432 
No. of Firm Years 11122 10530 10530 10530 10530 




Table 3.4: Fixed –Effects regression 
The panel data fixed effect regression encompasses all firms which have a governance index value created 
by GIM (2003) for 1990-2004. The dependent variable is tyΔ or growth in value added. The regression 
result corresponds to the empirical Cobb-Douglas production function discussed in the paper. The 
regressors include the growth rate of tangible capital stock tkΔ , growth rate of labor tlΔ , and the growth 
rate of intangible capital stock thΔ . it INDkΔ , it INDlΔ  and it INDhΔ give the cross–industry dummies 
associated with tangible capital, labor, and intangible capital respectively. The measure of corporate 
governance is given by CORPG where higher values of CORPG signify stronger shareholder rights in a 
company. Ln(Age)is the logarithm of firm age in years. ***,**,*  denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 

































      
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ALL DEM DICT 
tkΔ  0.3581 0.3689 0.4929 
 (0.1920) (0.6178) (0.8093) 
tlΔ  0.3458** 0.2637 0.0606 
 (0.1325) (0.4046) (0.9139) 
thΔ  -0.2702 -0.1313 0.0127 
 (0.3826) (0.0908) (0.1961) 
1, −tiCORPG  0.0031* 0.0054* -0.0118 
 (0.0014) (0.0025) (0.0152) 
Ln(Age) -0.0274* -0.0174 -0.0567 
 (0.0138) (0.0251) (0.072) 
Intercept 0.0799 0.005 0.3809 
 (0.0608) (0.1463) (0.333) 
it INDkΔ , it INDlΔ , 
it INDhΔ  
yes yes yes 
    
R-Squared (within) 0.1838 0.1545 0.2138 
R-Squared (between) 0.2579 0.3645 0.1674 
R-Squared (overall) 0.2235 0.2268 0.2303 
No. of firm years 10530 3023 1010 
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Table 3.5: Year-by-Year Regressions 
The data is comprised of all firms which have a governance index value created by GIM (2003) from 1990-
2004. The dependent variable is tyΔ or growth in value added. The regression result corresponds to the 
empirical Cobb-Douglas production function discussed in the paper. The regressors include the growth rate 
of tangible capital stock tkΔ , growth rate of labor tlΔ , and the growth rate of intangible capital stock thΔ . 
it INDkΔ , it INDlΔ  and it INDhΔ give the cross–industry dummies associated with tangible capital, labor, 
and intangible capital respectively. The measure of corporate governance is given by CORPG where higher 
values of CORPG signify stronger shareholder rights in a company. Ln(Age)is the logarithm of firm age in 
years. For brevity of exposition, only the coefficient on lagged CORPG is tabulated. Robust standard errors 

































      
year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
1, −tiCORPG  0.00329 0.00265 0.00263 0.00231* 0.00028* 
 (0.0024) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0001) 
      
R-Squared 0.2183 0.1913 0.2720 0.2794 0.2181 
No. of  
Observations 387 799 860 928 1004 
      
      
year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
1, −tiCORPG  0.00145 0.00274* -0.00046 0.00404** 0.00681*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0368) (0.0015) (0.0016) 
      
R-Squared 0.2113 0.2859 0.3506 0.3577 0.2968 
No. of  
Observations 1085 1159 1266 1399 1504 
      
      
year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
1, −tiCORPG  0.00401** 0.00118 0.00153* 0.00154* 0.00099 
 (0.0015) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
      
R-Squared 0.3174 0.3069 0.1816 0.1778 0.1786 
No. of  
Observations 1596 1703 1880 2135 2245 




Table 3.6: GLS Random –Effects regression 
The panel data generalized least squares random effects regression encompasses all firms which have a 
governance index value created by GIM (2003) from 1990-2004. The dependent variable is tyΔ or growth 
in value added. The regression result corresponds to the empirical Cobb-Douglas production function 
discussed in the paper. The regressors include the growth rate of tangible capital stock, tkΔ , growth rate of 
labor tlΔ , and the growth rate of intangible capital stock thΔ . it INDkΔ , it INDlΔ  and it INDhΔ give the 
cross–industry dummies associated with tangible capital, labor, and intangible capital respectively. The 
measure of corporate governance is given by CORPG where higher values of CORPG signify stronger 
shareholder rights in a company. Ln(Age)is the logarithm of firm age in years. Random effects use the 








































 (1) (2) (3) 
 ALL DEM DICT 
tkΔ  -0.0129 0.7073 0.3915 
 (0.1454) (0.5389) (0.7685) 
tlΔ  0.0283 0.201 -0.2636 
 (0.1248) (0.3285) (0.7931) 
thΔ  0.0015 0.0032 -0.0642 
 (0.3458) (0.0674) (0.1791) 
1, −tiCORPG  0.0028*** 0.0069*** -0.0182 
 (0.0008) (0.002) (0.0116) 
Ln(Age) -0.0124** -0.0167** 0.0198 
 (0.0042) (0.0054) (0.0206) 
Intercept 0.0343 -0.0281 0.1395 
 (0.0237) (0.0489) (0.1482) 
it INDkΔ , it INDlΔ , 
it INDhΔ   
yes yes yes 
    
R-Squared (within) 0.1832 0.1472 0.2182 
R-Squared (between) 0.2773 0.4588 0.0456 
R-Squared (overall) 0.2274 0.2426 0.1915 
No. of firm years 10530 3023 1010 
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Table 3.7: OLS regression with robust standard errors and Control variables 
The data is comprised of all firms which have a governance index value created by GIM (2003) from 1990-
2004. The dependent variable is tyΔ or growth in value added. The regression results correspond to the 
empirical Cobb-Douglas production function discussed in the paper. The regressors include the growth rate 
of tangible capital stock tkΔ , growth rate of labor tlΔ , and the growth rate of intangible capital stock thΔ . 
it INDkΔ , it INDlΔ  and it INDhΔ give the cross–industry dummies associated with tangible capital, labor, 
and intangible capital respectively. The measure of corporate governance is given by CORPG where higher 
values of CORPG signify stronger shareholder rights in a company. The control variables are lagged value 
of log total assets 1,ln −tiASSETS , lagged intangible intensity 1, −tiINTANI , defined as the ratio of 
intangibles to net fixed assets, lagged growth in value added, 1, −Δ tiy , and  Ln(Age), the logarithm of firm 
age in years. Robust standard errors are due to Huber-White sandwich estimators. ***,**,*  denote 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 












tkΔ  0.2526*** 0.1129 0.4402*** 0.1024 0.4585*** 
 (0.0258) (0.1034) (0.1147) (0.1086) (0.1193) 
tlΔ  0.3428*** 0.5062** 0.5088** 0.5031** 0.5052* 
 (0.0342) (0.1942) (0.1968) (0.1938) (0.1964) 
thΔ  0.0246*** -1.4897** -0.0127 -1.5026** -0.0131 
 (0.0056) (0.4629) (0.0441) (0.4621) (0.0441) 
1, −tiCORPG  0.0019** 0.0019* 0.0016* 0.0017* 0.0015* 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
1,ln −tiASSETS  -0.0033 -0.0042* -0.0037 -0.0054** -0.0048* 
 (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.002) 
1, −tiINTANI  0.0023** 0.0021* 0.0022* 0.0019* 0.002* 
 (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
1, −Δ tiy  -0.0636* -0.0641* -0.0677* -0.0681* -0.0719* 
 (0.0285) (0.0291) (0.0297) (0.0292) (0.0298) 
Ln(Age) -0.0108** -0.0092* -0.0107** -0.0058 -0.0074* 
 (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0038) 
Intercept 0.0799 0.04 0.0952 0.0259 0.084 
 (0.024) (0.0273) (0.0304) (0.0335) (0.0353) 
it INDkΔ , it INDlΔ ,











R-Squared 0.2319*** 0.2437 0.2558** 0.2461 0.2582* 
Number of Obs. 10584 10011 10011 10011 10011 





Table 3.8: ALL firms with control variables 
The panel data fixed effects regression and GLS random effects regression encompasses all firms which 
have a governance index value created by GIM (2003) from 1990-2004. The dependent variable is tyΔ or 
growth in value added. The regression result corresponds to the empirical Cobb-Douglas production 
function discussed in the paper. The regressors include the growth rate of tangible capital stock tkΔ , growth 
rate of labor tlΔ , and the growth rate of intangible capital stock thΔ . it INDkΔ , it INDlΔ  and it INDhΔ give 
the cross–industry dummies associated with tangible capital, labor, and intangible capital respectively. The 
measure of corporate governance is given by CORPG where higher values of CORPG signify stronger 
shareholder rights in a company. The control variables are lagged values of log total assets 1,ln −tiASSETS , 
lagged intangible intensity 1, −tiINTANI , defined as the ratio of intangibles to Net fixed assets, lagged 
growth in value added, 1, −Δ tiy , and  Ln(Age), the logarithm of firm age in years. ***,**,*  denote 







































           (1)                          (2) 
 (Fixed Effects) 
(Random 
Effects) 
tkΔ  -0.1234 0.0877 
 (0.182) (0.1419) 
tlΔ  0.0544 0.0395 
 (0.1263) (0.121) 
thΔ  -0.9377 -0.0429 
 (0.491) (0.3458) 
1, −tiCORPG  0.0024* 0.0023** 
 (0.001) (0.0008) 
1,ln −tiASSETS  -0.0389*** -0.0059** 
 (0.0068) (0.0023) 
1, −tiINTANI  0.0027* 0.0021** 
 (0.0011) (0.0007) 
1, −Δ tiy  -0.1292*** -0.0843*** 
 (0.0094) (0.0086) 
Ln(Age) -0.0029 -0.01* 
 (0.0159) (0.0041) 
Intercept 0.3352* 0.0544 
 (0.1581) (0.0314) 
it INDkΔ , it INDlΔ , 
it INDhΔ  
yes yes 
R-Squared (within) 0.2138 0.2081 
R-Squared (between) 0.1676 0.2829 
R-Squared (overall) 0.2099 0.2429 
No. of firm years 10011 10011 
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Table 3.9: Democratic firms with control variables 
The panel data fixed effects regression and GLS random effects regression encompasses all firms which 
belong to the democratic portfolio characterized by G  values of 5 or less based on a governance index 
value created based on firm anti-takeover amendments and charter provisions from the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). See GIM (2003) for a detailed explanation of this governance 
index.  Democracies are defined as firms with 5 or fewer charter provisions having G  values of 5 or less. 
The dependent value is tyΔ or growth in value added. The regression results correspond to the empirical 
Cobb-Douglas production function discussed in the paper. The regressors include the growth rate of 
tangible capital stock tkΔ , growth rate of labor tlΔ , and the growth rate of intangible capital stock thΔ . 
it INDkΔ , it INDlΔ  and it INDhΔ give the cross–industry dummies associated with tangible capital, labor, 
and intangible capital respectively. The measure of corporate governance is given by CORPG where higher 
values of CORPG signify stronger shareholder rights in a company. The control variables are lagged value 
of log total assets 1,ln −tiASSETS , lagged intangible intensity 1, −tiINTANI , defined as the ratio of 
intangibles to net fixed assets, lagged growth in value added 1, −Δ tiy  and  Ln(Age), the logarithm of firm 




































           (1)                          (2) 
 (Fixed Effects) 
(Random 
Effects) 
tkΔ  0.1009 0.5685 
 (0.8838) (0.3894) 
tlΔ  0.2456 0.1589 
 (0.3851) (0.3095) 
thΔ  -0.1295 0.0042 
 (0.0869) (0.0125) 
1, −tiCORPG  0.0042 0.0058** 
 (0.0032) (0.0021) 
1,ln −tiASSETS  -0.0361** -0.0073* 
 (0.0134) (0.0033) 
1, −tiINTANI  0.0031 0.0017 
 (0.0017) (0.001) 
1, −Δ tiy  -0.1190*** -0.0032 
 (0.0168) (0.0144) 
Ln(Age) 0.0071 -0.0112 
 (0.0292) (0.0057) 
Intercept 0.2569 0.0156 
 (0.1821) (0.0628) 
it INDkΔ , it INDlΔ , 
it INDhΔ  
yes yes 
R-Squared (within) 0.1808 0.2068 
R-Squared (between) 0.5746 0.2045 
R-Squared (overall) 0.2846 0.1950 
No. of firm years 2924 2924 
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Table 3.10: Dictator Firms with Control Variables 
The panel data fixed effects regression and GLS random effects regression encompass all firms which 
belong to the dictator portfolio characterized by G  values of 13 or more based on a governance index 
value created based on of firm anti-takeover amendments and charter provisions from the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). See GIM (2003) for a detailed explanation of this governance 
index.  Dictators are defined as firms with 13 or more restrictive charter provisions. The dependent value is 
tyΔ or growth in value added. The regression results correspond to the empirical Cobb-Douglas production 
function discussed in the paper. The regressors include the growth rate of tangible capital stock tkΔ , growth 
rate of labor tlΔ , and the rate of growth of intangible capital stock thΔ . it INDkΔ , it INDlΔ  and 
it INDhΔ give the cross-industry dummies associated with tangible capital, labor, and intangible capital 
respectively. The measure of corporate governance is given by CORPG where higher values of CORPG 
signify stronger shareholder rights in a company. The control variables are lagged value of log total assets 
1,ln −tiASSETS , lagged intangible intensity 1, −tiINTANI , defined as the ratio of intangibles to net fixed 
assets, lagged growth in value added 1, −Δ tiy  and  Ln(Age), the logarithm of firm age in years. ***,**,*  





































           (1)                          (2) 
 (Fixed Effects) 
(Random 
Effects) 
tkΔ  -0.2209 -0.3517 
 (1.3019) (1.2659) 
tlΔ  -0.1278 -0.1082 
 (0.9021) (0.7482) 
thΔ  0.1886 0.1911 
 (1.6627) (1.628) 
1, −tiCORPG  -0.0019 -0.0137 
 (0.016) (0.0115) 
1,ln −tiASSETS  -0.0318 -0.0012 
 (0.0236) (0.0086) 
1, −tiINTANI  -0.2209 -0.3517 
 (1.3019) (1.2659) 
1, −Δ tiy  -0.1278** -0.1082* 
 (0.9021) (0.7482) 
Ln(Age) 0.1886 0.1911 
 (1.6627) (1.628) 
Intercept 0.0019 -0.0137 
 (0.016) (0.0115) 
it INDkΔ , it INDlΔ , 
it INDhΔ  
yes yes 
R-Squared (within) 0.2503 0.2356 
R-Squared (between) 0.0438 0.2809 
R-Squared (overall) 0.1819 0.2649 
No. of firm years 969 969 
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Table 3.11: Old and Young Firms 
The data is comprised of all firms which have a governance index value created by GIM (2003) for 1990-
2004. The sample is divided into “young” and “old” firms based on whether the firm age is below or above 
50 years. The dependent value is tyΔ or growth in value added. The regression results correspond to the 
empirical Cobb-Douglas production function discussed in the paper. The regressors include the growth rate 
of tangible capital stock tkΔ , growth rate of labor tlΔ , and the growth rate of intangible capital stock thΔ . 
it INDkΔ , it INDlΔ  and it INDhΔ give the cross–industry dummies associated with tangible capital, labor, 
and intangible capital respectively. The measure of corporate governance is given by CORPG where higher 
values of CORPG signify stronger shareholder rights in a company. The control variables are lagged value 
of log total assets 1,ln −tiASSETS , lagged intangible intensity 1, −tiINTANI , defined as the ratio of 
intangibles to net fixed assets, and lagged growth in value added, 1, −Δ tiy . Robust standard errors are due to 






             (1)                       (2) (3) (4) 
 Age< 50 Age< 50 Age> 50 Age> 50 
tkΔ  -0.1381  0.3148* -0.1299 -0.1229 
 (0.4990) (0.1394) (0.3368) (0.3415) 
tlΔ  0.0768 0.0537 0.3091 0.6327 
 (0.1534) (0.1545) (0.2265) (0.4543) 
thΔ  -0.0443 0.023 0.6134 -0.8112 
 (0.0348) (0.0213) (0.4952) (0.6957) 
1, −tiCORPG  0.0038*** 0.0028** 0.0025** 0.0022* 
 (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0010) 
1,ln −tiASSETS   -0.0057  -0.0008 
  (0.0034)  (0.0026) 
1, −tiINTANI   0.0015  0.0017 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
1, −Δ tiy   -0.0508  -0.0245 
  (0.0336)  (0.0378) 
Intercept -0.0267 0.0121 0.0054 -0.0216 
 (0.0198) (0.0403) (0.0158) (0.0334) 
it INDkΔ , it INDlΔ , 
it INDhΔ  
yes yes yes yes 
R-Squared (within) 0.2314 0.2482 0.2158 0.2295 
No. of firm years 6685 6360 5350 5064 
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Table 3.12: Winsorized Sample 
The data is comprised of all firms which have a governance index value created by GIM (2003) for 1990-
2004. The dependent variable is tyΔ or growth in value added. The regression results correspond to the 
empirical Cobb-Douglas production function discussed in the paper. The regressors are the growth rate of 
tangible capital stock tkΔ , growth rate of labor tlΔ , and growth rate of intangible capital stock thΔ . 
it INDkΔ , it INDlΔ  and it INDhΔ give the cross–industry dummies associated with tangible capital, labor, 
and intangible capital respectively. The measure of corporate governance is given by CORPG where higher 
values of CORPG signify stronger shareholder rights in a company. The control variables are lagged value 
of log total assets, 1,ln −tiASSETS , lagged intangible intensity 1, −tiINTANI , and defined as the ratio of 
intangibles to net fixed assets, lagged growth in value added 1, −Δ tiy  and, Ln(Age), the logarithm of firm 
age in years. The independent variable and the dependent and control variables except CORPG are 
winsorized 10% in each tail to remove extreme values. Robust standard errors are due to Huber-White 




             (1)                       (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
tkΔ  0.2633 0.0799 0.1023 0.0652 
 (0.1902) (0.0830) (0.1645) (0.093) 
tlΔ  0.3109** 0.4785*** 0.3451*** 0.3970* 
 (0.106) (0.1120) (0.0993) (0.1582) 
thΔ  0.0328 0.0335 0.0373 0.0308 
 (0.033) (0.0337) (0.0707) (0.0411) 
1, −tiCORPG  0.0014*** 0.0013*** 0.0022*** 0.0015*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) 
1,ln −tiASSETS   -0.0026* -0.0330*** -0.0032* 
  (0.0011) (0.0042) (0.0013) 
1, −tiINTANI   0.0032 0.0077* 0.003 
  (0.0016) (0.0035) (0.0017) 
1, −Δ tiy   0.0036 -0.0240*** -0.0021 
  (0.0078) (0.0048) (0.0044) 
Ln(Age) -0.0113*** -0.0088*** 0.0267* -0.0088*** 
 (0.0018) (0.002) (0.0129) (0.0022) 
Intercept 0.0576** 0.0714* 0.2047** 0.0747 
 (0.0199) (0.0342) (0.069) (0.0369) 
it INDkΔ , it INDlΔ , 
it INDhΔ  
yes yes yes yes 
R-Squared 0.3202 0.3218 0.2558 0.3216 
No. of firm years 10530 10011 10011 10011 
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C H A P T E R  4  
IPO Underperformance and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the US Stock 
Market 
Introduction 
This third essay serves as a connecting link between the previous two essays. It 
compares long run performance of IPOs with strong shareholder rights and weak 
shareholder rights. In this essay, the sample is narrowed to those firms from Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (GIM, 2003) to a subsection of firms which were IPOs in the 1990s 
and early part of 2000.  
I. Background and Motivation 
A. Background 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that modern corporations are plagued by two 
types of agency conflicts. First, an agency conflict occurs between shareholders and 
managers. Managers who own less than 100% of a firm’s equity may not act in the best 
interests of shareholders, potentially running the firm to maximize their own private 
benefits rather than those of the shareholders. Second, there is an agency conflict between 
shareholders and creditors. Here, an agency conflict occurs when shareholders invest the 
borrowed funds in risky projects, thereby exposing creditors to a level of risk that is not 
commensurate with the return they are promised. This paper is confined to the first type 
of agency conflict. 
B. Corporate Governance and IPOs: Existing Literature 
Both Daines and Klausner (2001) and Field and Karpoff (2002) analyze the use of 
takeover defenses at the date of an IPO. Daines and Klausner examine the bylaws and 
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charters of 310 IPOs, finding that over two-thirds of their sample has anti-takeover 
provisions (ATPs). By looking at the cross-sectional determinants of ATP adoption, they 
argue that putting ATPs in place at the time of an IPO is more likely to be an effort to 
entrench management rather than to maximize value. Field and Karpoff reach a similar 
conclusion in their analysis of a sample of 1,019 IPOs from 1988 to 1992, observing that 
the extensive use of ATPs by IPOs is associated with a lower likelihood of being 
acquired, but is unrelated to premiums for acquired firms. They find no difference in 
post-IPO operating performance between firms with and without ATPs.  
Smart and Zutter (2003) look at a sample of 253 dual-class and 2,369 single-class 
IPOs, showing that underpricing is greatest for single-class IPOs. Furthermore dual-class 
IPOs have greater institutional ownership and obtain higher price sales multiples at the 
time of an IPO. Baker and Gompers (2003) view the structure of the board of directors at 
the time of an IPO as an outcome of a bargaining game between management and outside 
shareholders. They find that the presence of venture capitalists in the firm act as a sort of 
balance to CEO power. Hartzell, Kalberg and Liu (2004), in a sample of 107 IPOs on real 
estate investment trusts (REITs) from 1991 to 1998, discovering that REIT firms with 
stronger governance structures not only have higher initial IPO valuations, but also have 
better long-term operating performance than their peers. 
C. Tying them together. 
In order to evaluate a firm's performance, it makes sense to define the ultimate 
purpose of a corporation as long term value creation. However, Monks and Minow 
(2001) write that 
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The expressions "long term" and "value" are subject to many interpretations. 
Anyone who is being evaluated has an incentive to define "long term" as 
"after I am gone." Anyone who is being evaluated has an incentive to define 
"value" as "results from whichever financial formula makes us look most 
appealing this year. 
Nevertheless, the ultimate objective of managers is long term shareholder wealth 
maximization which roughly amounts to how well a stock price (or dividends plus capital 
gains) performs in the long run. In this context it is important to consider IPOs because 
the literature suggests that IPOs under perform size and value matched peer firms in the 
long-run (Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995). It seems that managers in IPO firms 
are unable to attain the goal of long term shareholder wealth maximization. Thus, the 
long-run underperformance of IPOs could be, among other things, a corporate 
governance issue. Thus far, there has been no study to test the relationship between the 
broad based corporate governance index created by GIM (2003) and the long run 
performance of IPO firms.  
This paper presents two hypotheses about the relationship between shareholder 
rights and IPOs. First, IPO firms having stronger shareholder rights outperform relative to 
the peer IPOs having weaker shareholder rights. This paper presents evidence in support 
of this hypothesis. Second, the widely documented underperformance of IPOs might be 
attributed partly to the governance structure of IPOs. The sample of IPOs in this paper for 
which the governance index is available lacks smaller IPOs and is therefore not 
representative. So, testing for the second hypothesis is left for future research.  
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The remainder of this paper is as follows.  Section II describes the data set. 
Section III presents the methodology used. Section IV discusses the results. Section V 
concludes. 
II. Data 
A. Data on Corporate Governance 
In the U.S. there are few agencies which rate corporations on the basis on their 
corporate governance. Institutional Shareholder Services, GovernanceMetrics 
International, Standard and Poor’s, and The Corporate Library are among the companies 
which supply governance scores. These companies gather data on various aspects of 
corporate governance, such as the structures and make-ups of boards of directors, 
management and director compensation, and charter provisions. 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) use the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center (IRRC), which publishes detailed listings of corporate-governance provisions for 
individual firms in Corporate Takeover Defenses (Rosenbaum 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 
2000, 2002, and 2004) as their primary data-source. The G  index constructed by GIM 
(2003) is widely used in the finance literature as a broad based index for the strength of 
shareholder rights. This essay also employs their governance index to measure to level of 
corporate governance.  
GIM’s (2003) governance index is created on the basis of how many restrictive 
governance provisions are imposed on shareholder rights – the more restrictive the 
governance, the weaker the shareholder rights. The governance index G  is constructed as 
follows. For every firm, GIM (2003) add one point for every provision that restricts 
shareholder rights (increase managerial power). While this index may not accurately 
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reflect the relative impacts of the various provisions, it has the advantage of being 
transparent and easily reproducible. The index does not require any judgments about the 
efficacy or wealth effects for any of the provisions; GIM (2003) only considers the 
impact on the balance of power. 
B. Data Description 
Equity market data is used from the CRSP database.31 There are some limitations 
to this approach. Index G  is created using mostly large firms. The sample of IPO firms 
would be larger in market capitalization than a typical IPO firm. Only firms listed in the 
G  index within first four years of their initial public offering are included. This reduces 
the sample to only 495 firms. It is assumed that firms which appear in the index after 5 or 
more years are already seasoned firms.  Hence, it would be incorrect to include them in 
the final IPO sample.  
The median G  score of the entire sample created by GIM (2003) is 9. Figure 4.1 
reveals that the distribution is heavily centered on the median G  values, between 7 and 
11. For the IPO sample of 495 firms used here, the mean is 7.65 and the median 7.5 
(Table 4.1). In general, the distribution of IPO firms is skewed more towards lower 
values of G  than the sample containing all firms (Table 4.3). 
III. Methodology 
In their paper, GIM (2003) classify the democratic firms as 5≤G  and 14≥G  for 
dictator firms. Unfortunately, the 495 IPO firms used here are a small subset of about 
2000 firms in the extended GIM dataset. There are very few firms in this reduced dataset 
                                                 
31 We thank Andrew Metrick for providing the CRSP permno of firms in the G  index 
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with G  greater than 14 which renders classification based on GIM (2003) not feasible. 
Instead, for the sample, firms are sorted into democratic IPOs and dictator IPOs based on 
the G  index scores less than or equal to seven ( 7≤G ) and G scores greater than or equal 
to nine ( 9≥G ), respectively. An alternative selection method (with 5≤G  for democratic 
IPOs and 12≥G  for dictator IPOs) is used as well, and, as is shown, the results are not 
markedly different.  
To determine how democratic and dictator firms perform against each other in 
calendar time, an equal-weighted portfolio is created based on the governance criteria G , 
as discussed in the previous paragraph. Each portfolio is rebalanced each month such that 
only IPOs of relevant age are included in the portfolio. Thus, each month some IPOs may 
be dropped because of age or because of delisting. If the firm gets delisted, the delisting 
return is taken as -0.30 calculated using Shumway’s (1997) correction. Also, IPOs are 
added to the portfolio if they reach the appropriate age.  
A value-weighted portfolio is similarly constructed. The weight on each firm in 
the democratic or dictator portfolio is the value of the market capitalization of that firm 
divided by the sum of the market capitalizations of all the firms in that particular portfolio 
(democratic or dictator). Furthermore, alternative time horizons are considered for the 
analysis. 
The hedge portfolio each month is created as the difference between the return on 
the democratic portfolio and the return on the dictator portfolio for that month. The 
regression equation for the analysis is: 
ttDictDem RR εμ +=− ,,  
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where tDemR , is an equal-weighted or a value-weighted monthly return on democratic 
IPO firms at time t and tDicR , is the corresponding equal-weighted or value-weighted 
monthly return on dictator IPO firms. 
IV. Results 
A. Cumulative Average Returns 
Panel A of figure 4.2 shows the cumulative equal-weighted returns of the two 
portfolios DemocraticR  and DictatorR , where democratic firms are IPO firms which have 7≤G  
and dictator firms are IPO firms which have 9≥G . It is clearly evident from the graph 
that democratic firms have a higher cumulative return than their peer dictator firms in 
calendar time. Panel B of figure 4.2 depicts the corresponding graph for cumulative 
value-weighted returns. The difference in cumulative returns between the democratic and 
dictator firms is lower in magnitude than the equal-weighted case, but the democratic 
firms cumulative returns are always above that of dictator firms. The difference between 
the equal-weighted and value-weighted returns for IPOs is also evident from the 
regression results discussed below. 
B. Zero Investment Portfolio 
Panel A of Table 4.1 presents the returns for a portfolio which is long on 
democratic IPO firms (where democratic firms are all IPO firms which have 7≤G ) and 
short on dictator firms (where dictator firms are all IPO firms which have 9≥G ) from 
1992 to 2003. The long term returns are from the second month of an IPO to 5 years (60 
months). The hedge portfolio generates a significant excess monthly return of 0.39% 
which is equivalent to an annualized return of about 5%. The value-weighted excess 
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monthly return is 0.3% but it is statistically insignificant. Panel B presents the result of a 
similar portfolio of democratic and dictator firms based on the time horizon from the 2nd 
year (13th month) to the 5th year (60th month) of an IPO. The equal-weighted excess 
monthly return of 0.53% (significant at 10% level) translates to about a 6.5% annualized 
return. The value added excess return of 0.59% monthly is also significant at 10% level.  
C. Multi Factor Framework 
The results discussed above are based on raw returns. In order to see the 
performance of the IPOs in a multifactor framework, the Fama French (1992, 1993) three 
factor model and the Carhart (1997) four factor model is used.  They are described in 
detail in chapter 2. Before the performance of the democratic and dictator IPOs is tested, 
an examination of how the entire IPO sample32 performs in comparison to Metrick’s 
entire sample of firms for which the G  index exists33 is provided for the time period 
January, 2000 to December, 2005. 
The entire sample of firms which are available on Andrew Metrick’s website 
contains many firms which were not included in the GIM (2003) dataset, which looked at 
the years from 1990 to 1999. Column (1) in Table 4.2 reports the Fama French (1992, 
1993) three factor regression results for a portfolio of all the firms that have an G  index 
and are included in the Metrick dataset. During the sample period from 1990 to 2005, an 
equal-weighted portfolio of these firms has a positive and significant Jensen’s alpha of 
0.034%. For the Carhart (1997) four factor model, the alpha is 0.055% and highly 
significant (column (2) of Table 4.2). Column (3) of Table 4.2 shows the Fama French 3-
                                                 
32 The entire IPO sample is obtained from SDC platinum new issue database and has been cross checked 
with Jay Ritter’s data. 
33 Available at Andrew Metrick’s website. 
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factor regression results of a portfolio of firms which have issued new equity for cash 
within the prior 60 months. The Jensen’s alpha in this regression is -0.285% per month 
and significant.  This implies an underperformance of 3.5% annually.  
If the Carhart (1997) model is considered, the alpha is -0.135% but not significant 
(column (4) of Table 4.2). A comparison of the factor loadings for the different factors 
for the Metrick dataset and the IPO dataset is important. For the Metrick sample, the 
factor loading on the market premium for the Fama French (1992, 1993) model is 1.16 as 
compared to 1.315 for the IPO portfolio during the same period from January, 1990 to 
December, 2005. However, both the samples have a higher beta than the market.  The 
factor loading on the size factor for the IPO portfolio is almost double that of the Metrick 
sample.  This is expected as small capitalization portfolios will have a large positive 
factor loading on size. The coefficient on the value factor for the Metrick sample is 
positive at 0.55 for the Fama French model, suggesting that an average firm in the 
Metrick sample is not a growth firm. In contrast, the IPO portfolio has a factor loading of 
-0.3 which suggests that IPO firms are high growth firms. The factor loadings on the 
momentum factor for Carhart (1997) for both samples are negative and highly significant, 
but the coefficient on the IPO portfolio is larger in absolute value than Metrick’s sample. 
For the sample of 495 IPO firms employed here which form a part of the Metrick 
sample, a portfolio of IPOs is created which have issued new equity for cash within the 
prior 60 months. The monthly portfolio returns are then regressed using the Fama-French 
and Carhart (1997) frameworks. The first IPO which appears in the sample is in April of 
1990.  Accordingly, the sample period is from April, 1990 to December, 2005.  
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Table 4.2, columns (5) and (6), report the results of two multifactor regressions. 
For the Fama French model, the alpha is positive and significant at 0.067, implying over-
performance in the long-run for IPOs. This contrasts the monthly underperformance of  
-0.285 basis points reported in column (3) of Table 4.2 for the entire IPO sample.  For the 
Carhart (1997) model, the over-performance still persists though it is lower in 
significance level than reported for the three factor model. In comparison with the entire 
Metrick sample, the factor loadings are not markedly different except for the loading on 
the value factor. For the IPO sample of 495 firms, the loading on the value factor is -0.29 
for the Fama French model, compared to 0.4 for the Metrick sample with a similar model 
specification. This suggests the IPO firms in Metrick’s sample are high growth firms. 
Compared to the entire data set of IPO firms, the truncated IPO sample have similar 
factor loadings for most factors except for the loading on the size factor. For the truncated 
IPO sample the factor loading on the size factor is 0.56 compared to 1.05 for the entire 
IPO sample. This signifies that the truncated IPO sample has, on average, larger market 
capitalization than a typical IPO firm. 
Table 4.3 displays descriptive statistics for the three samples. The GIM dataset 
has a mean market capitalization of about $305.5 million and a median of $762 million. 
In comparison, during the same sample period from 1990 to 2005, the entire IPO sample 
has a mean of $61.1 million and a median of just $14.7 million. The truncated IPO 
sample of 495 firms has a much larger mean market capitalization than a typical IPO firm 
that has a mean market capitalization of $274.1 million. This supports the explanation of 




D. Democratic versus Dictator IPOs 
As discussed in section III, firms having G  index scores less than or equal to 
seven are classified as democratic firms and with firms having G scores greater than or 
equal to nine are classified as dictator firms. Equal-weighted monthly return portfolios of 
IPOs that have gone public during the prior 60 months are formed. These portfolio 
returns are regressed on the Fama French three factor model and the Carhart (1997) four 
factor model for the period April, 1990 to December, 2005. Table 4.3 reports the results. 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4.3 correspond to the Fama French (1992, 1993) 
and Carhart (1997) multifactor model results for the democratic portfolio and columns (3) 
and (4) report the corresponding results for the dictator portfolio. The Jensen’s alphas in 
all the four regressions are positive and significant. The dictator firms in the sample do 
not underperform the multifactor models though the extent of over-performance is lower 
than that of the democratic firms. For the Fama French three factor model, the democratic 
portfolio has a positive abnormal monthly return of 0.135% which translates to a 1.65% 
annual abnormal return. For the dictator portfolio the corresponding monthly abnormal 
return is 0.087%, or 1.05% per year. If the factor loadings on the market factor for the 
two portfolios are considered, they are very similar at 1.33 for democratic and 1.31 for 
the dictator firms for Fama French model. The coefficients on the size factor are quite 
similar as well. For the value factor, the portfolio returns on democratic firms have a 
higher negative factor loading than that of dictator firms.  
Different portfolio creation criteria are also used by forming a portfolio of IPOs 
which have completed their first anniversary of IPO but have not exceeded the 60 month 
age limit. Columns (1) through (4) of Table 4.4 report the Fama French 3 factor and 
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Carhart (1997) four factor results for the democratic and dictator portfolios. Jensen’s 
alpha is positive but insignificant for all regressions except for the Carhart (1997) four 
factor model with democratic portfolio, which has a significant alpha equal to 0.0925%. 
The magnitude of the Jensen’ alpha for the Fama French model is an insignificant 
0.038% for the democratic portfolio and an insignificant 0.026% for the dictator 
portfolio. In each of the regressions, the alpha for the democratic firms is larger than the 
corresponding alpha for the dictator firms. 
These results suggest that during the sample period 1990 to 2005, none of the IPO 
sub-samples showed underperformance. In fact, in most of the regressions, the sub-
samples had over-performance, though the magnitude of over-performance was higher 
for the democratic sub-sample. 
E.  Zero Investment Results in a Multi-factor Framework 
To evaluate the zero-investment strategy returns in the Fama French framework 
augmented by momentum and liquidity factors, the five factor model can be re-written:  
 
 
this can be re-written as: 
 
where tdR , is the monthly returns on a portfolio that buys the democratic portfolio 
( 7≤G ) and sells short the dictatorship portfolio ( 9≥G ). The alpha ( tDictDemtd ,,, ααα −= ) 
in the regression is the excess return on the zero investment strategy. Table 4.6 reports 
the regression results for Fama French and Carhart (1997) models. Columns (1) and (2) 
ttdtdtdtdtddtd UMDuLIQcHMLhSMBsMKTbR εα ++++++=,
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of Table 4.6 shows the results for the portfolio holding period of five years and columns 
(3) and (4) show the results for the hedge portfolio created on IPOs which have 
completed their one year anniversary but have not exceeded the five year age limit. For 
all the regressions, dα is positive but insignificant, though for the Carhart model in 
column (2) the t-statistic is high at 1.72.  
Analyzing the coefficient on the market, size, value, and momentum factors for 
the zero investment portfolio returns is also relevant. This gives information about the 
extent to which the two portfolios vary from each other apart from the characteristic 
based on the G index scores. The coefficient on the market premium is insignificant and 
does not have a definitive sign for all the regressions. The coefficient on the size factor 
and momentum factors are also highly insignificant and do not have definitive signs. For 
value factor, the coefficient is negative for all the regressions (Table 4.6), implying that 
the democratic firms have higher negative factor loadings than the dictator firms.  This 
may confirm that democratic firms are “high growth” firms compared to dictator firms.  
F. Different Sample Periods 
Core, Gray, and Rusticus (2006) find that the relative over-performance of 8.5% 
per year of the democratic portfolio over the dictator portfolio documented by GIM 
(2003) during the sample period of 1990 to 1999 diminishes in magnitude and 
significance to 4.8% per year if the sample period is increased to 2003. As figure 4.2, 
panels A and B suggest, there is a similar decline in the returns for the democratic 
portfolio for the IPO sample starting mid-2000. The decline in returns for the democratic 
portfolio is arrested in early 2003 when it shoots up sharply. The sharp rise and the 
widening of the gap between the returns of the democratic and dictator portfolios 
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continue to the end of the sample. The performance of the democratic portfolio is 
consistently higher than dictator portfolio barring the years from 2000 to 2002 when the 
bubble burst and the economy moved into a recession. Interestingly, this was also the 
period in the U.S. where the two huge corporate scandals at Enron and Worldcom 
happened.  
Following Core, et al. (2006), the sample period is divided into two parts. The 
first sample period is 1990 to 1999, which corresponds to the sample period analyzed by 
GIM (2003). The second sample period starts in year 2000 and extends the Core, et al. 
(2006) sample period by two years to 2005.  
Table 4.7 reports the results of the multi-factor regressions for the dictator and 
democratic portfolio returns between 1990 and 1999. Jensen’s alpha is positive and 
significant for both the democratic and dictator firms though the magnitude of the over-
performance is higher for the democratic portfolio. The hedge portfolio results confirm 
that as alpha is positive, though insignificant, for the Fama French (1992, 1993) and the 
Carhart (1997) model. Table 4.8 reports the corresponding result for the sample period 
from 2000 to 2005. The alphas are positive but insignificant for the democratic and 
dictator portfolios. The hedge portfolio gives an alpha of 0.075% for Fama French model 
with a t-statistic of 1.88. 
G. Small and Big IPOs 
The results have so far shown that there is no evidence of long term 
underperformance for the IPO sample of 495 firms between 1990 and 2005. In fact, in 
many of the regressions, there is significant over-performance. This runs counter to the 
evidence of the long-run underperformance of IPOs documented in chapter 2 as well in 
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Table 4.2 of this essay. Further, the truncated IPO sample differs from a typical IPO firm 
by size characteristic. How the “small” and “big” IPOs in the truncated sample perform is 
now examined.  
The sample is sorted into four size quintiles based on market capitalization. In the 
two extreme size quintiles, firms are sorted into democratic and dictator portfolios based 
on their G scores. Table 4.9 reports the multi-factor regression results for the “small” 
firms. Jensen’s alpha is negative for both democratic and dictator firms and is significant 
for the Fama French model for the dictator portfolio. The under-performance for the 
small dictator portfolio during the period 1990 to 2005 is 0.2% per month or 2.5% per 
year. This is slightly less than -3.45% per year documented for the entire IPO sample 
during the similar sample period (Table 4.2). The hedge portfolio in Table 4.9 shows a 
positive but insignificant alpha which supports the previous results. 
Similar regressions for the “big” firms in the IPO sample documented in Table 
4.10, show that Jensen’s alpha now has significant over-performance for both the 
democratic and dictator portfolios. The hedge portfolio alpha is positive but not 
significant. These result support Brav and Gomper’s (1997) finding that IPO 
underperformance is a small firm effect. The significant over-performance for the “big” 
sample implies that the overall results for the truncated IPO sample, as in Table 4.2, may 
be driven by the large number of big IPO firms in the sample.  
The focus now shifts to the small size IPO firms as they are more representative 
of a typical IPO firm than the big size IPO firms in the truncated sample and how they 
perform in different sample periods. From 1990 to 1999, the Fama French regression 
results for both the democratic and dictator firms are insignificant and negative, Table 
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4.11 reveals. In the Carhart model, there is an insignificant positive Jensen’s alpha for the 
democratic and dictator portfolios. For the hedge portfolio, there is an insignificant 
negative and positive alpha for the Fama French and Carhart models respectively.  
The results change dramatically for the sample period 2000 to 2005, documented 
in Table 4.12.  For the small size IPOs, the Jensen’s alpha is negative for both democratic 
and dictator portfolios. For the Fama French model, the small democratic IPOs have a 
significant alpha of -0.23% per month which translates to about -2.8% annual 
underperformance. The results are more severe for the dictator firms where the Fama 
French regression generates an under-performance of -0.42% per month or -5.1% per 
year. 
The last two columns in Table 4.12 report the results for the hedge portfolio. 
Though both the democratic and dictator sub-samples under performed, the alpha for the 
hedge portfolio is significantly positive. The excess return was close to 0.2% per month 
or 2.4% per year for the hedge portfolio. 
Overall, the small IPOs in the truncated sample underperformed in the long-run 
and the underperformance is more severe for the dictator firms. The extent of under 
performance varied between the two sample periods. 
F. Robustness Checks 
F.1. Value Weighted Portfolio Returns 
The previous regressions were based on equal-weighted returns which are 
commonly used in long-run event studies. Now, how the democratic and dictator IPO 
portfolios behave when value-weighted portfolio returns are used on three Fama French 
and the momentum factors is tested. The results presented in Table 4.13 are not 
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qualitatively different from similar model and sample period specification for equal-
weighted returns. The dictator and democratic firms have significant over-performance 
and the magnitude of this over-performance is the larger than the equal-weighted 
portfolios (Table 4.4). This result is expected for the value-weighted portfolios as large 
IPOs over-performed irrespective of being a dictator or a democratic firm.  
The alpha for the hedge portfolio is positive but not significant which is consistent 
with the previous results. 
F.2. Alternative Definition of Democratic and Dictator Portfolios 
GIM (2003) defines democratic firms as firms which have G  index score less 
than or equal to five. The dictator firms are the firms with G  index scores of fourteen 
and above. The sample of 495 IPOs is heavily biased towards stronger shareholder rights. 
There are very few firms with G greater than or equal to 14 in the IPO sample, making it 
difficult to create a feasible dictator portfolio based on GIM (2003). In the regression 
results in the previous sub-sections, 7≤G  and 9≥G  are used to screen the IPO firms 
into democracy and dictator portfolios. The main reason is that there are many fewer 
firms if democratic firms with smaller G  and autocratic firms with larger G  are chosen. 
In particular, there are few firms with 5<G and very few firms with 14≥G  in the 
sample. For robustness then, an alternative criterion is used to sort IPO firms into two 
sub-portfolios. This alternative criterion specifies that democratic firms are those 
with 5≤G which similar to GIM (2003) definition of democratic firms. Dictator firms are 
categorized those with 12≥G . This process sacrifices test power, but it is closer to the 
definition of democratic and dictator firms as defined in GIM (2003). 
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As before, equal-weighted monthly returns portfolio of IPOs that have gone 
public during the prior 60 months are formed. The portfolios returns are regressed using 
the Fama French 3 factor model and the Carhart (1997) four factor model for the period 
April, 1990 to December, 2005. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4.14 correspond to the 
Fama French and Carhart (1997) multifactor model results for the democratic portfolio 
and columns (3) and (4) report the corresponding results for the dictator portfolio. The 
alphas for both democratic and dictator portfolios are positive though only significant for 
the democratic portfolio. As before, the dictator firms in the sample do not under perform 
in the multifactor models though the extent of the over-performance is lower than that of 
the democratic firms. For the Fama French model, the democratic portfolio has a positive 
abnormal monthly return of 0.101%, which translates to a 1.21% annual abnormal return.  
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 4.14 report the results of the hedge portfolio returns 
on the Fama French and Carhart models. The excess return of the democratic portfolio 
over the dictator portfolio measured by alpha is positive but not significant. The 
magnitude of underperformance from 1990 to 2005 is around 1.25% per year. All the 
results in this sub-section support the previous multifactor regression results that during 
the sample period 1990 to 2005, none of the IPO sub-samples show underperformance.  
A series of tests based on value-weighted returns, different sample periods, and 
size were also performed. The results are not qualitatively different from what was 
previously found. For the purpose of brevity, these results are omitted. 
F.3. Regression with Year Dummies. 
 As a final robustness check, Table 4.15 reports the results of the multi-
factor regressions for the dictator, democratic and hedge portfolio returns including year 
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dummies to take account of the temporal effect. The coefficient on the year dummies are 
positive and significant for the dictator firm in 1991 and 1995. The year dummy is 
negative and significant for the democratic firm in 2002 which interestingly was the year 
when the corporate scandal of Enron took place. The year 1999 has positive and 
significant coefficient on both democratic and dictator portfolios. The Jensen’s alpha is 
positive and significant (at for the democratic firms but negative and insignificant for 
dictator firms. This is a major change from the previous results where the alpha was 
positive and significant for both portfolios for entire sample. The result on the hedge 
portfolio is even stronger. The Jensen’s alpha is positive and significant at 1% level for 
the Fama French (1992, 1993) and the Carhart (1997) model. The .magnitude of the over-
performance is little over 0.6% per year for both the models. What is interesting is the 
coefficient on the year dummies on the hedge portfolios are all negative and statistically 
significant except for year 2005 where it is negative but not significant at 10% level. This  
 In summary, the inclusion of the year dummies brings the result closer to what 
GIM (2003) found for their sample that the hedge portfolio has significant positive 
returns. 
V.  Concluding Remarks 
The existing literature on IPO underperformance (Welch and Ritter, 2002) 
suggests that IPOs under perform in the long-run. GIM (2003) find that the democratic 
firms outperformed dictator firms over a period from 1990 to 1999. This paper find that 
IPOs which are included in GIM sample are more democratic than the sample of the 
more seasoned firms. Thus, following GIM’s results, IPOs should be performing better 
than seasoned firms. Indeed, the results here confirm that IPO firms belonging to GIM 
sample actually do not underperform in the long-run. An explanation for these 
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contradictory results is that the IPO firms in the Metrick’s sample are not representative 
IPO firms. The IPO firms in GIM sample differ from a typical IPO firm by the size. 
There is no underperformance found for the large IPO firms in the sample. These results 
support Brav and Gomper’s (1997) contention that IPO underperformance disappears for 
the larger IPO firms.34  
Moreover, the results here suggest that governance plays a role in how an IPO 
performs in the long-run. IPOs having stronger shareholder rights perform better than 
IPOs with weaker shareholder rights in most of the results. However, in few cases, this 
performance is statistically insignificant, which may be partly attributed to the relatively 
small sample of IPOs with the governance index. There is also some evidence of 
underperformance for smaller firms that are less democratic even in the sample. The 
effect is most pronounced for the period from 2000 to 2005. Future research should 
explore the effect of governance on IPO performance using a more representative sample. 
The hypothesis suggest here is that IPOs in general might be less democratic, which 
could contribute to the explanation of IPO underperformance. This would require more 
data collection which will hopefully be possible in the future. 
                                                 
34 Brav and Gompers (1997) find that the IPO underperformance is driven by nonventure capital backed 
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Figure 4.2: Panel A 



















Figure 4.2: Panel B 



















This table presents the calendar time results of a hedge portfolio which is long on democratic IPOs (G≤7) 
and short on dictator IPOs (G≥9). The data period is from 1990 to 2005, and comprises of IPO firms taken 
from the data set on Governance index G, created by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).  
The regression equation is: ttDictDem RR εμ +=− ,, , where tDemR , is an equal-weighted or a value-
weighted monthly return on IPOs which form the democratic portfolio based on criteria outlined in panels 
A and B. tDicR , is the corresponding equal-weighted or value-weighted monthly return on IPOs which 
form the dictator portfolio based on criteria the in panels A and B. The portfolios are rebalanced monthly 
such that only IPOs of relevant age are included in the portfolio. Aμ  and Bμ  are the excess return on the  
DicDem RR −  monthly portfolios based on the criteria in panels A, B, and C. The t-statistics are provided 







      
  Equally  Value   
  Weighted  Weighted  
      
Panel A: (2-60 months)      
 
DEM (G≤7) -DICT (G≥9)   Aμ  0.0039*  0.0030  
      (1.952)  (1.029)  
ANOVA (p-value)  0.1323  0.4351  
      
 
Panel B: (13-60 months)      
 
DEM (G≤7) - DICT (G≥9)   Bμ  0.0053*  0.0059*  
  (1.893)  (1.67)  
ANOVA (p-value)  0.0749  0.1466  




This table presents the Fama French (1992, 1993) and Carhart (1997) regression results on the portfolio of 
three related samples. Columns (1) and (2) are the results based on the dataset compiled by Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick (2003). Columns (3) and (4) are the regression estimates based on the entire IPO sample for 
January 1990 to December 2005. The sample of IPOs is procured from SDC platinum’s new issue database 
and cross-checked with Jay Ritter’s dataset. Columns (5) and (6) are based on the truncated sample of IPOs 
which went public during 1990 to 2003 and are also included in the GIM dataset. MKT  is the realization 
of the market risk premium in period t, SMB is the return on a portfolio of small stocks minus the return on 
a portfolio of big stocks in period t, and HML is the return on a portfolio of value stocks minus the return 
on a portfolio of growth stocks in period t. UMD is the momentum factor as in Carhart (1997).The factor 
returns are obtained from Kenneth French’s web site. The Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses. 











                                             








 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
α  0.0342** 0.0548*** -0.285* -0.1315 0.067** 0.0764* 
 ( 0.0115) (0.011) (0.1352) (0.1123) (0.0279) (0.0323) 
 
MKT 1.157*** 1.1*** 1.315*** 1.142*** 1.264*** 1.153*** 
 (0.0321) (0.0211) (0.1115) (0.0719) (0.0936) (0.0723) 
 
SMB 0.5464*** 0.5729*** 1.053*** 1.101*** 0.5567*** 0.5829*** 
 (0.0835) (0.0508) (0.1664) (0.1074) (0.113) (0.108) 
 
HML 0.3956*** 0.36*** -0.2958 -0.4267*** -0.2941** -0.3538*** 
 (0.0763) (0.0592) (0.1679) (0.1203) (0.125) (0.1097) 
 
UMD  -0.1794***  -0.4873***  -0.3052** 
  (0.0229)  (0.0756)  (0.1195) 
       
R-squared 0.9375 0.964 0.8186 0.8841 0.7458 0.7716 
No. of 





This table presents the market capitalization (in millions) for different samples.  The GIM dataset is based 
on the dataset compiled by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and obtained from Andre Metrick’s 
website. The entire IPO sample data is obtained from SDC platinum’s new issue database and cross-
checked with Jay Ritter’s dataset. The GIM-IPO dataset is based on the truncated sample of IPOs which 








 GIM  All IPOs GIM-IPOs 
  
Mean $304.47 $61.09 $274.10 
 
Median $762.12 $14.68 $102.18 
 






This table presents the Fama French (1992, 1993) and Carhart (1997) regression results for monthly equal-
weighted portfolio returns on the democratic (G≤7) and dictator (G≥9) IPO portfolios consisting of firms 
that have gone public during the prior 60 months. The value of the governance index G is obtained from the 
dataset compiled by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). The sample period is April, 1990 to December, 
2005. MKT  is the realization of the market risk premium in period t, SMB is the return on a portfolio of 
small stocks minus the return on a portfolio of big stocks in period t, and HML is the return on a portfolio 
of value stocks minus the return on a portfolio of growth stocks in period t. UMD is the momentum factor 
as in Carhart (1997).The factor returns are obtained from Kenneth French’s web site. The Newey-West 

























1990-2005: Equal-Weighted,  60 months 
 Democratic (G≤7) Dictator (G≥9) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FF-3 factor Carhart(1997) FF-3 factor Carhart(1997) 
 
α   0.1352***  0.183***  0.0873**  0.1211*** 
  (0.029)  (0.0323)  (0.033)  (0.0316) 
 
MKT  1.334***  1.201***  1.314***  1.22*** 
  (0.1715)  (0.1443)  (0.1312)  (0.1171) 
 
SMB  0.5803***  0.6375***  0.6367***  0.6771*** 
  (0.1159)  (0.0921)  (0.1342)  (0.1041) 
 
HML -0.6165*** -0.7005*** -0.3528*** -0.4121*** 
  (0.123)  (0.1158)  (0.1179)  (0.1134) 
 
UMD  -0.3982***  -0.2809** 
   (0.1245)   (0.0984) 
     
R-squared  0.7037  0.7428  0.6217  0.6421 
No. of 
Observations  188  188  188  188 





This table presents the Fama French (1992, 1993) and Carhart (1997) regression results for monthly equal-
weighted portfolio returns on the democratic (G≤7) and dictator (G≥9) IPO portfolios. The holding period 
is from the end of the first year of the IPO to the 5 year age limit. The value of the governance index G is 
obtained from the dataset compiled by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). The sample period is April, 
1990 to December, 2005. MKT  is the realization of the market risk premium in period t, SMB is the 
return on a portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a portfolio of big stocks in period t, and HML is 
the return on a portfolio of value stocks minus the return on a portfolio of growth stocks in period t. UMD 
is the momentum factor as in Carhart (1997).The factor returns are obtained from Kenneth French’s web 




























1990-2005: Equal Weighted, 13months-60months 
 Democratic (G≤7) Dictator (G≥9) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FF-3 factor Carhart(1997) FF-3 factor Carhart(1997) 
 
α   0.0379  0.0925***  0.0256  0.0713 
  (0.023)  (0.029)  (0.041)  (90.041) 
 
MKT  1.594  1.447  1.529  1.405 
  (0.1605)  (0.0962)  (0.1388)  (0.0991) 
 
SMB  0.6734  0.7613  0.6395  0.7132 
  (0.1389)  (0.0886)  (0.163)  (0.1044) 
 
HML -0.2857 -0.3725 -0.1726 -0.2454 
  (0.149)  (0.0974)  (0.1594)  (0.105) 
 
UMD  -0.472  -0.3955 
   (0.1261)   (0.1028) 
      
R-squared  0.7841 0.8422  0.5807  0.6158 
No. of 




This table presents the Fama French (1992, 1993) and Carhart (1997) regression results on the hedge 
portfolio formed by a trading strategy based on G-index. The hedge portfolio is constructed by taking a 
long position on an equal-weighted portfolio of democratic IPOs (G≤7) and taking a short position in on 
equal-weighted portfolio of dictator IPOs (G≥9) consisting of firms that have gone public during the prior 
60 months. The value of the governance index G is obtained from the dataset compiled by Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick (2003). The sample period is April, 1990 to December, 2005. MKT  is the realization of the 
market risk premium in period t, SMB is the return on a portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a 
portfolio of big stocks in period t, and HML is the return on a portfolio of value stocks minus the return on 
a portfolio of growth stocks in period t. UMD is the momentum factor as in Carhart (1997).The factor 
returns are obtained from Kenneth French’s web site. The Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses. 



























 Hedge Portfolio (1990-2005) and  G≤7 & G≥9 
Holding Period 60 months 13months -60 months 
 Democratic -Dictator Democratic -Dictator 
 FF-3 factor Carhart FF-3 factor Carhart 
     
α   0.0479  0.062  0.0123  0.0211 
  (0.035)  (0.036)  (0.039)  (0.040) 
 
MKT  0.0200 -0.0191  0.06533  0.04138 
  (0.0831)  (0.0775)  (0.0812)  (0.0781) 
 
SMB -0.0564 -0.0395  0.03388  0.04812 
  (0.1021)  (0.1122)  (0.0808)  (0.0848) 
 
HML -0.2637 -0.2885* -0.1131 -0.1271 
  (0.1345)  (0.1306)  (0.1216)  (0.1224) 
 
UMD  -0.1173*  -0.07644 
   (0.0573)   (0.0659) 
     
R-squared  0.0213  0.044  0.0117  0.0154 
No. of 




This table presents the Fama French (1992, 1993) and Carhart (1997) regression results for monthly equal-
weighted portfolio returns on the democratic (G≤7), dictator (G≥9) and hedge portfolios consisting of firms 
that have gone public during the prior 60 months.  The hedge portfolio is constructed by taking a long 
position on an equal-weighted portfolio of democratic IPOs (G<=7) and taking a short position on an equal- 
weighted portfolio of dictator IPOs (G>=9) consisting of firms that have gone public during the prior 60 
months. The value of the governance index G is obtained from the dataset compiled by Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003). The sample period is April, 1990 to December, 1999. MKT  is the realization of the 
market risk premium in period t, SMB is the return on a portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a 
portfolio of big stocks in period t, and HML is the return on a portfolio of value stocks minus the return on 
a portfolio of growth stocks in period t. UMD is the momentum factor as in Carhart (1997).The factor 
returns are obtained from Kenneth French’s web site. The Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses. 





 1990-1999: Equal weighted Portfolio Returns 
 Democratic (G≤7) Dictator (G≥9) Democratic- Dictator 
Variable 
FF-3 
factor  Carhart  
FF-3 
factor Carhart   
FF-3 
factor  Carhart  
       
α   0.1664***  0.1764***  0.1361***  0.1308**  0.0349 0.0503 
  (0.026)  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.039)  (0.049) (0.053) 
 
MKT  1.176***  1.169***  1.226***  1.23*** -0.0550 -0.0653 
  (0.0916)  (0.0979)  (0.1023)  (0.1013)  (0.1009) (0.1024) 
 
SMB  0.8181***  0.7982***  0.9613***  0.9718*** -0.1394 -0.1701 
  (0.0889)  (0.1056)  (0.1509)  (0.1461)  (0.1818) (0.1927) 
 
HML -0.4379*** -0.4744*** -0.2649 -0.2455 -0.1903 -0.2467 
  (0.0913)  (0.1222)  (0.1867)  (0.1894)  (0.2409) (0.2570) 
 
UMD  -0.08387   0.04454  -0.1295 
   (0.1037)   (0.1429)  (0.1388) 
       
R-squared  117  117  118  118  118 118 
No. of 




This table presents the Fama French (1992, 1993) and Carhart (1997) regression results for monthly equal-
weighted portfolio returns on the democratic (G≤7), dictator (G≥9), and hedge portfolios consisting of 
firms that have gone public during the prior 60 months.  The hedge portfolio is constructed by taking a long 
position on an equal-weighted portfolio of democratic IPOs (G<=7) and taking a short position in on equal-
weighted portfolio of dictator IPOs (G>=9) consisting of firms that have gone public during the prior 60 
months. The value of the governance index G is obtained from the dataset compiled by Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003). The sample period is January, 2000 to December, 2005. MKT  is the realization of the 
market risk premium in period t, SMB is the return on a portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a 
portfolio of big stocks in period t, and HML is the return on a portfolio of value stocks minus the return on 
a portfolio of growth stocks in period t. UMD is the momentum factor as in Carhart (1997).The factor 
returns are obtained from Kenneth French’s web site. The Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses. 
***,**,* denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
 2000-2005: Equal weighted Portfolio Returns 
 Democratic (G≤7) Dictator (G≥9) Democratic- Dictator 
Variable 
FF-3 
factor Carhart FF-3 factor Carhart 
FF-3 
factor Carhart 
       
α   0.0957  0.0921  0.0112  0.0078  0.0752  0.0742 
  (0.050)  (0.054)   (0.055)  (0.055 )  (0.040)  (0.042) 
 
MKT  1.905***  1.611***  1.736***  1.511***  0.1704  0.0992 
  (0.1707)  (0.1501)  (0.1044)  (0.1198)  (0.1116)  (0.1089) 
 
SMB  0.6358***  0.9078***  0.6510***  0.8595*** -0.0066  0.0593 
  (0.1003)  (0.1105)  (0.1553)  (0.1539)  (0.1215)  (0.1392) 
 
HML -0.4259* -0.3554* -0.1951 -0.1406 -0.2213 -0.2041 
  (0.1742)  (0.1526)  (0.1333)  (0.1281)  (0.1186)  (0.1179) 
 
UMD  -0.4592**  -0.351*  -0.111* 
   (0.1666)   (0.137)   (0.0498) 
       
R-squared  0.8363  0.8821  0.8596  0.8952  0.1752  0.2075 
No. of 




This table presents the Fama French (1992, 1993) and Carhart (1997) regression results for monthly equal- 
weighted portfolio returns on the democratic (G≤7), dictator (G≥9), and hedge portfolios consisting of 
firms that have gone public during the prior 60 months and belong to the smallest size quintile.  The hedge 
portfolio is constructed by taking a long position on an equal-weighted portfolio of democratic IPOs 
(G<=7) and taking a short position on an equal-weighted portfolio of dictator IPOs (G>=9) consisting of 
firms that have gone public during the prior 60 months. The value of the governance index G is obtained 
from the dataset compiled by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). The sample period is April, 1990 to 
December, 2005. MKT  is the realization of the market risk premium in period t, SMB is the return on a 
portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a portfolio of big stocks in period t, and HML is the return on 
a portfolio of value stocks minus the return on a portfolio of growth stocks in period t. UMD is the 
momentum factor as in Carhart (1997).The factor returns are obtained from Kenneth French’s web site. The 







 1990-2005: Small IPOs, Equal weighted Portfolio Returns 
 Democratic (G≤7) Dictator (G≥9) Democratic- Dictator 





       
α  -0.1283 -0.0361 -0.2003* -0.0895 0.0691 0.049 
 (0.066) (0.068) (0.097) (0.098) (0.073) (0.077) 
 
MKT 1.524*** 1.269*** 1.859*** 1.539*** -0.3059 -0.2477 
 (0.1895) (0.1318) (0.2218) (0.1519) (0.1756) (0.1707) 
 
SMB 0.8677*** 0.9774*** 1.207*** 1.349*** -0.3431 -0.369 
 (0.2206) (0.1147) (0.2752) (0.1696) (0.1913) (0.2007) 
 
HML 0.0966 -0.0653 0.3554 0.1644 -0.2455 -0.2107 
 (0.2728) (0.1675) (0.3669) (0.2073) (0.2289) (0.2077) 
 
UMD  -0.7644***  -0.9307***  0.1693 
  (0.1219)  (0.1705)  (0.1406) 
       
R-squared 0.5779 0.7066 0.4649 0.5718 0.0356 0.0442 
No. of 





This table presents the Fama French (1992, 1993) and Carhart (1997) regression results for monthly equal-
weighted portfolio returns on the democratic (G≤7), dictator (G≥9), and hedge portfolios consisting of 
firms that have gone public during the prior 60 months and belong to the largest size quintile.  The hedge 
portfolio is constructed by taking a long position on an equal weighted portfolio of democratic IPOs 
(G<=7) and taking a short position on an equal-weighted portfolio of dictator IPOs (G>=9) consisting of 
firms that have gone public during the prior 60 months. The value of the governance index G is obtained 
from the dataset compiled by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). The sample period is April, 1990 to 
December, 2005. MKT  is the realization of the market risk premium in period t, SMB is the return on a 
portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a portfolio of big stocks in period t, and HML is the return on 
a portfolio of value stocks minus the return on a portfolio of growth stocks in period t. UMD is the 
momentum factor as in Carhart (1997).The factor returns are obtained from Kenneth French’s web site. The 






 1999-2005: Big IPOs, Equal weighted Portfolio Returns 
 Democratic (G≤7) Dictator (G≥9) Democratic- Dictator 
Variable  FF-3 factor   Carhart   FF-3 factor  Carhart   
 FF-3  
 factor   Carhart  
       
α   0.2457***  0.2150*** 0.1932***  0.1719***  0.024  0.0417 
  (0.039) ( 0.038)  (0.049)  (0.045)  (0.029)  (0.034) 
 
MKT  1.270***  1.275***  1.369***  1.433*** -0.03244 -0.08549 
  (0.0948)  (0.0876)  (0.0604)  (0.0704)  (0.0904)  (0.0831) 
 
SMB  0.4622***  0.3515***  0.3500***  0.3056***  0.07439  0.1114 
  (0.1297)  (0.0973)  (0.0921)  (0.0823)  (0.1006)  (0.1089) 
 
HML -0.8047*** -0.6611*** -0.3344 -0.3102 -0.2888* -0.309** 
  (0.1152)  (0.1079)  (0.1944)  (0.1564)  (0.1318)  (0.1200) 
 
UMD   0.07097   0.1822  -0.1519 
   (0.0967)   (0.0661)   (0.0777) 
       
R-squared  0.7927  0.7943  0.7393  0.7592  0.0594  0.0834 
No. of 





This table presents the Fama French (1992, 1993) and Carhart (1997) regression results for monthly equal-
weighted portfolio returns on the democratic (G≤7), dictator (G≥9), and hedge portfolios consisting of 
firms that have gone public during the prior 60 months and belong to the smallest size quintile.  The hedge 
portfolio is constructed by taking a long position on an equal-weighted portfolio of democratic IPOs 
(G<=7) and taking a short position on an equal-weighted portfolio of dictator IPOs (G>=9) consisting of 
firms that have gone public during the prior 60 months. The value of the governance index G is obtained 
from the dataset compiled by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). The sample period is April, 1990 to 
December, 1999. MKT  is the realization of the market risk premium in period t, SMB is the return on a 
portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a portfolio of big stocks in period t, and HML is the return on 
a portfolio of value stocks minus the return on a portfolio of growth stocks in period t. UMD is the 
momentum factor as in Carhart (1997).The factor returns are obtained from Kenneth French’s web site. The 






 1990-1999: Small IPOs, Equal weighted Portfolio Returns 
 Democratic (G≤7) Dictator (G≥9) Democratic- Dictator 
Variable  FF-3 factor   Carhart  
 FF-3 
 factor  Carhart   
 FF-3 
 factor   Carhart  
       
α  -0.0141  0.0575 -0.0115  0.00934 -0.0057  0.0487 
  (0.073)  (0.078)  (0.0117)  (0.0138)  (0.0114)  (0.1280) 
 
MKT  1.080***  1.033***  1.547***  1.475*** -0.4385 -0.4158 
  (0.1582) ( 0.1564)  (0.2797)  (0.2329)  (0.2643)  (0.2472) 
 
SMB  1.254***  1.111***  1.854***  1.647*** -0.601 -0.5357 
  (0.1686)  (0.1961)  (0.4137)  (0.318)  (0.4241)  (0.3562) 
 
HML  0.02365 -0.2376  0.4525  0.0699 -0.4132 -0.2926 
  (0.3658)  (0.2379)  (0.6524)  (0.4504)  (0.467)  (0.4441) 
 
UMD  -0.6008**  -0.8757   0.276 
   (0.1819)   (0.488)   (0.3952) 
       
R-squared  0.5742  0.6268  0.4144  0.4584  0.052  0.0591 
No. of 




This table presents the Fama French (1992, 1993) and Carhart (1997) regression results for monthly equal-
weighted portfolio returns on the democratic (G≤7), dictator (G≥9) and hedge portfolios consisting of firms 
that have gone public during the prior 60 months and belong to the smallest size quintile.  The hedge 
portfolio is constructed by taking a long position on an equal-weighted portfolio of democratic IPOs 
(G<=7) and taking a short position on an equal-weighted portfolio of dictator IPOs (G>=9) consisting of 
firms that have gone public during the prior 60 months. The value of the governance index G is obtained 
from the dataset compiled by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). The sample period is January, 2000 to 
December, 2005. MKT  is the realization of the market risk premium in period t, SMB is the return on a 
portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a portfolio of big stocks in period t, and HML is the return on 
a portfolio of value stocks minus the return on a portfolio of growth stocks in period t. UMD is the 
momentum factor as in Carhart (1997).The factor returns are obtained from Kenneth French’s web site. The 







 2000-2005:Small IPOs, Equal weighted Portfolio Returns 
 Democratic (G≤7) Dictator (G≥9) Democratic- Dictator 
Variable FF-3 factor  Carhart  
FF-3 
factor Carhart   
FF-3 
factor  Carhart  
       
α  -0.2271* -0.2354* -0.4236*** -0.434  0.1965***  0.1986*** 
  (0.094)  (0.101)  (0.090)  (0.087)  (0.044 ( 0.038) 
 
MKT  1.997***  1.451***  2.093***  1.407*** -0.0953  0.0439 
  (0.1842)  (0.1756)  (0.2704)  (0.1859) ( 0.1746)  (0.1933) 
 
SMB  0.658**  1.164***  0.9127***  1.548*** -0.2547 -0.3835* 
  (0.2112)  (0.1338)  (0.2247)  (0.2053) ( 0.1285)  (0.146) 
 
HML  0.2132  0.3455  0.3843  0.5504* -0.1712 -0.2049 
  (0.1991)  (0.2256)  (0.2744)  (0.2538) ( 0.187)  (0.1763) 
 
UMD  -0.8524***  -1.069***   0.2169 
   (0.1436)   (0.1282)  ( 0.1173) 
        
R-squared  0.6433  0.7973  0.5936  0.7904  0.0398  0.0957 
No. of 





This table presents the Fama French (1992, 1993) and Carhart (1997) regression results for monthly value-
weighted portfolio returns on the democratic (G≤7) and dictator (G≥9) IPO portfolios consisting of firms 
that have gone public during the prior 60 months. The value of the governance index G is obtained from the 
dataset compiled by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). The sample period is April, 1990 to December, 
2005. MKT  is the realization of the market risk premium in period t, SMB is the return on a portfolio of 
small stocks minus the return on a portfolio of big stocks in period t, and HML is the return on a portfolio 
of value stocks minus the return on a portfolio of growth stocks in period t. UMD is the momentum factor 
as in Carhart (1997).The factor returns are obtained from Kenneth French’s web site. The Newey-West 




 1990-2005: Value weighted Portfolio Returns 
 Democratic (G≤7) Dictator (G≥9) Democratic- Dictator 
Variable  FF-3 factor   Carhart  
 FF-3 
factor  Carhart   
 FF-3 
 factor   Carhart  
       
 
α   0.2117***  0.1899***   0.1883***   0.1686***  0.0267  0.0246 
  (0.038)  (0.030)   (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.034)  (0.037) 
 
MKT  1.273***  1.333***  1.125***  1.18***  0.1452  0.151 
  (0.094)  (0.097)  (0.1247)  (0.1134)  (0.0944)  (0.0969) 
 
SMB  0.4714***  0.4454***  0.3328***  0.3092***  0.1376  0.1351 
  (0.1285  (0.0985)  (0.078)  (0.0858)  (0.1312)  (0.1265) 
 
HML -0.7953*** -0.757*** -0.5077*** -0.473*** 
-
0.2971** -0.2934* 
  (0.1138)  (0.1062) ( 0.1572  (0.1410)  (0.1138  (0.1268) 
 
UMD   0.181   0.1639   0.01745 
  ( 0.0922)   (0.0884)   (0.0927) 
       
R-squared 0.8243  0.8338 0.6292  0.6385  0.0984  0.0986 
No. of 
Observations 188  188 188  188   188  188 
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 Table 4.14 
This table presents the Fama French (1992, 1993) and Carhart (1997) regression results for monthly equal-
weighted portfolio returns on the democratic (G≤5) and dictator (G≥12) IPO portfolios consisting of firms 
that have gone public during the prior 60 months. The value of the governance index G is obtained from the 
dataset compiled by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). The sample period is from April, 1990 to 
December, 2005. MKT  is the realization of the market risk premium in period t, SMB is the return on a 
portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a portfolio of big stocks in period t, and HML is the return on 
a portfolio of value stocks minus the return on a portfolio of growth stocks in period t. UMD is the 
momentum factor as in Carhart (1997).The factor returns are obtained from Kenneth French’s web site. The 







 1990-2005: Equal weighted Portfolio Returns 
 Democratic (G≤5) Dictator (G≥12) Democratic- Dictator 
Variable 
 FF-3 
 factor   Carhart  
 FF-3 
 factor  Carhart   
 FF-3 
 factor   Carhart  
       
α   0.1012**  0.1470***  0.0014  0.0449  0.1025  0.1047 
  0.034  0.038  0.092  0.112  0.102  0.116 
 
MKT  1.554***  1.427***  1.013***  0.8924***  0.5396*  0.5334 
  0.1555  0.1188  0.229  0.2729  0.2288  0.2753 
 
SMB  0.7171***  0.7717***  0.4651  0.517  0.2512  0.2539 
  0.1284  0.0991  0.4084  0.4105  0.3358  0.3648 
 
HML -0.2874 -0.3679** -0.2498 -0.3262 -0.04521 -0.04913 
  0.1416  0.1253  0.3914  0.4227  0.3623  0.3824 
 
UMD  -0.3801***  -0.3612  -0.0186 
   0.1114   0.3263   0.2622 
       
R-squared  0.7223  0.7561 0.1893  0.2074  0.0538  0.0539 
No. of 





 Regression with Year dummies 
 Democratic (G≤7) Dictator (G≥9) Democratic- Dictator 
 FF-3  FF-3  FF-3
 factor factor factor 
.0328* .0372** -0.0075 -0.0065 .0516*** .0539***
0.0132 0.0128 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012
0.4179 0.3602 0.1567 0.1385 0.2645 0.2247
0.2333 0.2472 0.2485 0.2677 0.1308 0.1467
SMB .5764* .6161* .7099*** .7223*** -0.1339 -0.1067
0.2639 0.2442 0.2011 0.2061 0.1284 0.1292
HML .8669** .8414* .7281* .72* 0.1422 0.1244
0.3162 0.329 0.2828 0.2861 0.1591 0.169
UMD -0.1805 -0.0563 -0.1235
0.118 0.1293 0.1225
1991 0.0037 0.0014 .0854*** .0850*** -.0929*** -.0939***
0.0166 0.0151 0.0173 0.0170 0.0177 0.0168
1992 -0.0148 -0.0183 0.0157 0.0149 -.04186** -.0435**
0.0245 0.0248 0.0159 0.0159 0.0154 0.0154
1993 -0.0295 -0.0302 0.0059 0.0061 -.0467*** -.0465***
0.0198 0.0188 0.0169 0.0164 0.0134 0.0133
1994 -0.0226 -0.0266 0.0140 0.0131 -.0479*** -.0499***
0.0149 0.0150 0.0125 0.0125 0.0123 0.0123
1995 0.0148 0.0140 .0471*** .0472*** -.0437** -.0436**
0.0161 0.0159 0.0128 0.0127 0.0136 0.0136
1996 0.0030 0.0003 .03874* .03822* -.0471*** -.0482***
0.0187 0.0178 0.0161 0.0157 0.0128 0.0126
1997 -0.0210 -0.0226 0.02634 0.0262 -.0588*** -.0591***
0.0187 0.0181 0.0147 0.0145 0.0129 0.0126
1998 0.0044 0.0045 .04257* .04295* -.0495*** -.0487***
0.0180 0.0183 0.017 0.0171 0.0122 0.0121
1999 .0481* .0478* .0924*** .0926*** -.0555*** -.055***
0.0200 0.0212 0.0248 0.0252 0.0136 0.0132
2000 -0.0517 -0.0532 -0.0097 -0.0098 -.0534** -.0537**
0.0560 0.0577 0.0434 0.0437 0.0182 0.0181
2001 -0.0462 -0.0522 -0.0226 -0.0242 -.0348* -.0382**
0.0275 0.0268 0.0248 0.0254 0.0137 0.0143
2002 -.0582* -.0593* -0.0320 -0.0321 -.0374** -.0374**
0.025 0.0235 0.0218 0.0214 0.0136 0.0131
2003 -0.0217 -0.0281 0.0235 0.0218 -.0565*** -.0601***
0.0191 0.0181 0.0187 0.0180 0.0165 0.0163
2004 -0.0278 -0.0316 0.0096 0.0088 -.0488*** -.0507***
0.0178 0.0170 0.0125 0.0122 0.0135 0.0133
2005 0.0113 0.0103 0.0163 0.0158 -0.0049 -0.0065
0.0207 0.0201 0.0175 0.0179 0.0147 0.0182
R-squared 0.1129 0.1201 0.1665 0.1672 0.1323 0.1426
No. of Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180
























A. Long Run performance and choice of Asset Pricing Models  
In a short-term study to look for abnormal returns, the risk adjustment is 
straightforward and typically unimportant. The error in calculating abnormal performance 
due to errors in adjusting for risk is likely to be small. However, in a long-term event-
study, an appropriate adjustment for risk is critical in calculating abnormal return 
performance. Event studies are joint tests of market efficiency and an asset pricing 
model. Evidence of abnormal returns would reject efficient market hypotheses as well as 
the assumed asset pricing model. Even though it is still unresolved and contentious 
whether asset pricing models capture the risks or styles they claim, the first step towards 
measuring abnormal returns in performance studies begins with the choice of an asset 
pricing model.  
Testable asset pricing models begin with the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
first introduced by Sharpe (1964). Derived under the assumptions of competitive markets, 
homogeneous expectations, and rational agents, the capital asset pricing model can 
compute the expected return for any asset if its beta, the extent to which the asset returns 
co-varies with the market, is known. The early testing of the capital asset pricing model 
supports the model. In the 1980’s, the CAPM model of expected returns came under 
criticism as anomalous evidence was found. The Fama-French (1993) three factor model 
was presented as an improvement over the capital asset pricing model. The Fama-French 
three factor model was found to better addresses empirical phenomena like size and value 
effects. 
Although the Fama and French (1993) model is more popular, it also is 
 
  158
criticized. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show that returns to portfolios formed on past 
returns cannot be explained by the returns to stocks of differing size and book-to-
market characteristics. This past return phenomenon, dubbed as momentum, is used by 
Carhart (1997) for studying the returns to mutual funds. Carhart (1997) modified the 
Fama and French (1993) model with the inclusion of a momentum factor.  
The Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) factors have been seen as 
lacking from a sound economic rationale motivating the inclusion of the size, book-to-
market, and momentum factors. Whether these factors represent equilibrium 
compensation for risk or they are an indication of market inefficiency has not yet been 
resolved in the literature. One alternative to the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart 
(1997) multifactor models are conditional asset pricing models of both the consumption 
type and the market model type. Conditional asset pricing models have intuitive appeal 
and theoretical soundness. Conditional consumption models are well aligned with 
Breeden’s (1979) theory which provides an intuitive appeal when considering what risks 
are pertinent to investors. However, the inability of conditional models to empirically 
outmatch the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) multi-factor models may have 
contributed to their relatively limited use.  
The Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) models used extensively in 
testing for long-term abnormal returns suffer from a few empirical deficiencies. Large 
returns to size, book-to-market, and momentum strategies all begin to disappear when 
studied out of sample. According to Kothari and Warner (2005), the purpose of an event 
study is to isolate the incremental impact of an event on asset price performance. Since 
the returns performance associated with the size, book-to-market, and momentum 
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characteristics is applicable to all stocks sharing those characteristics, and not just the 
sample of firms experiencing the event, the performance associated with the event itself 
must be distinguished from that associated with other known determinants of 














Industries and Standard Industrial Classification Codes Used in Analysis 
 
The table below represents the Standard Industrial Classification Codes (SIC) for each of the ten industry 
groups used in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. The 4 digit SIC codes are obtained from COMPUSTAT. The 
industry groupings are based on Fama-French industry classification. We thank Kenneth French for making 
the industry classification data available on his website at  
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html. 
 
Table B.1: Industry categories and Standard Industrial Classification Codes 
 
Industry               SIC Code IND(j) 
    
Consumer Non-Durables  
Food, Tobacco, Textiles, Apparel, Leather, Toys 0100-0999 1 
 2000-2399 1 
 2700-2749 1 
 2770-2799 1 
 3100-3199 1 
 3940-3989 1 
    
Consumer Durables  
Cars, TV's, Furniture, Household Appliances 2500-2519 2 
 2590-2599 2 
 3630-3659 2 
 3710-3711 2 
 3714-3714 2 
 3716-3716 2 
 3750-3751 2 
 3792-3792 2 
 3900-3939 2 
 3990-3999 2 
    
Manufacturing  
Machinery, Trucks, Planes, Chemicals, Office 
Furniture, Paper, Commercial Printing 2520-2589 3 
 2600-2699 3 
 2750-2769 3 
 2800-2829 3 
 2840-2899 3 
 3000-3099 3 
 3200-3569 3 
 3580-3629 3 
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 3700-3709 3 
 3712-3713 3 
 3715-3715 3 
 3717-3749 3 
 3752-3791 3 
 3793-3799 3 
 3830-3839 3 
 3860-3899 3 
    
Energy 
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 1200-1399 4 
 2900-2999 4 
    
HiTech & Business Equipment  
 Computers, Software, and Electronic Equipment 3570-3579 5 
 3622-3622 5 
 3660-3692 5 
 3694-3699 5 
 3810-3839 5 
 7370-7372 5 
 7373-7373 5 
 7374-7374 5 
 7375-7375 5 
 7376-7376 5 
 7377-7377 5 
 7378-7378 5 
 7379-7379 5 
 7391-7391 5 
 8730-8734 5 
    
Telecommunications 
Telephone and Television Transmission 4800-4899 6 
    
Shops  
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services (Laundries, 
Repair Shops) 5000-5999 7 
 7200-7299 7 
 7600-7699 7 
    
Health  
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 2830-2839 8 
 3693-3693 8 
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 3840-3859 8 
 8000-8099 8 
    
Utilities 4900-4949 9 
    
Others  
Mines, Construction, Transport, Hotels, Business 
Services, Entertainment, Finance  Everything Else 10 


















What the caterpillar calls the end of the world, the master calls a butterfly. 
 
-RICHARD BACH (Illusions, 1977.) 
 
